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This thesis is the culmination of nearly three years of research that I have conducted on 
economic perceptions in South Africa. As a Semester Study Abroad student at the University 
of Cape Town during my junior year of college in 2012, I wrote an Honours Thesis on 
perceptions of economic inequality and social mobility in Cape Town. When I returned to 
Yale University for my senior year, I incorporated my Honours Thesis and additional 
research that I conducted during July of 2012 on economic perceptions in Mount Frere, 
Eastern Cape and Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal into my senior thesis. With the generous 
support of the Fox International Fellowship, I returned to Cape Town last year to investigate 
how migration experience shapes these perceptions through this Master’s dissertation. 
 
Because of the extensive work that I have already done on the subject, large portions of the 
literature reviews and other background and methodological materials in the introduction and 
the chapters on perceptions of economic inequality and social mobility have appeared 
elsewhere. Smaller sections of the chapter on migration have similarly appeared in my earlier 
work. The heart of this thesis—the primary research that I conducted in Cape Town and the 








For much of South Africa’s history, rural areas provided the labor necessary to fuel the 
furnaces of South Africa’s manufacturing and mining sectors. In turn, wage labor in urban 
areas and mines provided opportunities for black Africans to access the hard currency 
increasingly necessary for survival. However, since South Africa’s transition to democracy, 
the connection between rural and urban areas has changed dramatically. Through this thesis, I 
seek to contribute to the nascent literature on the changing relationship between rural and 
urban areas in South Africa by investigating how economic perceptions—which have been 
shown to influence voting behavior, resource allocation, mental health outcomes, and the 
degree of social and political cohesion in a society—differ in both. In particular, I explore 
how these perceptions are shaped by migration. 
 
Migration has framed how generations of black South Africans experienced the South 
African economic system, either directly, as migrants themselves, or indirectly, as 
beneficiaries of remittances. This study focuses on a particular migration pathway between 
“Alfred Nzo”—a district municipality in the rural northeast of the Eastern Cape centered on 
the town of Mount Frere—and Cape Town. Twenty-six individuals were interviewed, from 
three different, and socially and economically relevant, migration backgrounds: those who 
migrated to Cape Town and have remained there (“migrants”), those who migrated to Cape 
Town but have since returned to Alfred Nzo (“returnees”), and those who have never left 
Alfred Nzo (“non-migrants”). 
 
I found that local economic conditions and personal economic experiences—including an 
individual’s experience with migration—have a more profound impact on economic 
perceptions than national and international trends. Though they do not appear to influence 
how individuals view the overall distribution of income in South Africa, migration 
experience and the disproportionate role of the public sector in rural economies shape 
whether individuals believe that the top and the middle of the income distribution are 
comprised primarily of public sector workers, in the case of non-migrants; private sector 
workers, in the case of migrants; or a combination of the two, in the case of returnees. 
Similarly, non-migrants and returnees, all of whom currently live in rural areas, tended to 
emphasize the geographic character of the economic divisions in South Africa, while 
migrants, who live in Cape Town, a city with relatively small black middle- and upper-
classes, highlighted the racialized nature of these divisions. Yet, regardless of migration 
experience, the vast majority of my interviewees greatly underestimated their relative 
economic position, suggesting that many South Africans continue to view their personal 
economic experiences through a lens of poverty. 
 
In contrast, local economic conditions and migration experience appear to have a less direct 
impact on perceptions of social mobility. Interviewees from all three migration backgrounds 
highlighted the importance of two individualistic pathways to mobility—or those over which 
they believed they could exercise direct control—including education and hard work, and 
three structural pathways/impediments to mobility—or those that they believed were entirely 
outside of their control—including corruption and nepotism, access to information, and the 
availability of jobs. Ultimately, the vast majority of my interviewees believed that rural areas 




Because my interviewees identified migration as the primary mechanism for accessing 
economic opportunities in South Africa, I also explore perceptions of migration itself. This 
thesis suggests that migration is viewed through a primarily individualistic, economic lens 
and that migrant networks may play a more fundamental role before and during the migration 
process than much of the existing literature suggests. 
 
Though this study is ultimately based on a small sample of individuals originally from one 
area of South Africa and is thus unlikely to be representative of views held by the broader 
population, the findings in this thesis have potentially important ramifications for 
development policy in South Africa by suggesting that the underdevelopment of rural areas 
may in part be a construct of both the economic perceptions held by many South Africans 
and the existing power dynamics in these areas. Additionally, this study offers a number of 
fruitful paths for researchers to pursue, including investigating how economic and migratory 
perceptions differ among South Africa’s many racial, economic, and geographic subgroups 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The spatial and economic separation of rural and urban South Africa was greatly influenced 
by apartheid policies. The racist underpinnings of apartheid South African society demanded 
as complete a segregation of white and black individuals as possible. The National Party 
government thus herded the black African majority into rural reserves—known as 
“homelands”—which covered a fraction of the country’s territory. Simultaneously, however, 
the South African white minority required black African labor for both its mining and, later, 
manufacturing sectors.1 As a result, the apartheid government deliberately underdeveloped 
tribal areas, while aggressively subsidizing the manufacturing and mining industries, to 
provide a pool of cheap labor for white-owned capital. 
 
The relationship between this rural, black labor pool and the white-dominated mining towns 
and urban centers was mediated by a system of legislation that attempted to control the 
movement of black Africans completely. Successive governments—culminating in the 
National Party governments after 1948—developed an elaborate system of policies—
including Pass Laws, Influx Control, and Separate Development—designed to satiate the 
demands of industry while maintaining, to the best of its ability, racial separation. Though 
these laws had limited success in controlling urbanization and movement in South Africa, 
they entrenched a system of circular migration between urban and mining areas and rural 
homelands that has left an indelible mark on South African society. This circularity deeply 
intertwined rural and urban locations, shaping the economic (through labor migration and 
remittances) and cultural (through sustained and frequent cultural exchange) landscape of 
both (see Bank, 2011; Hunter, 2010; Adepoju, 2006; Kok, Gelderblom, and van Zyl, 2006; 
Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006; Feinstein, 2005; James, 2001; Wilson, 1972, for detailed 
accounts of the history and cultural and economic impact of migration). 
 
At the end of apartheid the nature of this connection between tribal and urban South Africa 
began to change. As the mining industry and segments of the manufacturing sector 
retrenched unskilled workers during the 1990s and 2000s, many rural areas lost their 
economic links to South Africa’s urban centers (Bank, 2005: 174; Bank and Minkley, 2005: 
22; James, 2001: 98). As Bank and Minkley (2005: 32) argue, “If [the] rural struggle in the 
Twentieth Century was dominated by the quest of white capital for cheap black labour to fuel 
the furnaces of industry, … then the main dynamic in the post-apartheid era at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century is that rural labour—once so eagerly desired—has become a 
burden to the state and an irrelevance to capital.” 
 
The links between rural and urban South Africa were further eroded by fundamental changes 
in the nature of internal migration in South Africa. With the repeal of the repressive National 
Party policies near the end of apartheid, black South Africans no longer faced restrictions on 
when and where they could move. Although internal migration initially retained its circularity 
(Kok and Collinson, 2006: 25), there is growing evidence that greater numbers of migrants 
have begun to settle permanently in urban areas and are not maintaining as close a connection 
with their rural homes (see Posel, 2009: 3-4 and 7; see also Bank et al., 2006: 30, specifically 
on the Eastern Cape). Consequently, the number of migrants sending remittances has fallen 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Though both sectors required black African labor, the manufacturing sector required a stable and skilled group 
of laborers that ultimately could afford to purchase its products, while the mining sector preferred cheap and 
oscillatory labor (Feinstein, 2005). This tension, which some have argued strained and ultimately broke South 
Africa’s system of apartheid, is explored in more depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
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dramatically. In 1993, according to the October Household Survey (OHS), 78 percent of 
black South African households with at least one migrant member received some remittance 
income. By 2008, according to the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), this number 
had fallen to only 31 percent. At least part of this discrepancy may be attributable to 
differences in data collection between the two surveys. However, even if all black households 
in NIDS that received income from an outside source are assumed to be “migrant 
households,” an extremely generous assumption, the proportion of black migrant households 
receiving remittances in 2008 was still significantly below the proportion receiving 
remittances in 1993 (Posel, 2009: 9-12). 
 
The rapid expansion of government social assistance and pension programs after apartheid 
has largely filled the gap left by the decrease in remittance income from successful rural-to-
urban moves (Neves and du Toit, 2013: 106-107; James, 2001: 98; see also du Toit and 
Neves, 2009b). Still, “there may,” in the words of James (2001: 98), be an even “greater 
dependence [in rural areas] on the relatively fewer links which remain” to urban economies 
(see also du Toit and Neves, 2009: 26). Investigating these connections is thus necessary to 
understand the changing nature of and relationship between rural and urban societies in South 
Africa, topics that are poorly understood (Bank and Minkley, 2005: 174). 
 
Treating the rural economies of South Africa as “marginal” spaces disconnected from “first-
world” urban economies, as many development researchers and government officials do, 
however, is fundamentally misleading. The end of apartheid brought about fundamental 
structural changes to both rural and urban areas. As du Toit and Neves (2007; see also du 
Toit and Neves, 2009a; du Toit, 2008) argue, based on research conducted in the rural 
Eastern Cape and Khayelitsha, a township outside of Cape Town, the process of “jobless de-
agrarianization”—the decline of small-scale agricultural production during a collapse of local 
employment opportunities—and “deindustrialization” have marginalized segments of both 
areas. Simultaneously, the arrival of major consumer and financial firms has created pockets 
of formalization previously absent from rural areas. As du Toit (2008: 140) later summarized 
his findings, “These cases illustrate[] how both margins and centre are everywhere present in 
[] South African society, fractally interpenetrating and overlaid on one another.” In this 
context of increasing insecurity across the geographical landscape of South Africa, household 
connections to the formal labor market, du Toit and Neves argue, have become increasingly 
important, and simultaneously increasingly tenuous. How individuals access these formal-
sector opportunities in both rural and urban settings, and the role of migration in this process, 
can thus provide profound insights into the changing economic structure of South African 
society. 
 
This thesis attempts to contribute to the literature on the changing relationship between rural 
and urban areas by examining economic opportunities in both, as well as how migration 
connects the two. In particular, this thesis focuses on how perceptions of economic 
opportunity and migration differ in the rural Eastern Cape and Cape Town. Although there is 
a vibrant debate in the social psychology literature over to what degree perceptions reflect 
and shape reality (see Jussim [1991] for a more detailed discussion), it is generally accepted 
that, in the words of Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976: 4), “The relationship between 
objective conditions and psychological states is very imperfect and [] in order to know the 
[full] quality of life experience it will be necessary to go directly to the individual himself.”  
 
This dissociation between perceptions and reality is not merely of academic interest. Though 
objective economic trends undoubtedly shape economic perceptions, perceptions—and not 
3!
necessarily reality—affect behavior, decision-making, and, subsequently, outcomes 
(Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001). It is thus important to understand how, and in what ways, 
subjective economic perceptions differ from objective realities. 
 
Perceptions of economic inequality and social mobility in particular have profound 
repercussions on society. Internationally, perceptions of inequality and mobility have been 
shown to shape voting behavior (Birdsall and Graham, 2000: 5), how resources and effort are 
incentivized and allocated in capitalist societies (Graham, 2000: 228), mental health 
outcomes (Jin and Tam, 2012), and perhaps even democratic deepening. Studying these 
perceptions is particularly important in post-apartheid South Africa. As Burns (2009: 7) has 
argued, how individuals perceive their economic opportunities affects social and political 
cohesion in this already fractured country (see also Behrman, 2000: 77). 
 
Because migration has framed how generations of black South Africans experienced their 
economic system—either directly, as migrants themselves, or indirectly, as beneficiaries of 
remittances—and continues to play an important role in both rural and urban livelihood 
strategies, in this thesis I examine whether and in what ways migration shapes these 
perceptions. This study builds on my earlier work. In two previous papers (Telzak, 2012, 
2014), I investigated how experiences of social mobility shape perceptions of economic 
inequality and mobility in Cape Town, the Alfred Nzo District Municipality in the northeast 
of the Eastern Cape—an area that encompasses the rural towns of Mount Frere, Mount 
Ayliff, and Matatiele—as well as Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal. In this thesis, I go beyond 
my earlier work by exploring how migration in South Africa affects both these economic 





In order to gauge if and how migration experience shapes perceptions of South Africa’s 
economic environment and of migration itself, I conducted a series of 26 in-depth 
ethnographic interviews with individuals from diverse migration backgrounds in April and 
May of 2014. Because South Africa’s social, economic, and cultural spheres are diverse, I 
decided to focus on one particular migration pathway: movement between the Alfred Nzo 
District Municipality of the Eastern Cape and Cape Town. Alfred Nzo, a political and 
administrative district in the northeast of the Eastern Cape, typifies the underdevelopment of 
rural areas in South Africa and sits at the center of one of South Africa’s most economically 
and socially important migration pathways: movement between the Eastern Cape and Cape 
Town. 
 
I utilized the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)—a longitudinal study of young adults in Cape 
Town currently piloting its sixth wave—to recruit a random group of individuals in Cape 
Town originally from Alfred Nzo. Through snowball sampling, this initial group of 
interviewees helped to recruit individuals living in or near Alfred Nzo who either had 
migrated to Cape Town and since returned or had never permanently left this rural district. 
 
Although there is evidence that urban-to-urban moves may now be more common in South 
Africa than rural-to-urban ones (see Collinson et al., 2007: 79; cf. Cross et al., 1999, who 
argue that rural-to-rural moves may be dominant in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape), 
studying rural-to-urban migration remains extremely important. Because of the social and 
economic exclusion of rural areas during apartheid, migration remains among the only 
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opportunities for rural residents to integrate themselves into the contemporary South African 
economy. Furthermore, understanding this particular migration pathway between Cape Town 
and parts of the Eastern Cape appears especially important for understanding the nature of 
migration in South Africa. Cape Town, which is one of South Africa’s largest cities and its 
parliamentary capital, absorbs a disproportionate number of migrants from the Eastern Cape, 
one of South Africa’s largest and poorest provinces. According to the 2011 South African 
Census, the vast majority (nearly 78 percent) of those who had migrated to Cape Town over 
the previous 10 years moved from the Eastern Cape (Statistics South Africa, 2011a). In turn, 
in-migration from the Eastern Cape has dramatically altered the demographic makeup of 
Cape Town. Up until the 1970s, Cape Town was 90 percent white and colored. By 2011, in 
large part due to this in-migration, approximately 40 percent of the city’s residents were 
black (Statistics South Africa, 2011a; Seekings, 2007). 
 
At the center of the migration between Cape Town and the Eastern Cape are the former 
homeland regions of the Ciskei and Transkei. Until South Africa’s largely unsuccessful 
attempt at “separate development,” the National Party purposefully underdeveloped reserves 
in order to supply inexpensive black workers to South Africa’s mines and farms, and later, its 
manufacturing and heavy industry sectors, which were concentrated in urban and 
metropolitan areas (see Section 1.1). With the lifting of apartheid restrictions on movement, 
migrants poured out of rural areas in search of better opportunities in towns and metropolitan 
centers (Bank and Kamman, 2010). 
 
The Alfred Nzo Municipality District, one of the six administrative and political entities that 
comprise the Eastern Cape province, typifies this underdevelopment and the resulting 
migration dynamics. Located in the former Transkei, Alfred Nzo is an uninterrupted vista of 
rolling hills that abuts KwaZulu-Natal and the mountains of Lesotho. Potholed gravel roads 
connect small villages and largely uncultivated pastures to a series of major national 
highways and medium-sized towns, including Mount Frere, Mount Ayliff, and Matatiele. 
Much of Alfred Nzo’s economic activity occurs in these towns, and local residents travel 
frequently to these towns for work, consumer staples, and recreation (du Toit and Neves, 
2007). 
 
From Alfred Nzo, many migrants travel to the informal settlements of Cape Town in search 
of work. Though Bank and Kamman (2010: 27-28) found that a disproportionate number of 
migrants from Alfred Nzo and the surrounding areas went to Johannesburg and Durban, over 
25 percent of black migrants from the Eastern Cape congregate outside of the City of Cape 
Town. Located far outside the city center and separated from Cape Town’s primary economic 
opportunities, tin shacks and small government-built houses stretch as far as the eye can see; 
infrastructure, though much superior to Alfred Nzo’s, is uneven; and an informal economy of 
taxis, peddlers, and day laborers thrives alongside formal stores and factories. As Du Toit and 
Neves (2007: 160) described one such area, Khayelitsha, these settlements are “in, but not of 
Cape Town,” economically, socially, and in many respects culturally. 
 
The legacy of the underdevelopment of rural areas and the simultaneous state-driven 
development of urban ones can be clearly seen in the vast demographic and economic 
differences between Alfred Nzo and Cape Town, as Table 1.1 indicates. While Cape Town is 
only 40 percent black, fewer than one-percent of Alfred Nzo residents are not black. 
Similarly, the broad unemployment rate for black individuals in Alfred Nzo is substantially 
higher (by almost 50 percent) than it is in Cape Town. Additionally, there is both substantial 
out-migration from Alfred Nzo and substantial in-migration to Cape Town. Post-1996 South  
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Table 1.1: Summary demographic and economic statistics for Alfred Nzo, Cape Town and 
South Africa 




Black African 99.1 Black African 38.6 Black African 79.2 







White 0.2 White 15.7 White 8.9 














Female 54 Female 50 Female 52 
Male 46 Male 50 Male 48 




0-19 54 0-19 35 0-19 41 
20-49 31 20-49 56 20-49 46 
50+ 15 50+ 9 50+ 13 
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 
Source: These statistics are from my own analysis of 2011 South African Census data (Statistics South Africa, 
2011a) and from Statistics South Africa (2013: 8) and Statistics South Africa (2012: 17, 20, and 51). 
 
 
African Census data do a notoriously poor job at capturing migration patterns (Kok and 
Collinson, 2006: 6; Posel, 2003: 7-8). However, by charting the age distribution of residents 
in Alfred Nzo and Cape Town—and comparing these distributions to that of South Africa as 
a whole—it is possible to gauge the degree of in- or out-migration for labor purposes in each 
area. The proportion of black Africans aged 20-49, or those who are most likely to be 
economically active (see Statistics South Africa, 2012a: 54), in Alfred Nzo is almost a third 
lower than in South Africa as a whole, perhaps reflecting significant out-migration of black 
Africans from Alfred Nzo. Similarly, the proportion of 20-49 year-old black Africans in Cape 
Town is over 10 percentage points higher than in South Africa as a whole, indicating in-
migration to Cape Town. In the census data, there is also some indication of who is migrating 
from Alfred Nzo: while there are about 94 men per 100 women in South Africa as a whole, 
there are only 84 men per 100 women in Alfred Nzo. These conclusions are supported by 
findings in a comprehensive survey of socioeconomic conditions in the Eastern Cape (Bank 
et al., 2006; see also Bank and Kamman, 2010, specifically on migration). 
 
Because the focus of this study is on how migration influences an individual’s economic 
perceptions, I sought to interview a sample of individuals with diverse migration experiences. 
As I described at the beginning of this chapter, the National Party’s attempts to dictate 
population movement in South Africa produced a distinctive system of circular migration. 
Although there is growing evidence that migration in South Africa may be less circular today 
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than it was during apartheid (Posel, 2009; Bank and Kamman, 2010), this circularity has 
historical import and continues to influence the nature of migration in South Africa. As a 
result, I sought to interview individuals from the three distinct migration backgrounds 
comprising this circulatory process: “migrants” (M), or those who had migrated to Cape 
Town from in and around the Alfred Nzo District Municipality and have remained there; 
“returnees” (R), or those who had moved to Cape Town but have since returned home; and 
“non-migrants” (NM), or those who have never left the Alfred Nzo District Municipality with 
the intention of permanently resettling elsewhere. 
 
I used the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) to identify randomly selected interviewees who 
were living in Cape Town and had spent at least some time in the Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality. These individuals were recruited into my “Migrant” category. CAPS, a joint 
effort of the Population Studies Center of the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan and the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) at the University of Cape 
Town (UCT), is a longitudinal study of originally approximately 4,800 randomly selected 
Cape Town residents, who were between the ages of 14 and 22 when the study began in 
2002. The study has since completed five waves, the most recent of which was in 2009 (for 
more information on CAPS, see Lam et al., 2012; http://www.caps.uct.ac.za/).2 
 
Schooling data from Wave 3 of CAPS was used to determine whether individuals had lived 
in Alfred Nzo. In total 55 CAPS respondents had attended a school in Alfred Nzo at some 
point during their lives, though this number most likely understates the total. Detailed 
retrospective data was not recorded until Wave 3 of CAPS—before Wave 3, only data on 
province of birth were collected—by which point the attrition rate had reached over one-
quarter of the original sample (Lam et al., 2008: 29). Because the major reason given among 
black respondents for not participating in waves 2 and 3 of CAPS was movement out of Cape 
Town, drawing the sample of interest from Wave 3 instead of from earlier waves of CAPS 
may introduce bias into this study (Ibid.: 31): it is likely that those who were interviewed 
during Wave 3 of CAPS (and thus had not moved back to their province of birth) either have 
a stronger support system in Cape Town or have been relatively successful themselves. Of 
these 55 individuals, 46 were successfully re-interviewed during Wave 4 and 38 were 
successfully re-interviewed during Wave 5. 
 
Multiple attempts were made to contact these 55 individuals through the telephone numbers 
collected during each wave of CAPS for both the respondent and up to three non-household 
members who were listed as contacts. Of the 55 individuals from Alfred Nzo, two had died 
since Wave 3; 13 were completely unreachable (i.e., none of the contact numbers provided 
were operable or the people reached at these numbers had never met the individual of 
interest); and 17 failed to answer any of the phone numbers provided after six separate 




2 “The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3 were collected between 2002 and 2005 by the University of Cape 
Town and the University of Michigan, with funding provided by the US National Institute for Child Health and 
Human Development and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wave 4 was collected in 2006 by the University 
of Cape Town, University of Michigan, and Princeton University. Major funding for Wave 4 was provided by 
the National Institute of Aging through a grant to Princeton University, in addition to funding provided by 
NICHD through the University of Michigan. Wave 5 was conducted in 2009 with major funding provided by 




Figure 1.1: Connections among the interviewees 
 
 
Snowball sampling was used to recruit individuals in the two other categories (i.e., returnees 
and non-migrants). The 23 individuals from Cape Town were asked to provide the names of 
two people from the location in the Eastern Cape where they are originally from—one who 
had never permanently left that area3 and another who had migrated to Cape Town but has 
since returned home—whom they considered “similar” to themselves. They were given no 
further instruction about what factors to take into consideration when selecting these 
individuals. In return, these individuals (in Cape Town) were promised an R100 gift voucher 
to Shoprite for each interview that was successfully completed with their contacts in the 
Eastern Cape. 
 
Nine of the 23 respondents agreed to participate and to provide the names of two additional 
individuals.4 Respondents used a variety of methods to select the individuals that they 
recommended (see Figure 1.1). However, only 11 of the 18 individuals that were 
recommended agreed to be interviewed. In the seven situations where one of these individual 
was unwilling or unable to be interviewed, a substitute was found in the same rural area 
either by asking those whom we interviewed to recommend someone else or by using a local 
contact from that particular rural area. Three individuals (the two recommended by M-5 and 
one recommended by a local contact from M-8’s rural area) were unable to participate 
because they could not understand many of the questions asked; suitable replacements were 
found in all three situations through a local contact. Upon my return from the Eastern Cape, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 An individual’s movement was considered “permanent” if he or she moved outside of Alfred Nzo for more 
than a discrete and predetermined period of time. Thus, those who left their local area solely for education and 
returned soon after graduation were not considered to have moved permanently. 
4 Because CAPS school codes, and not actual home addresses, were used to identify individuals from Alfred 
Nzo, one individual, M-2, who had attended school in Alfred Nzo, was actually from a town (Qumbu) in an 
adjacent district municipality, OR Tambo. As a result, the two individuals she recommended for this study (R-2 
and NM-2) also lived in Qumbu. Additionally, R-7, though she is originally from Alfred Nzo, moved to Tsolo, a 
town also in the OR Tambo District Municipality, as part of her job for the South African Police Service. 
Because these borders are largely political constructs and have little economic and social significance, the fact 
that these individuals live outside of Alfred Nzo should have little impact on my findings. 
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only eight of the nine CAPS respondents agreed to be interviewed, further reducing the size 
(and thus presumably the representativeness) of the Migrant category. 
 
The interview questions (reproduced in Appendix A) were developed specifically to probe 
how the interviewees conceptualize their economic position in South African society and the 
role of migration in the South African economy. Many of these questions were adapted from 
the 2005 Cape Area Study (CAS) survey questionnaire and the 2001-2002 Human Sciences 
Research Council Migration Survey. However, unlike in CAS and the HSRC Migration 
Survey, individuals were not asked to choose from a number of predetermined responses; 
instead, these individuals formulated their own, often elaborate, responses to the questions 
asked. The questions thus served as a guide during the interviews and were not used as a 
formal script. 
 
Individuals in the Eastern Cape were interviewed over the two weeks between March 22 and 
April 4 and individuals in Cape Town were interviewed over the two weeks between May 5 
and May 16. Each interview lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half. 13 of the 18 
interviews in the Eastern Cape were conducted in isiXhosa through an interpreter, while four 
of the eight interviews in Cape Town were conducted in isiXhosa. Participants were given an 
R100 gift voucher to Shoprite in exchange for their time. 
 
At the time of this study, the Centre for Social Science Research was piloting a sixth wave of 
the Cape Area Panel Study, using telephonic interviews. In order to solicit background 
demographic data from the Eastern Cape interviewees, a modified version of the telephonic 
questionnaire that is being used for Wave 6 of CAPS, with a detailed migration supplement, 
was administered after the interviews (see, Appendix B). Those in Cape Town were 
administered an unmodified version of CAPS Wave 6, followed by a migration supplement. 
 
The arguments that follow are based on mixed methods research (see Thaler, 2012 for a good 
introduction to mixed methods approaches). This thesis is primarily concerned with the 
economic perceptions of the interviewees. It is thus important to examine when and in what 
ways these micro-level economic perceptions differ from the macro-level “reality.” 
Therefore, the careful examination and coding of the qualitative interviews are supplemented 
with an examination of both qualitative and quantitative surveys, including CAPS, NIDS, and 
the 2001-2002 HSRC Migration Survey. 
 
In this study, I used Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) conceptualization of Grounded Theory and 
Glaser’s (1998) practical manual on the topic, Doing Grounded Theory, as guides during my 
analysis of the interviews. Analyses with Grounded Theory seek to aggregate similar data 
into thematic categories in order to generate a theoretical understanding for the observed 
patterns. There are three basic steps to Glaser and Strauss’ methodology: after identifying (or 
“coding”) the recurring topics, these topics are sequentially aggregated into “higher-level” 
categories until broader theories can be delimited (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 101-15). Glaser 
and Strauss’ approach to analyzing qualitative data, however, was only used to guide my 
analysis. Ultimately, through this process, I sought to identify continuities and discontinuities 
among the different migration groups interviewed and to uncover gender, location, and age-
based variations. By combining this qualitative methodology with quantitative data analysis, I 





1.3 Introduction to the Interviewees 
 
Although I sought to interview three groups of demographically similar individuals with 
different migration experiences, the groups differ along a number of important demographic 
and economic characteristics (see Table 1.2-Table 1.4). While the gender breakdown of those 
interviewed in the “Non-Migrant” (NM) and “Returnee” (R) categories was relatively evenly 
split (the groups were 56 percent and 44 percent female, respectively), 75 percent of those 
interviewed from the “Migrant” (M) sample was female.5 Many ethnographies in South 
Africa—including Hunter’s (2010) ethnography of HIV/AIDS—have found that perceptions 
are often gendered. The gender imbalance of the Migrant interviewees may thus ultimately 
shape the results presented here and may make it difficult to uncover gender nuances in the 
economic perceptions expressed by the migrant interviewees. 
 
Similarly, the median age of those interviewed in the Non-Migrant and Returnee categories 
(27.5 years old) differed substantially—by over five years—from the median age of those 
interviewed in the Migrant category (32.5 years old). Additionally, the ranges of the ages of 
non-migrants and returnees were broader (at 14 and 12.5 years, respectively) than that of 
migrants (8 years). These age differences are in part a function of the design of CAPS. The 
initial cohort of CAPS respondents—first interviewed in 2002—was comprised of young 
adults between the ages of 14 and 22, with a median age of 18. Thus, by design, the highest 
possible age range of the interviewees in the Migrant sample was nine years.6 Still, the 
median age of the Migrant sample is higher than what would have been predicted (i.e., 30 
years old) from the age distribution of the initial CAPS cohort. 
 
On average, those interviewed in all three categories were more educated than the general 
population. Educational outcomes in South Africa have increased dramatically since the end 
of apartheid. Girdwood and Leibbrandt (2009: 3-4), in their analysis of the first wave of 
NIDS, found that the average years of education among black Africans in 2008 had risen 
from 4.04 years for those over 50 to 10.16 years for those between the ages of 20 and 35 (the 
first group subjected to South Africa’s minimum education law, which made education 
through Grade 9, or until the age of 15, mandatory). This large increase in years of 
educational attainment has also translated into a dramatic increase in matric passage rates (the 
equivalent of high school graduation) among black Africans: whereas only 1 percent of black 
individuals in the 21-to-25 year-old age cohort in 1970 had matriculation certificates, 36 
percent of black individuals aged 21-to-25 in 2001 (roughly the cohort of interest for this 
study) had matriculation certificates (Louw et al., 2007: 561). In total, only six of the 26 
interviewees (23 percent) did not have matriculation certificates, which is less than one-third 
the percentage that would have been predicted from Louw et al.’s findings. 
 
Despite the higher than average educational level of the interviewees, important differences 
in educational attainment emerge between and among the three groups in this study. 
Returnees had noticeably lower educational outcomes than those in the other two categories: 
one-third of returnees did not have matric certificates, while only one returnee had any post-
secondary education (R-6 who has a diploma/certificate that does not require matric).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Although some of M-9’s information, which is drawn from publically available CAPS data, is included in 
Table 1.3, because M-9 refused to be interviewed, all calculations in this section exclude these data. 
6 The high end of the range is 35 and not 34, as expected. Though only 12 years have passed since Wave 1 of 
CAPS, it is possible that an individual could have been interviewed in early 2002 and turned 23 soon thereafter, 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similarly, although four non-migrants and four migrants have some post-secondary 
education, the quality of these degrees is not equivalent: only one of the four interviewees in 
the Non-Migrant category with some post-secondary education had studied at a university or 
technikon—the most valued tertiary degrees—whereas three of the four individuals in the 
Migrant category with some post-secondary education had done so. The proportion of 
migrants with some tertiary education appears to dwarf that of black Africans in Cape Town 
with some tertiary education: in an unpublished paper, Telzak (2013) found that among 
participants in Wave 4 of CAPS in 2006, only 9 percent of those with co-resident mothers 
during Wave 1 had either completed or were enrolled in a tertiary programs that required 
matric. 
 
In part, the higher educational levels were a function of the study design. The questions asked 
during the interviews require some level of mathematical aptitude; the opening showcard, 
around which much of the first half of the interview was based, for example, requires an 
ability to understand proportions (see Figure 2.1). Ultimately, three individuals—the two 
individuals recommended by M-5 and one recommended by a contact in M-8’s rural area—
all of whom had not studied past Grade 8, could not complete the interview because they 
were unable to comprehend the complex questions being asked. If these individuals had been 
interviewed, then the average educational qualifications in the Non-Migrant category would 
have been much lower. These educational variations may also reflect the importance of 
education for migration outcomes. It is probably not a coincidence that those in the Migrant 
category, all of whom had lived in Cape Town for over a decade, had the highest educational 
outcomes among the three groups of interest. 
 
The unusually high educational levels in my sample help to explain the sample’s strong 
employment outcomes. Across South Africa as a whole, tertiary qualifications have been 
shown to have a large employment premium, while secondary and matric qualifications 
appear only to affect wages (Branson and Leibbrandt, 2013). The unemployment rates in both 
the Non-Migrant and Returnee categories (33 percent) roughly track the official 
unemployment rate7 in South Africa, which reached 28.5 percent in 2014 (Statistics South 
Africa, 2014b: 4); this rate, however, is much lower than the official unemployment rate in 
Alfred Nzo, which reached over 44 percent in 2013 (see Table 1.1). The zero percent 
unemployment rate among individuals interviewed in the Migrant category varies 
tremendously from the unemployment rate among black Africans in Cape Town, which was 
34.5 percent in 2011 (see Table 1.1). This discrepancy may also be a result of the study 
design. If, as I argue later in this thesis (see Section 4.3.3), a major cause of return migration 
is failure to secure employment, it is likely that those who have lived in Cape Town 
continuously for over 12 years (the period over which, including its piloted sixth wave, 
CAPS has followed the individuals in the Migrant category) would be employed. The 
relatively high employment rates in all three categories may ultimately color how these 
individuals conceptualize the South African economy and migration. 
 
Finally, this study was designed specifically to interview people with a broad range of 
migration experiences, and the migration experiences of individuals in all three categories do, 
as expected, differ substantially. Though there was some short-term educational migration 
among those in the Non-Migrant category,8 the majority (67 percent) had never left the rural 
area where they were born for a significant period of time and the vast majority (78 percent) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The official unemployment rate excludes those who have given up looking for work. 
8 A move for educational purposes was not considered a “permanent” move if the interviewee returned home 
soon after graduation. 
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either never left their rural area or only moved within Alfred Nzo during their lifetimes. 
Those in the Returnee category had very different migration experiences. For only two (or 22 
percent) of the returnees was Cape Town their only migration destination; the rest had moved 
at least twice over the course of their lives. Additionally, many of these individuals moved 
within Alfred Nzo: after returning from Cape Town, one-third of the Returnee sample had 
moved from their rural area to a nearby rural town. 
 
Similarly, for the majority (63 percent) of those in the Migrant sample, Cape Town was not 
their first experience with migration. Still, most of those in the Migrant sample came to Cape 
Town when they were relatively young and for educational reasons; only two (25 percent) of 
the migrants moved to Cape Town for work. In contrast, six (67 percent) of those in the 
Returnee category had moved to Cape Town for non-work-related reasons. Again, this 
outcome is consistent with the study design: because CAPS was designed to track the 
economic, educational, health, household, and attitudinal progress of young adults (originally 
14 to 22 year olds) in Cape Town, it is unsurprising that most of those interviewed in the 
Migrant category arrived in Cape Town when they were relatively young and for educational 
purposes, though this pattern may ultimately affect how the migrants conceptualize their 
economic environments and migration.  
 
The demographic and economic differences among the three groups may have a potentially 
confounding impact on the perceptions expressed during the interviews. Throughout this 
study, I thus pay particularly close attention to how the gender, age, educational, and 
employment variations in and among the three groups shape these perceptions in order to 
determine what role migration experience plays in driving the observed trends. Though the 
small sample size of this study may make it difficult to examine such variation, this thesis 
offers preliminary findings of the relationship between migration experience and economic 
perceptions in South Africa and suggests potentially fruitful paths for future research. 
 
 
1.4 An Overview of the Road Ahead 
 
This study seeks to investigate perceptions of economic opportunity and migration in South 
Africa. Through the eight interviews that I conducted in Cape Town and the 18 interviews in 
Alfred Nzo, I examine whether and how migration experience influences these perceptions 
and investigate their implications for South African society. I do so in four parts. 
 
In Chapter 2, I examine how migration experience affects perceptions of economic 
inequality. Because South Africa is among the most unequal countries in the world, how 
South Africans conceptualize this inequality is particularly important to investigate. Though 
migration experience does not appear to shape how individuals view the overall distribution 
of income in South Africa, it does affect how these individuals understand the makeup of this 
distribution. Whereas those in the Non-Migrant and Returnee categories believed that the top 
and the middle of the income distribution consisted primarily of public sector employees, 
those in the Migrant category argued that private sector individuals made up a substantially 
larger share of the middle and upper classes. Additionally, non-migrants and returnees tended 
to emphasize the geographic character of the economic divide between rural and urban areas 
in South Africa, while migrants highlighted the continued racialized nature of South Africa’s 
economic divisions. Yet, regardless of migration experience, the vast majority of 
interviewees  greatly underestimated their relative economic position, suggesting that many 
South Africans continue to view their personal economic experiences through a lens of 
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poverty. These findings add support to the hypothesis that it is local economic conditions, 
and not national economic trends, that shape economic perceptions. 
 
I then explore how migration shapes the interviewees’ perceptions of social mobility and the 
available pathways to economic success in Chapter 3. First, I develop a framework for 
subjective social mobility and argue that perceived mobility pathways can be divided into 
two categories: individualistic pathways—or those over which an individual believes he can 
exercise direct control—and structural pathways/impediments—or those which an individual 
believes are entirely outside of his or her control. I then examine the two individualistic 
pathways—education and hard work—and the three structural pathways—corruption and 
nepotism, access to information, and the availability of jobs—highlighted by the interviewees 
and explore whether and how migration experience shapes the interviewees’ 
conceptualization of these mobility pathways. I conclude that the interviewees believe rural 
areas are substantially less meritocratic than urban ones, facilitating the extremely high rates 
of internal migration in South Africa. 
 
As both large-n studies and my interviewees indicate, migrating from rural to urban areas is 
among the only strategies that many rural individuals have for accessing economic 
opportunities in South Africa. In Chapter 4, I thus turn to perceptions of migration itself and 
investigate how my interviewees conceive the migration process. First, I examine the 
theoretical literature on why individuals migrate, and argue that in South Africa at least, most 
individuals appear to conceptualize migration through a primarily individualistic, economic 
lens. I then explore how the interviewees perceive each step of the migration process: what 
categories of people are believed to migrate to urban areas, which individuals succeed while 
there, and finally which individuals return to their rural homes. Though the interviewees had 
difficulty pinpointing the characteristics of those who migrate, they argued that most of the 
individuals who remained in rural areas lacked access to social networks in urban ones, 
which they argued was a prerequisite for migration. The migrants judged the success of those 
who did migrate through changes in the material wellbeing of both the migrant and their rural 
household, but simultaneously argued that financial prudence (and not material acquisition) 
was fundamental to the success of any migration. Those who did not succeed, the 
interviewees believed, were the most likely to return to rural areas, if illness, the threat of 
crime, or the migrants’ urban hosts did not force them to return home beforehand. Ultimately, 
this chapter points to two paths for future research: the role that individuals and their 
households play in the migration decision and the role of migrant networks both before and 
during the migration process. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the implications of these findings for South 
African society and pointing to a number of potentially fruitful directions for future research. 
Though the findings in this thesis come from a relatively small-n study of black South 
Africans originally from one geographical location, they offer among the first systematic, if 
preliminary, insights into these underexplored fields. 
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Chapter 2: A Geography of Disparity: Migration and Perceptions of 
Economic Inequality 
 
On the eve of its transition to democracy, South Africa ranked “among the most unequal 
societies in the world” (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 188). After 1994, South Africa’s 
already unparalleled degree of inequality rose further, despite hopes that democratization and 
the enfranchisement of South Africa’s poor, black majority would work to redress the 
pernicious economic legacies of apartheid (Seekings, 2011a: 22). The Gini coefficient for 
income distribution—a commonly used measure of inequality that is derived from the Lorenz 
Curve and ranges from 0 in completely egalitarian societies to 1 in societies where a single 
individual receives all of the income—was 0.66 at the end of apartheid, 0.68 in 2000, and 0.7 
by 2008 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 32).1  Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Gini 
index may actually underestimate the growth of income inequality in South African society. 
The Gini coefficient is better able to capture changes in the middle of the income distribution 
than at the tails. Thus, if the rich are getting comparatively richer or the poor are getting 
comparatively poorer, as appears to be happening in South Africa (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 
26), then the Gini coefficient will underestimate the degree of inequality (Seekings, 2011b: 
29). 
 
South Africa’s high and growing levels of inequality threaten to undermine its nascent 
democracy. Muller (1997: 152; see also Muller, 1988) first suggested that “high levels of 
income inequality are [completely] incompatible with the development of a stable democratic 
political system.” But it was not until Boix and Stokes’s (2003: 504; see also Boix, 2003:129; 
cf. Muller, 1997: 134) seminal work that compelling evidence was presented indicating that 
“democracy is caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany 
development, in particular, [a reduction in] income equality.” Boix and Stokes’ analysis was 
bolstered by Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) robust theoretical model elucidating the 
underlying connections between democracy and inequality—work largely absent from earlier 
analyses highlighting the relationship between income and democracy (Boix, 2003: 6). Most 
researchers also agree that, as Houle (2009: 590; see also Ibid., 615; Lane and Ersson, 1997: 
8) concludes, inequality unquestionably “affects consolidation … negatively.” 
 
Theorists have presented a number of hypotheses undergirding the negative relationship 
between democratic consolidation and income inequality. Muller (1997: 136), for example, 
argues that continued inequality impels “dissident groups [to] turn to non-democratic 
methods of participation, such as civil disobedience and violence … increase[ing] the 
likelihood of a breakdown of democracy through civil war, revolution, or a coup d’état.”  In 
contrast, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 222) stress discontent among elites as the primary 
threat to democracy: as inequality increases, so too do the redistributive demands of the 
masses, making coupes more likely. Others posit a more indirect relationship between 
inequality and the breakdown of democracy. Fukuyama (2011: 83) argues that inequality’s 
deleterious impact on criminality, educational and health outcomes, and social cohesion 
undermines democratic consolidation. And Solt (2008: 57-58) found that “economic 
inequality depresses political engagement,” undermining “political equality” and ultimately 
democracy. Although the precise pathway by which socioeconomic inequality undermines 
democratic deepening is debatable, there is resounding consensus that “income inequality is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Although there is much variation in reported Gini coefficients in South Africa, these variations are largely 
attributable to the methodology employed and there is general “agreement” about the rising levels of inequality 
in post-apartheid South Africa (van der Berg, 2010: 12). 
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incompatible with the stability of democracy over time” (Muller, 1997: 137). Additionally, 
scholars have found that economic inequality has a pernicious affect on a number of other 
social, political, and economic indicators internationally, including physical and mental 
health (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2009), crime (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), political 
polarization (Duca and Saving, 2014), and growth (Berg et al., 2008).  
 
Because of South Africa’s persistently high and growing levels of inequality and its possible 
repercussions for South African society, significant space has been dedicated to analyzing the 
nature of this inequality. The available research indicates that the composition of this 
inequality has not been static. Towards the end of apartheid, South Africa’s distribution of 
income began to “reflect race far less than class” (Seekings, 2008a: 22) because of “the 
expansion of educational and employment opportunities for black South Africans” (Seekings, 
2008c: 40). While aggregate inequality has risen since South Africa’s democratic transition, 
this growth in inequality is a result of increasing intra-, as opposed to inter-racial disparities, 
a trend that began before the end of apartheid (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 300). The Theil-
T Index for inequality—which analyzes the percentage of the Gini coefficient that is derived 
from within-group versus between-group inequality—indicates just how profoundly South 
Africa’s distribution of income has been de-racialized. Whereas in 1975 intra-racial 
inequality accounted for 38 percent of total inequality, by 1996 intra-racial inequality 
represented 67 percent of aggregate inequality, and by 2008 this figure had climbed to 70 
percent (Whiteford and van Seventer, 2000: 17; Leibbrandt et al., 2012: 30).2 
 
This trend reflects the growing economic power of sections of South Africa’s previously 
marginalized black population and the partial de-racialization of South Africa’s class 
structures. The proportion of income going to South Africa’s white population fell from 71 
percent to 48 percent between 1972 and 2001, while the proportion of income going to 
Africans rose from 20 percent to 38 percent (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 304; Leibbrandt et 
al., 2006: 102). Consequently the middle and upper classes in South Africa have become 
increasingly more de-recialized since the end of apartheid (Seeking and Nattrass, 2006: 336). 
The “middle class,” for example, which was only 29 percent black in 1994, was nearly half 
black by 2000 (García-Rivero, 2006: 66). Similarly, whereas Africans made up only 28 
percent of the top two income deciles in 1995, they constituted over 45 percent of the top two 
deciles in 2000 (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 306). Although inequality is still correlated 
with race (Simkins, 2011: 107), as Landman et al. (2003: 7) conclude, “The main driver of 
inequality currently in SA is no longer the Black/White divide, but rather the intra-group 
divide between rich Blacks and poor Blacks.” 
 
Additionally, focusing solely on the Gini coefficient fails to consider how post-apartheid tax 
and social spending reforms affect the distribution of income. South Africa has one of the 
most “progressive”—i.e., most redistributive—and successful income tax systems in the 
world (Lieberman, 2001: 516),3 and, according to calculations by Morekwa and Schoeman 
(2005: 18), the progressivity of South Africa’s tax system has grown considerably because of 
post-apartheid tax reforms. Furthermore, the relative success of these taxation policies has 
allowed South Africa to become one of “the developing world’s largest and most generous 
welfare state[s],” reflecting both the dramatic expansion of social assistance programs and of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Bhorat and van der Westhuizen, in contrast, argue that inter-racial inequality has actually been increasing. 
However, they offer no explanation for why their “admittedly provisional evidence” does not conform to the 
predominant trends found in the literature (Bhorat and van der Westhuizen, 2010: 57). 
3 South Africa collects close to 15 percent of GDP in income taxes, making it “one of the world’s most 
successful income tax collectors” (Lieberman, 2001: 516). 
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public spending more generally after South Africa’s democratic transition (Hassim, 2008: 
104). South Africa inherited an extraordinarily expansive, if racialized, welfare system from 
its apartheid past (Matisonn and Seekings, 2003: 57). These generous levels of social 
spending were not only maintained after South Africa’s transition to democracy, but they 
were greatly increased. In 2006, South Africa spent R177 billion, or 10 percent of its GDP, 
on social and welfare programs, an increase of over 50 percent from 2000 spending levels. 
And this growth in spending came on top of the already large increase of over 20 percent, in 
per-person terms, in social spending during the first five years of democracy (Van der Berg, 
2009: 1; Van der Berg, 2010: 17). 
 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the incidence of South Africa’s social spending has 
become increasingly pro-poor. After its transition to democracy, South Africa “saw a large 
and significant shift of social spending away from the more affluent to the formerly 
disadvantaged members of the population” (van der Berg, 2001: 157), due in part to the 
doubling, in real terms, of spending for means tested social assistance programs between 
1994 and 2006 to nearly 3.5 percent of GDP (Seekings, 2008b: 29). Additionally, other social 
programs, including health care, education, and housing, have become dramatically more 
redistributive in practice since 1994. Thus, South Africa’s concentration ratio—a measure of 
the incidence of social spending, which ranges from negative-one to one as the distribution of 
spending becomes increasingly more pro-rich—changed “considerabl[y]” from 0.095 in 1995 
to -0.152 in 2006, indicating “extremely good targeting of spending on the poor” (van der 
Berg, 2009: 12 and 18). 
 
South Africa’s progressive system of taxation and its large and well-targeted social 
expenditures have had a profound impact on the distribution of income. Van der Berg (2001: 
157-58) calculated that taxation and social spending lowered the Gini coefficient in 1995 
from 0.68 to 0.44, a decrease of over one-third. And there is some indication that inequality 
may actually be falling in South Africa, once the impact of taxation and welfare spending are 
considered: in a subsequent study focused on fiscal outcomes, van der Berg (2009: 18) 
calculated that the impact of social spending reduced the Gini coefficient by 0.14 in 1995, 
0.18 in 2000, and 0.22 in 2006. Even if the increasingly progressive nature of South Africa’s 
tax system is ignored, the redistributive impact of social spending far outpaced the growth in 
income inequality between 1995 and 2006, as calculated by Leibbrandt et al. (2010: 26). As 
Bosch et al. (2010: 9) conclude, “The research shows that the true [or perhaps, the more 
economically consequential] Gini coefficient for South Africa resides at much lower levels of 
inequality than generally reported. … [Although] the impact of government social policies on 
inequality is substantial, [it is] unfortunately often overlooked.”4 
 
Whether and how South Africans conceive the changing nature of inequality thus has 
profound ramifications for South Africa. Though South Africa’s high and growing rates of 
pre-tax and -transfer inequality threaten to undermine South Africa’s nascent democracy and 
social cohesion, if South Africans recognize the changing nature of this inequality and the 
aggressive social welfare programs instituted by the post-apartheid government, the impact of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Of course, the degree of redistribution through welfare spending says nothing about the efficacy of these social 
programs, and there are strong indications that South Africa’s social programs have largely failed to live up to 
their potential (Van der Berg and Moses, 2012: 133-39; Hassim, 2008: 105). But the extraordinarily effective 
budgetary redistributive policies that post-apartheid South Africa has undertaken indicate that the “greatest 
threat” to South Africa’s democracy may not ultimately lie in South Africa’s ostensibly high levels of 
inequality, but may rather lie elsewhere, for example, in the South African government’s failure to successfully 
deliver social services. 
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South Africa’s rising inequality may not be as deleterious as predicted. However, to date little 
work has examined individual perceptions of inequality. In fact, what literature does exist 
merely states the expected. Roberts (2004), for example, examining data from the 2003 South 
African Social Attitudes Survey, found that the vast majority (87 percent) of those living in 
the most unequal country in the world unsurprisingly agree that South Africa is too unequal. 
 
In previous work (Telzak, 2012, 2014), I examined how 27 individuals in Cape Town, the 
rural areas around Mount Frere (in the Eastern Cape), and Newcastle (a small city in 
KwaZulu-Natal) conceived of the economic system in which they lived. Both papers found 
that an individual’s economic background and the degree of economic mobility that he or she 
had experienced greatly affected his or her perceptions of inequality. In particular, those from 
advantaged backgrounds and those who had experienced some degree of social mobility 
tended to identify a broader middle class linking poor and rich, while those who had 
experienced little mobility saw the gap between poor and rich as insurmountable. Those who 
had experienced little mobility represent the majority of South Africans, suggesting that 
rising rates of inequality are undermining South Africa’s social and economic perceived 
inclusiveness. Furthermore, these papers indicated that differences existed in how rural and 
urban populations understood South Africa’s inequality regime: while those in urban areas 
saw the distribution of income in distinctly racial terms, those in rural areas were much less 
concerned with the racial distribution of income. 
 
This chapter augments my earlier work by examining how experiences of migration affect 
perceptions of inequality. Migration is one lens through which many South Africans 
experience their economic system, either directly or indirectly. Investigating how these 
experiences shape economic perceptions is therefore particularly important in South Africa. 
Unlike my two earlier papers, this chapter pays close attention to perceptions of geographical 
economic divisions in South Africa. It does so in four parts. First, I present how my 
interviewees generally view inequality in South Africa and how these views divide along 
migration backgrounds. Next, I examine the two major divisions that my interviewees 
expressed during their interviews: race and geography. Third, I examine where individuals 
situate themselves within the South African income distribution and why they do so. Finally, 
I draw conclusions about the potential repercussions of these perceptions for South African 
society. This chapter argues that local economic conditions, and not national trends, are the 
salient factor shaping an individual’s perceptions of inequality. 
 
 
2.2 Perceptions of Inequality in South Africa 
 
In order to facilitate discussion about the distribution of income in South African society, my 
interviewees were given a copy of Figure 2.1 (which was originally used in the 2005 Cape 
Area Study) and read a version of the following: 
 
These four pictures show different types of society. The first picture represents 
a society with a small elite of rich people at the top, a few people in the middle, 
and a large number of poor people at the bottom. The second picture represents 
a society that is like a pyramid, with a small elite at the top, more people in the 
middle, and a lot of poor people at the bottom. The third picture shows a society 
in which most people are in the middle. The fourth picture shows a society with 
lots of people at the top, some in the middle, and very few at the bottom. Which 




Figure 2.1: Pictures depicting different models of the economic stratification of 
South African society. 
 
 
The small and non-random sample means that we should beware treating the data in Table 1 
as representative of their larger respective populations. But it is striking that, in this small 
sample, there were only minor differences among the choices of interviewees in the three 
different migration categories. Most of the interviewees chose a picture of society that 
showed many poor people—i.e., most individuals in all three categories selected Type 1 or 
Type 2—because of what they saw as the intense suffering of the majority of South Africans. 
NM-6, the spaza shop and transport services owner, for example, explained that he believed 
society resembled Type 2 because there are people who “are making means,” but “most of 
the people [in South Africa] are starving. There are few people who have got money.” 
Similarly, R-2, the taxi owner, argued that “most of the people have got not enough money. 
Most people are suffering in South Africa financially. We cannot run away from that.” And 
M-4, the street cleaner and sangoma, asserted that she would “choose Type 1 because there 
are still a lot of people that are suffering. … Many people have to go and sell just to eat 
something [instead of] sleeping with an empty stomach.” 
 
Differences emerged, however, over explanations of persistent poverty. Interviewees who 
had never migrated, unlike migrants and returnees, tended to fault the wealthy and powerful 
for the continued suffering of the majority of South Africans. NM-2, the unemployed woman  
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Table 2.1: How the interviewees conceptualized the distribution of income in South Africa 
Category Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 No 
Response 
Total 
Migrants 5 3 1 0 0 9 
Returnees 6 1 2 0 0 9 
Non-
Migrants 5 1 1 0 1 8 
 
 
from a rural area outside of Qumbu, for example, argued that the distribution of income 
resembled Type 2 “because South African society has some rich people but they are only 
interested in enriching themselves without uplifting others.” Similarly, NM-9, the 
unemployed Matatiele resident, described how “those who are in power don’t care about the 
country. … When they are campaigning for election, they come to the people and give them 
false promises. When they get the positions, they forget about the people.” In rural areas, 
where there are many fewer economic opportunities, individuals appear to believe their 
fortunes are dependent on the whims of those who have control over the opportunities that do 
exist (i.e., the wealthy and the politicians) (see also du Toit et al., 2007, which found a 
similar trend in Mount Frere, Eastern Cape). 
 
The minority of the interviewees who selected Type 3—which shows a society with a 
broader middle class and fewer people at the top and bottom—emphasized how much society 
has progressed economically since the end of apartheid. NM-1, the information-technology 
specialist, for example, described how “those people that were in the bottom are uplift[ing] 
themselves to the middle, to the standard of the rest of South Africa. Everybody is striving to 
be in the middle … and we now have the chances that we didn’t have before.” R-6, the 
municipal councilor employee, similarly described how “things are not the same as it was 
before.” Whereas society used to resemble Type 1, “the change that has happened is that the 
poor moved up now to join the richer people. They’re moving slowly but surely. The graph is 
moving up, up, and up day-by-day.” 
 
These responses provide some support for the hypothesis advanced in my earlier papers 
(Telzak, 2012, 2014) that it is primarily an individual’s personal experience of economic 
mobility that shapes his or her conceptualization of the distribution of income. Although the 
current study did not separate individuals based on their experiences of economic mobility, 
two of three individuals who selected Type 3 had achieved unusually high degrees of 
mobility. NM-1 is an IT employee at the Department of Health and drives a luxury German 
car, while R-6 left a job as a financial advisor and sales representative at an insurance 
company to work for a ward councilor in his local community. The one exception from this 
pattern was R-3, who is unemployed. R-3’s mother, however, owns a spaza shop, which, 
according to R-3, has been very successful. R-3, who is only 22, may see himself as 
economically mobile because of his mother’s experience. 
 
Despite the similarities among the interviewees in all three categories in their views of the 
distribution of income in South African society, they did not all agree on which individuals 
were located in different parts of the income distribution. While those in the Non-Migrant 
and Returnee categories tended to argue that those with government jobs occupied the upper 
end of the income distribution, migrants were much more likely to place those with private 
sector positions at the top. Non-migrants were by far the most emphatic in their views that 
public sector workers occupied the top of the income distribution. As NM-3, the unemployed 
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21-year-old, described, the people at the top are “people who are in parliament, … 
Department of Education, [and] Health and Engineering.” Although he recognized that there 
“are” people at the top who are not part of government, he described these people as those “in 
nursing, those at clinics and hospitals, and teachers and police … [and] traffic officials”—that 
is, people who do in fact mostly work for the South African government. Similarly, even 
those from the Non-Migrant category who recognized that there are private sector individuals 
at the top of the income distribution, failed to think of many examples. NM-7, the credit 
collector at a furniture store, described that she “think[s] it is politicians and business people” 
at the top. But when asked for specific examples of those at the top of the income 
distribution, she only mentioned those in politics: “People like Jacob Zuma and other 
political party leaders and then people in positions like public relations and councilors … 
[and] mayors, people that are working for government departments.” 
 
Those who had never migrated also conceptualized the middle of the income distribution as 
consisting primarily of government workers. NM-1, the information technology specialist, 
described how “the people [in the middle] are working “hand-in-hand with the MPs. … I 
don’t know if you understand government structures, but people like Municipality managers, 
councilors, those people who are working for the government, to serve our communities.” 
Though some individuals who had never left their rural areas, like NM-4, the school security 
guard, were more likely to place those in the private sector in the middle of the income 
distribution—“people who are running small business,” for example—they ultimately 
believed most of those in the middle were “working in government departments.” 
 
Returnees also emphasized the relative wealth of government workers; however, they were 
much more likely also to place private sector workers at the top of the income distribution 
than those who had never migrated. Though some, like R-4, the unemployed female 
individual planning to move to Johannesburg, believed that the top of the income distribution 
is comprised of “presidents, teachers and [] people who are working for government”—in 
fact, she argued that there are “no” people who are not working for government who are on 
top, at least “not that I can think of”—most saw the top of the distribution as more of a mix 
between the public and private sector. As R-8, the unemployed female who originally went to 
Cape Town for “health” reasons, flatly described, “I think it’s people with big businesses and 
those people that are working in parliament.” However, even though returnees believed that 
there were private sector individuals at the top of the income distribution, they often 
described private sector positions that were deeply connected to the public sector. R-7, the 
female police officer, for example, believed that “most of them [at the top] are in politics … 
[and] some are in municipalities. Those,” in the private sector at the top, she continued, are 
those “who are getting tenders from government.” 
 
Returnees, however, unlike those who had never left rural areas, conceptualized the middle of 
the distribution as much more of a mix between the public and private sectors. Though the 
views expressed by some returnees, like those of R-2, the taxi owner—who spoke of 
“teachers, nurses, police, correctional officers, [and] clerks” as the only people in the 
middle—resembled the views expressed by non-migrants, more often than not, the returnees 
believed that the middle was occupied primarily by those in the private sector. R-5, the 
government projects administrator, pointed to “mine workers, security guards, house builders 
and other people in construction.” While R-4, described those in the middle as “people who 
are working in mines, on the streets as cleaners and also cashiers.” 
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In contrast to returnees and non-migrants, migrants believed that the top of the income 
distribution was occupied primarily by those in the private sector. M-1, the policeman, 
“would refer to the businessmen” when describing the top of the distribution. “For instance, 
… if I can talk about the man who owns all the Pick n’ Pays in South Africa. I refer to them 
as the people on the top.” M-6, the manager in a department store collections department, 
concurred: “The kinds of people that are here at the top are businessmen. We’re talking about 
the people who have means of businesses. … Those people who own businesses, like 
investment banks, like investment companies, like goldmines and all that.” Similarly M-2, 
the Transnet worker, described how “most of them [on top], they are doing business, owning 
their own businesses. … That’s all I can say.” Only after she was asked where she would 
place the politicians did she suggest that “parliamentarians,” “cabinet” members and 
“presidents” were all “on top.” Others were less emphatic and painted the top as a mixture of 
government and private sector workers. But ultimately most migrants believed that the top of 
the income distribution comprised primarily of individuals with private sector jobs. 
 
The migrants’ relatively large emphasis on private sector jobs held for the middle of the 
income distribution as well. As M-4 described, “Teachers” are in the middle, but more 
generally the middle are the people who “are working for private companies and everyone 
who wakes up and goes to a job.” And as M-1 asserted, “I can refer to the working class, 
especially those who are working for the big companies like Old Mutual, Sanlam,” as those 
in the middle. 
 
In large part, this trend probably reflects the different opportunities available in rural and 
urban areas and the relatively higher salaries of government workers. The private sector in 
rural areas is significantly less developed than it is in urban areas and the vast majority of 
formal employment in rural areas is in the public sector (du Toit et al., 2007: 526; van der 
Berg et al., 2002: 7 and 15). Furthermore, higher-level public sector jobs are particularly 
accessible to black individuals. Though black Africans have always been employed in large 
numbers in the public sector in South Africa, during apartheid their advancement was 
severely constricted (Cameron, 2005: 77). Since the transition to democracy, however, there 
has been a concerted effort to integrate the senior levels of the public sector, and by 2011 87 
percent of senior managers were non-white, up from 35 percent in 1995 (Cameron, 2005: 82; 
Public Service Commission, 2011: 50). Furthermore, whereas black Africans occupy nearly 
all public-sector jobs in traditional areas because there are virtually no non-black residents, 
white and coloured individuals occupy many of the public-sector jobs in Cape Town, where 
black Africans are still in the minority. The public sector may thus represent the primary 
pathway to social mobility for most black individuals in South Africa, especially those who 
live in rural areas. 
 
In contrast, the apartheid government focused on building private sector industry in the major 
commercial centers of South Africa, a legacy that survives today. In fact, the only clear 
exceptions to the emphasis among migrants on the concentration of private-sector workers in 
the middle and top of the income distribution were those who worked in government jobs 
themselves. M-5, who works as a cleaner in government offices, stated emphatically that 
“there’s no one” at the top who does not work for government. Similarly, M-3, who is an 
auditor for the Department of Labour, initially said, “I think the ones on the top are the ones 
like presidents. Those are the ones that are the richest,” but then backtracked, arguing that 
“maybe the business guys [are also on top], like those people who are running Woolworths, 
Shoprite, and stuff.” 
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These trends would lend some further support to the hypothesis that local economic 
conditions may shape how individuals in South Africa conceptualize economic inequality. It 
also suggests that personal economic experience may play an equally, if not more, important 
role (see Piketty, 1995). As M-1 described: Before he came to Cape Town, “I didn't know 
anything about private sector. I only knew about government. … I didn't know anything 
about private sector.” 
 
However, there seems to be another reason why the interviewees placed government workers 
near the top, divorced from their local economic experiences: the benefits and perceived 
stability of government jobs. My interviewees mostly used monetary terms—like “rich” and 
“poor”—to describe those on the top and the bottom of the income distribution and often 
spoke about the distribution of income as a “financial” issue. As NM-3, the 21-year-old 
unemployed individual, described, he placed people in various parts of the income 
distribution “because of their salaries: the ones of those at the bottom are not the same as 
those who are in the middle … and those who are at the top.” 
 
However, when describing the placement of government workers, my interviewees often 
highlighted the benefits these individuals were provided. R-5, who works on a government 
project building houses, argued that those in the government were rich because of their 
benefits: “They get government subsidies when someone is buying a car or a house. The 
government assists them in most of the things that they need.” Similarly, M-2, who works for 
Transnet, argued that government jobs are better than private sector jobs “because the 
government jobs, they've got a lot of—what can I call this? Let me make an example: you're 
working for government, you do get a housing allowance, stuff like medical aid and all the 
other stuff of which the person who's working for Shoprite doesn't have a house allowance, 
doesn't maybe have the medical aid that the government is providing.” As NM-8, the 
government projects administrator, described, “For most of us black people government 
opportunities are better. … You can start a business but it may fall along the way. Yet if you 
work for government you’ll get a pension [until] the end of your time.” 
 
The perceived stability of government jobs, however, was viewed by the interviewees as 
more important than the benefits that these jobs provided. The most important “benefit” of 
government jobs not “offer[ed]” by “private businesses,” according to NM-4, the school 
security guard, is that “in private jobs you don’t get formal notice. … but you do with 
government.” As NM-7, the female credit collector, explained, she would rank teachers 
higher than those with tenders, even if those with tenders make more money, “because 
teachers are working for government on a stable income. People who are getting tenders are 
dependent on availability of tenders. They spend periods of time without doing work.” M-7, 
the electrical appliance saleswoman, was even more emphatic: “You don’t stop working for 
government until you retire or die. In [the] private sector [however] you [can] get retrenched” 
anytime. In fact, R-6 went so far as to claim that members of parliament were not on top 
because they were in “temporary” positions: “I can’t say the politicians are rich because 
that’s not a thing that someone can survive with because they are on contract. So you can’t 
really mention that because that particular job is not for a lifetime. Usually it’s a five-year 
contract. So you can be rich these five years and the next five years poor. So I don’t want to 
say they are rich.” 
 
In contrast, migrants, who were more likely to place private workers on top, highlighted the 
relatively high pay of the private sector. M-1, once he learned about the private sector when 
he came to Cape Town, realized that “private jobs are also better” and asserted that “if there 
25!
could be posts advertised, for instance for protection services, [in the private sector] with all 
the requirements that I meet, I'll definitely leave the government and go for the higher post on 
that side.” Similarly, M-6 described how, though in government “they look after you and you 
know that you are secured in terms of retrenchments and all that,” “private jobs, they pay 
very well.” 
 
There was, however, general agreement among interviewees from all three categories about 
who was at the bottom: those who were struggling financially. NM-8, the administrator of a 
government project, argued that those at the bottom are “people who are earning very little, 
just to eat at the end of the day. … [And] those people that are not working but earning social 
grants.” M-4, the street cleaner and sangoma, described these people as those who “are 
struggling for survival. Those who depend on government grants, individuals who are selling 
in schools and stations to have food to eat.” However, there was much less agreement about 
whether the salient characteristic uniting those at the bottom was race or geography. 
 
 
2.3 The great divide: race or geography? 
 
Though migration experience does not appear to have as strong an impact on how individuals 
conceptualize the distribution of income in South Africa as mobility experience does (Telzak, 
2012, 2014), it does influence an individual’s views on the relative economic position of 
those in the public and private sectors. Perhaps more importantly, however, migration 
experience deeply affects which of the two great economic divides in South African society 
individuals consider more salient: race or geography. While migrants to Cape Town 
highlighted the racial divide, those who had never left rural areas and those who had returned 
from Cape Town tended to emphasize the rural-urban divide. These findings provide further 
evidence that personal economic experiences, and not national trends, are the primary factor 
in shaping an individual’s economic perceptions and support the findings of my earlier 
research that those in rural areas are much less concerned with the racialized distribution of 
income in South Africa than those in urban areas. 
 
 
2.3.1 Racial Divisions 
 
Although the apartheid government deliberately structured the labor market, growth path, and 
welfare benefits of South Africa to benefit its white constituents, beginning in the 1970s race 
became less and less important for reproducing privilege (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 6, 
91). In fact, by 2000, the upper classes were nearly as black as they were white (García-
Rivero, 2006: 66; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 306). As Nattrass and Seekings (2001: 47) 
conclude, “In South Africa, black and white are no longer synonymous with rich and poor” 
(emphasis in original). 
 
Still, interviewees from all three migration categories continued to conceptualize the 
distribution of income in South Africa along distinctly racial terms. Migrants had the least 
accurate conceptualization of the racial division of income in South Africa. As M-1, the 
policeman argued, “In South Africa, most of the white people are still on top … [while] most 
of [the black people] are here on the bottom. … It doesn’t mean that because there are white 
people on top, there’s no black person. They are still there. But I think that there are just a 
few on top.” Similarly, M-5, the cleaner in government offices, argued that “most [of the 
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white people] are on top but also in the middle,” while most of the black people are below 
them. 
 
In contrast, those from the Non-Migrant and Returnee categories tended to have a slightly 
more accurate understanding of the changing nature of South African inequality. Most still 
believed that race was still closely related to class. As NM-6, the spaza shop owner, 
described, “I would put most of [the white people] on top. … There are some Africans who 
are higher up but the majority of them are in the middle to the bottom.” R-2, the taxi owner, 
echoed this sentiment when he said, “The white people are at the top and … [there are only a 
few] black people, those who have benefited from the Black Economic Empowerment.” 
However, many of those in the Non-Migrants and Returnee categories recognized the 
changing relationship between race and class. R-4, the unemployed individual who was 
planning to move to Johannesburg, described how “when we were growing up in most cases, 
it used to be the white people who have got money and Africans were working for white 
people, not Africans working for other Africans,” though this had since changed. Similarly, 
NM-4, the school security guard, described how “I would rate most of [the white people] in 
the middle class and some of them on top.” Blacks, however, filled out the rest of those on 
top. As R-9, the clothing store worker, acknowledged, “I can put [the white people] on top. 
… I have never seen a white person who is suffering,” but today, she continued, there are 
black people “on top, middle, and bottom.” 
 
Perhaps more importantly, interviewees in all three categories gave different reasons for the 
continued association between race and inequality. While those who had never migrated 
tended to fault black South Africans—and praise white South Africans—for their relative 
economic positions, those who had migrated to Cape Town attributed the class divide 
between the races to the structural disadvantages faced by black Africans. Returnees, perhaps 
because they had spent time in urban areas but currently lived in rural ones, offered a 
combination of both reasons. 
 
Those who had never migrated offered two primary reasons for why white South Africans 
continue to experience more economic success than black South Africans: the economic 
support that white individuals provide to one another and their shrewd economic planning. 
NM-3, the unemployed 21-year-old, described the support that white individuals provide for 
other white people in detail: 
 
The thing is white people [] help one another—they [] assist one another and 
say, ‘To succeed, do like this!’ … They do not look down on that other person. 
So for example, a person will ask them how they got to where they are and they 
will tell them, ‘I did this and this!’ and they will ensure that the other person 
gets to that level as well. 
 
As NM-3 concluded, “White people look out for one another, but black people just don’t. … 
We do not think about one another. When I see another person I will not care about him 
because I know he won’t care about me as well.” NM-9, NM-2, NM-7, and NM-8 all echoed 
this viewpoint. As NM-8, the administrator on a government project, argued, white people 
are “supportive towards one another in terms of helping each other. … Perhaps it’s also in 
our nature that as Africans we are selfish and only do what we can to enrich ourselves. We 
only want to succeed alone.” 
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Some who never migrated did recognize that white individuals were starting from an 
economically advantaged position. As NM-4, the security guard, highlighted, “Most of [the 
white people] inherit what their parents planned for their future. Their parents give them 
financial support: at the age of 21, their parents give them their own place to stay. By the 
time he starts working, he’s already having money in his pocket and that doesn’t happen to us 
black people.” But instead of blaming the structural legacy of apartheid for these advantages, 
Non-migrants tended to fault the planning and spending habits of black South Africans. As 
NM-4 continued, black people do not have that support because of “our nature. Black people 
are more about owning livestock; they spend their money on livestock.” Instead of focusing 
on livestock, however, he argued that black people “should focus on investing money with 
intentions of supporting their children in the near future.” NM-7, the credit collector, 
expressed nearly identical sentiments: “Africans like expensive things more than planning for 
the future. They spend money on expensive things.” 
 
In contrast, migrants were much more likely to attribute the advantaged economic position of 
white South Africans to the legacy of apartheid. Though at least one migrant—M-3, the 
auditor, who attributed the economic position of black Africans to their “laziness”—blamed 
black South Africans for their lack of economic success, most, like M-6, argued that “we 
cannot run away from [the] political structure that we had previously. They disadvantaged us. 
It was disadvantageous to certain people in South Africa. So that is why I am saying most of 
[the white people] are there because they have inherited from their forefathers.” M-4, the 
street cleaner and sangoma, was even more blunt in her assessment: “I would put most of [the 
white people] … on top … because they have stolen from us: livestock, land and everything 
our forefathers had. Now we must buy from them the same things they stole from us. … We 
are struggling and begging from white people.” In fact, M-7, the electrical appliance 
saleswoman, saw the continued “suffering” of black South Africans as the result of “racial 
discrimination. … [Black Africans] are racially discriminated at the workplace in favor of 
whites and sometimes coloreds.” Since apartheid, M-7 argued, “things have only changed a 
bit.” 
 
Returnees offered a combination of these individual and structural reasons for the continued 
correlation between race and class. The vast majority of those in the Returnee category 
highlighted, to some degree, the advantages that white individuals gained from apartheid. R-
1, the policeman, captured the prevailing sentiment well when he described how “the 
government—the apartheid government—they were supporting [white people]. They were 
supported by government and you’ll find out they were subsidized.” But they disagreed over 
how salient this support is for the continued inequality between white and black South 
Africans. R-1, for example, believed that this history was of little relevance to the present. 
Whites are “bit-by-bit going down, but not so far down,” because “they educate themselves 
and they try to keep the[ir] names alive.” Blacks on the other hand, “Let their kids do 
whatever they want to do.” Similarly, R-5 saw the success of whites as partially a result of 
their previous economic advantages: as he described, “Most of [the white people], their 
fathers have businesses which they inherit and keep them on top. … That’s why they can’t be 
in the bottom. They inherit assets from their fathers.” But he blamed black individuals 
themselves for not being able to achieve similar success: black people, he argued, are “in the 
middle and some on top, but the majority [are] in the bottom. … The problem is that, if one 
inherited a business from their father, they mismanage it and it collapses. Others get tenders 
and blow the cash. They all end up falling back to the bottom.” In contrast, R-2 attributed the 
economic differences among racial groups in South Africa exclusively “to the outcomes of 
white supremacy. Because of the apartheid system, most of the people lost their things.”  
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Both sets of explanations indicate how deep the racial divisions in South Africa remain. 
Those offered by non-migrants suggest that the legacy of apartheid (and its founding 
principle that black individuals were inferior to white individuals) may still continue to affect 
how black South Africans view themselves. And those offered by the migrants and returnees, 
which echo views frequently espoused by many past and current post-apartheid political 
leaders (see, e.g., Gillion, as quoted in Polgreen, 2012; Zuma, 2012; Mbeki, as quoted in 
Hadland and Rantao, 1999), indicate that racialized economic divisions in South Africa—
despite the progress that has been made—continue to fragment South African society and 
oppose efforts at national cohesion. As R-2, the taxi owner, bemoaned, “Although they are 
saying now it's a ‘rainbow nation,’ it'll never be a rainbow nation. Why am I saying that? 
There are still people, there are still black people with no jobs. … It's a pity we're in this” 
place. Both sets of explanations reflect the distinctly racialized prism through which many 
black Africans continue to view themselves and society, a trend observed repeatedly in South 
African social attitudes surveys (see, e.g., Grossberg et al., 2006). 
 
Although interviewees from all three migration categories had strong opinions on the 
relationship between race and class in South Africa, all of the interviewees were not equally 
interested in the relative economic position of South Africa’s racial groups. Most of those in 
the Migrant category brought up the connection between race and class organically. When 
asked, “What kinds of people are at the top?” and “What kinds of people are at the bottom?” 
more often than not, migrants responded with racial descriptions. This could reflect Cape 
Town’s unique demographics—a non-majority black African city in a majority black African 
country—and the continued association of race and class in Cape Town. Though the upper 
ends of the income distribution have experienced substantial integration nationally (see supra 
P. 17), economically Cape Town, with few wealthy black residents, still remains largely 
divided along racial lines. There is some tentative support for this hypothesis. M-6, the 
collections department manager, when describing who secured jobs in South Africa, argued 
that “it varies from province to province.” In Cape Town, where “the majority of people who 
are here are coloured and white … [the] people who [] get most of the jobs are coloureds and 
whites.” Conversely, he continued, “If you go to other provinces, … the first people who will 
be able to be appointed there is the other [black African] cultures.” 
 
In contrast, those from the Returnee and Non-Migrant categories, who live in an area where 
the population is almost entirely black African, rarely brought up issues surrounding race 
independently. With two exceptions (both of whom were returnees from Cape Town), those 
in the Non-Migrant and Returnee categories only spoke about race once they were asked 
guiding questions. For them, the much more salient economic division in South African 
society was geographic. 
 
2.3.2 Geographic Divisions 
 
Those living in rural areas tended not to stress the intersection of race and class. During the 
interviews, the interviewees gave some indication of why they did not emphasize the 
continued relationship between race and inequality: to them, skin color was not the proximate 
cause of the poverty of black Africans. Rather, the concentration of South Africa’s black 
population in rural areas spurred their relative poverty. R-2, the taxi owner, for example, 
described how those at the bottom, based on “color, [are] black people. We’re always 
vulnerable. [We] live in the outskirts. You have people who are living far, far, far [away] in 
remote areas, where there’s no routes, no electricity, no water, nothing.” Similarly, NM-5, the 
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administrative intern at a local school, when describing why black individuals in South 
Africa were poorer than white individuals, attributed it to the geographical divide between 
blacks and whites: “Some of us [black people],” she argued, “Grew up in rural areas [while] 
most of the white people grew up in urban areas.” 
 
These views reflect the systematic underdevelopment of rural areas during apartheid. While 
large numbers of black individuals were forcibly removed from “white” towns and farms to 
rural and peri-urban areas, the apartheid government purposefully neglected these areas in 
order to provide a source of cheap labor to white-owned companies. Two decades after the 
end of apartheid, South Africa’s rural, black population continues to lag behind the rest of 
South Africa in key infrastructural, economic, and human-development categories (Neves, 
2008; du Toit et al., 2007: 525; Anderson, 2006; Roux and van Tonder, 2006).  
 
Although those living in the rural area placed particular emphasis on the geographical 
divisions in South Africa, migrants also recognized the importance of the economic divide 
between those living in rural and urban areas. However, interviewees from all three 
categories did not agree on why those living in rural areas were poorer than those in urban 
ones: while those who had never migrated stressed the relative lack of job opportunities in 
rural areas compared with urban areas, migrants and returnees tended to emphasize the lack 
of infrastructure in rural areas. Responses to questions about what the South African 
government could do to improve urban and rural areas (Appendix A, Questions 2a-2e) 
suggest why this division exists. Those who had spent some time in Cape Town recognized 
the economic impact of infrastructural development while those who had never migrated 
tended to view infrastructural development as a quality-of-life consideration. 
 
Non-migrants viewed the economic divide between urban and rural areas as a result of the 
disparity in job opportunities. As NM-4, the school security guard, described, people in rural 
areas are “at the bottom … because there are no jobs.” In contrast, NM-5, the administrative 
intern, continued, “I can put the [urban people] on top … because we always believe that the 
money is in town and also jobs are found in towns.” Many, like NM-2, the unemployed 
female individual with a human resources certificate, recognized that there are people in 
urban areas who are “at the bottom because there are [] those in urban areas that are similar to 
us in rural areas, who are not working and struggling.” However, most still agreed with NM-
8, the government projects administrator, who argued that “people that are in urban areas are 
getting lots of piece jobs because there are many ongoing projects there. People here are very 
poor and dependent on social grants.” 
 
Returnees also stressed the lack of job opportunities in rural areas. R-1, the male police 
officer, described how people in rural areas are “at the bottom … because most of them, they 
are depending on grants. … [There are] no jobs, so the only person who’s got money in that 
certain home is the grandfather and grandmother,” who presumably have Old Age Pensions. 
Similarly, R-4, the female individual who had spent 11 years in Cape Town but has since 
returned, also described how people in rural areas are “at the bottom … because there are 
many people who stay here not working.” In contrast, she continued, the urban people are “in 
the middle … [because] some of them are working.” Even the jobs that do exist in rural areas, 
R-6, the municipal council employee, argued, are of lesser quality than those that exist in 
urban areas: “Here [in rural areas] we don’t have those big companies [like in urban areas]. 
… Even if you are working here you are working for small companies and you don’t earn as 
much money as you could earn when you’re out there in cities.” 
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However, returnees, unlike those who had never migrated, also emphasized the 
infrastructural disparities between rural and urban areas when describing the economic divide 
between the two. R-2, the taxi owner, for example, described how those in the townships 
often “suffer[] the same as [] the ones who are in rural areas … but they differ in terms of 
infrastructure. … There are roads in urban areas. There’s electricity. In some rural areas, 
there is electricity and there are those access roads, but not proper roads.” In contrast, R-9, 
the clothing store employee, highlighted how these infrastructural disparities affected schools 
in rural and urban areas: “Even the schools are not the same like the ones in rural areas. … 
The way that the schools are being built is not the same like rural areas. They have 
everything that the school needs.” As R-6 described, he “would place” those in rural areas 
“here, in the middle to the bottom. The ones that are on top are the ones that come from the 
locations or they are in towns … [because] here we don’t have electricity [but there they do], 
so they have access to everything. They are watching TV. They have things at the current 
moment.” 
 
Migrants, however, almost exclusively focused on the infrastructural differences between 
rural and urban locations. When asked why he would place rural people “on the bottom,” M-
1, the police officer, responded, “Firstly if I can talk about infrastructure, it’s something that 
causes me to put those people [on the bottom] because the areas where they live, they’re 
unplanned, not easily accessible, you find no electricity in some areas.” As M-3, the 
Department of Labour auditor, described, people in townships were “definitely” better off 
than people in rural areas because “if you compare infrastructure of rural areas and here in 
townships, and you look at the police stations, clinics, all those things, those are the [things] 
that you never find nearby in rural areas. But if you go to townships, you will find a clinic—
one or two—[and] you will have police stations.” 
 
Even migrants who highlighted the difficulty of finding jobs in rural areas tended to attribute 
the lack of job opportunities to the infrastructural underdevelopment of these areas. M-6, the 
collections department manager, described why urban areas are better off than rural ones: It’s 
because of “the fact that they are able to get jobs. They can get jobs.” However, he believed 
that the job opportunities in urban areas were a result of the infrastructural development of 
these areas. As he continued, “They’re more exposed in different things [in urban areas]. 
Technologies are more advanced compared to the Eastern Cape. Like if you’re here in Cape 
Town in townships, you are able to have access to a computer. If you’re looking for a job 
then you can be able to apply through a computer.” M-3, the Department of Labour auditor, 
was even more direct in her connection between the lack of jobs in the Eastern Cape and the 
failure of government to build infrastructure in those areas. “The Eastern Cape”—what she 
describes as “those places that you can’t even reach them, [because] there’s no roads that you 
can go there”—“is the worst place for jobs. … It’s not that they don’t want to do something, 
but the services that they’re getting, it’s very slow to go to Eastern Cape. It’s very slow, the 
services from government to go to the Eastern Cape. It’s very slow.” 
 
Responses to questions about what the South African government should do to improve rural 
areas indicate why the disparities in job opportunities were the salient distinction between 
rural and urban areas for non-migrants, while returnees and migrants tended to emphasize 
infrastructure. Most of those in the Non-Migrant category failed to recognize the 
developmental impact of infrastructure. In contrast, returnees had a more accurate grasp of 
the relationship between infrastructure and economic development. Migrants believed 
infrastructural development was synonymous with economic development. 
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Those who had never left Alfred Nzo saw infrastructural development as primarily a quality-
of-life concern. NM-3, the unemployed 21 year-old young man, for example, argued that “the 
government must do the same for rural [areas] as it is doing for urban areas. They have a lot 
of things there in urban areas … like RDP houses, water, sanitation projects and so on.” 
These improvements according to NM-3, however, would primarily shape the quality-of-life 
of those living in rural areas. If the government does all these things, he continued, “Life 
would be much better for those people who are poor and in rural areas.” Whatever 
developmental impact those who had never left Alfred Nzo did see in government investment 
in infrastructure was extremely limited. NM-9, the unemployed woman living outside of 
Matatiele, described how, if the government brought “electricity, water, RDP houses in rural 
areas for the poor, clinics, roads, as well as transport … jobs will be created.” However, once 
these services have been delivered, “People will carry on with life after that [as before].” 
Similarly NM-4, the security officer, described how the government needed to focus on 
“infrastructure development … like construction of roads, water and other things like RDP 
houses.” During this process, “many people will get jobs and poverty will be alleviated,” but 
these efforts will do little to help “private businesses.”  The non-migrants, thus, argued that in 
addition to infrastructure, the South African government—as NM-4 continued—must focus 
on a second, distinct goal: “open[ing] more job opportunities [and] help[ing] those graduates 
without jobs get jobs.” 
 
Returnees, who attributed the economic differences between rural and urban areas to both 
differences in job opportunities and infrastructure, had a better grasp of the developmental 
impact of infrastructure. Some saw the direct relationship between infrastructure and 
development. R-8, the unemployed woman who originally moved to Cape Town for health 
reasons, for example, described how the government needed “to ensure that all the services 
reach people and provide RDP houses for people in rural areas.” If they do this, she 
continued, “There will be development here in rural areas.” Similarly, R-9, the clothing store 
employee, described how, if the government “can improve the schools, clinics, streets lights, 
and fix the roads, people can get jobs. … People can get job opportunities.” But most saw 
infrastructure delivery as a mix of a quality-of-life and a development issue. As R-5, the 
worker on a government housing project, described, the primary benefit of infrastructure 
development would be “to provide us with electricity so that we can also watch TV [and] 
charge our cell phones.” However, “build[ing] roads, RDP houses, [and especially] 
deploy[ing] some white teachers in our primary education in order for our kids to improve 
their English”—R-5 believed that his lack of fluency in English was among the primary 
reasons he did not succeed while in Cape Town—would “open the doors” for rural South 
Africans.  
 
Those in the Migrant category—who attributed the disparities between rural and urban areas 
to infrastructural issues—viewed infrastructural development as synonymous with economic 
development. As M-1, who had earlier argued that “infrastructure … cause[d] me to put those 
people” in rural areas at the bottom, asserted that people in rural areas did want to work. 
However, “if their living condition is like that [i.e., without infrastructure], obviously it 
shows that those are [] people … [who] cannot do anything for themselves, like maybe try to 
redevelop the place where they live. They have got no means to survive.” M-6 was even 
more direct in his associations between infrastructure and economic development: “If the 
government did everything [with relation to infrastructure] in the stage that they want it to be, 
then everyone would stay in the Eastern Cape because the jobs will be able to be created 
there and the people won’t have to move to other areas to look for a job.”  
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However, perhaps because they had achieved some degree of success in Cape Town, 
migrants were ultimately much less focused on the economic underdevelopment of rural 
areas. M-6 argued that the government does “enough [for rural areas]. It takes time. … 
People who are there, they didn’t have toilets, they didn’t have running water, they didn’t 
have nothing. [Now,] the progress is there.” Similarly, M-1, who had earlier recognized the 
developmental impact of infrastructure, ultimately believed there was little urgency for the 
government to focus on the infrastructure of rural area and that doing so was wasteful: “I 
believe that if government might be thinking of having the structure in the rural areas 
whereby each and every house has a road next to it,” he argued, “it [would be] a lot of money 
that would be wasted.” 
 
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is well documented in the 
development literature (see, e.g., World Bank, 1994; Aschauer, 1989). Cape Town—and the 
Western Cape more generally—has some of the most advanced infrastructure, and perhaps 
not coincidentally the second largest gross regional product, in South Africa (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011b: 31; Statistics South Africa, 2010a: 4). Those who recognized the relationship 
between infrastructure and economic development—i.e., those who had spent time in Cape 
Town—saw the lack of infrastructure as the proximate cause of the poverty of rural areas and 
suggested that the government should focus on building infrastructure to develop these areas. 
However, those who did not recognize this relationship—i.e., those who had spent little time 
outside of rural areas, including some returnees—believed that a lack of jobs was responsible 
for the relative poverty of rural South Africans and offered fewer concrete suggestions 
(besides the amorphous entreaty that the government deliver “jobs”) for how to develop rural 
areas in South Africa. Merely building this infrastructure may not be sufficient to foster 
sustained economic growth in rural areas. As Bank and Minkley (2005: 20-21) argue, this 
approach has largely failed in South Africa thus far and more direct government intervention 
is necessary to stimulate “new variants of rural capitalism.” However, regardless of what 
additional steps are necessary to economically develop rural areas, infrastructure appears to 
be a prerequisite. 
 
 
2.4 Self-placement: A lens of poverty? 
 
During the interviews, individuals were asked where they would place themselves in the 
income distribution of South Africa. Subsequently, in the survey portion of the interview the 
respondents were asked for their household income (Appendix A, Question 1D and Appendix 
B, Questions B.13 and B.14). The vast majority of interviewees placed themselves at the 
bottom of the income distribution, although most of them were in households in the top three 
quintiles. There are two possible explanations for why these individuals underestimated their 
relative economic position: these views could reflect the fact that individuals look primarily 
at their own economic experiences when determining their relative economic position in 
society or that poverty continues to be the lens through which many black Africans view their 
economic situation. 
 
The vast majority of the interviewees placed themselves at the “bottom” of the income 
distribution (see Table 2.3). Only five of the 26 interviewees (19 percent) placed themselves 
in the “middle” of the distribution and none of the interviewees placed themselves at the top. 
Furthermore, those who placed themselves in the middle (including NM-1, R-6, and M-3) 
tended to place themselves at the bottom end of the middle. Where the interviewees placed 
themselves in the income distribution, however, appears to be largely divorced from reality. 
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Table 2.2: Per-capita household income in South Africa 








1 Up to R379 11.45 R422 
2 R380 – R819 11.45 R423 – R913 
3 R820 – R1 749 11.45 R914 – R1 949 
4 R1 750 – R4 759 11.45 R1 950 – R5 304 
5 R4 760 and above 11.45 R5 305 and above 
Sources: Per-capita income measurements were calculated from Statistics South Africa (2012) and CPI figures 
were calculated from http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=735&id=3. 
 
 
Every five years since 2000, Statistics South Africa—the statistical service of the South 
African government—has conducted a comprehensive Income and Expenditure Survey 
(IES). The last one, conducted in 2010/2011, collected income and expenditure data from 
25,328 households between September 2010 and August 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 
2012b). Because this study collected data on self-reported household income (Appendix B, 
Questions B.13 and B.14), by adjusting the per-capita household income reported in the 
2010/2011 IES for inflation using the CPI deflator, these data can be used to determine where 
the interviewees’ incomes rank nationally. Although self-reported household income may be 
less reliable than expenditure-based measures,5 it is possible to get a rough estimate of how 
the interviewees’ self-placement compares to their actual economic position in society (see 
Table 2.2). 
 
By comparing the per-capita household quintile data calculated from the 2010/2011 IES to 
the interviewees’ self-reported household income, it becomes apparent just how much the 
interviewees underestimated their relative economic positions (see Table 2.3). Although only 
five of the 26 interviewees did not place themselves in the bottom of the income distribution, 
well over half (15 of the 26 individuals) have per-capita household incomes that put them in 
the top three quintiles. Eight of those individuals are among the richest 40 percent of South 
Africans. This underestimation of their relative economic positions appears to transcend 
migration experience. NM-7, the credit collector, for example, whose per-capita household 
income was securely in the middle of the income distribution, describes herself as “on the 
very bottom end.” Similarly, R-1, the male police officer, whose income approached the fifth 
quintile, argued that he was only on the “second row from the bottom.” And M-6, the 
collections department manager, whose income was similar to R-1’s, also placed himself in 
“the second to last level.” 
 
The remaining 11 individuals were relatively poor and had a more accurate understanding of 
their economic position in society: six of those interviewed had per-capita household incomes 
below R500 per month (or incomes at or below the inflation-adjusted lower-bound poverty 
line—the amount under which South Africans are not able to afford necessary food and non-
food items—which was R443 in 2011 prices [Statistics South Africa, 2014a: 7-8]), and only 
two of them were in the second income quintile. Yet despite the comparative poverty of a  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This study collected self-reported household income, and not expenditure data, because of the time-intensive 
nature of expenditure surveys. 
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Self-Placement (seven rows 
from the bottom to the top of 
each diagram in Figure 2.1) 
NM-1 R19 000 6 R3 167 4 “Third one from the bottom,” 
but in the middle 
NM-2 R1 000 7 R143 1 “I’d place myself in the very 
bottom end” 
NM-3 R1 300 5 R260 1 “I am here at the bottom” 
NM-4 R5 600 1 R5 600 5 “There, in the bottom” 
NM-5 R7 500* 5 R1 500 3 “Maybe I am here in the 
middle” 
NM-6 R4 200 5 R840 2 “Maybe in this line [the second 
one]” from the bottom 
NM-7 R6 370 6 R1 062 3 “I’d place myself on the very 
bottom end” 
NM-8 R2 000 7 R286 1 “At the bottom” 
NM-9 R300 2 R150 1 “At the bottom” 
R-1 R19 000 4 R4 750 4 “The second row from the 
bottom” 
R-2 R13 000 10 R1 300 3 “I am there myself … [in] the 
bottom group” 
R-3 R2 500 2 R1 250 3 --------** 
R-4 R4 800 6 R800 2 “Here at the bottom” 
R-5 R1 600 7 R229 1 --------† 
R-6 R4 000* 4 R1 000 3 “Third [from the bottom] in the 
middle” 
R-7 R7 500* 3 R2 500 4 “On the bottom” 
R-8 R1 500 4 R375 1 “I’m at the bottom” 
R-9 R2 000 4 R500 1 “I can put myself at the bottom” 
M-1 R13 000 6 R2 167 4 “At the moment, I will place 
myself here [the second level 
from the bottom” 
M-2 R20 000 7 R2 857 4 “I’m still at the bottom” 
M-3 R25 000 5 R5 000 4 “For now I’m in the middle” 
but at the very bottom of the 
middle 
M-4 R3 000 5 R600 1 “At the bottom” 
M-5 R2 700 2 R1 350 3 “At the bottom” 
M-6 R30 000 6 R5 000 4 “I would place myself here, the 
second to last level” 
M-7 R1 000 2 R500 1 “At the bottom” 
M-8 R2 300 2 R1 150 3 “In the middle” 
*Those who did not know their exact monthly household income were asked to select the income range that best 
reflected their household income (Appendix B, Question B.14). For the purposes of this analysis, the simple 
average of these monthly ranges was used. 
**R-3 did not provide a response to the question of where he would place himself within the income 
distribution. 
†R-5 did not understand the question; he answered prospectively (where he wants to be) and not 
contemporaneously (where he is now). 
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significant portion of the sample (and their accurate understanding of this poverty), the 
overall self-placement trend is clear: none of the 26 interviewees overestimated their relative 
economic position.6 
 
Posel (2012: 6-11) found a similar trend in her analysis of data from the first two waves of 
NIDS. Respondents were asked to place their households’ relative economic position on a 
six-step ladder, with the top of the ladder representing the top of the income distribution. 
Over half of NIDS respondents placed themselves in the bottom third of the income 
distribution in both 2008 and 2010, while fewer than three percent of respondents believed 
they were in the top third of the distribution. Posel posits that part of the discrepancy between 
subjective and objective economic status may reflect the fact that “people do not have 
complete or accurate information about the economic status of others” (Ibid.: 9). 
 
During the interviews, a second explanation presented itself: individuals may mostly ignore 
the economic status of others when conceptualizing their own relative economic position. 
Instead, they may judge their economic position based on where they had expected to be 
economically, not on where they are relative to the rest of the population. R-2, the taxi owner 
who is on the upper end of the fourth quintile, for example, described how “I am there myself 
… [in] the bottom group … because I don’t have money, I don’t have means to make my life 
progress the way I wanted it to be. I wanted to be educated, I wanted to have professional 
jobs, you know. But now see where I am?” Similarly, M-2, the Transnet worker who is also 
in the fourth quintile, described how “I am still at the bottom. … It’s because I haven’t got 
what I want. I haven’t achieved what I was supposed to be achieving at the moment, so I’m 
still at the bottom trying my way up to the middle.” M-6, the debt collector whose per-capita 
household income approaches the fifth quintile, provides the most direct evidence for this 
hypothesis: “On this picture, I would place myself here: the second to last level … because 
I’m still very far. I’m still very far from where I’m supposed to be. … You can see that in 
terms of salaries that I get, I’m still very far.” These responses indicate that the discrepancy 
between subjective and objective economic status among South Africans may reflect the fact 
that individuals look towards their own experiences and aspirations when estimating their 
relative economic position more than it reflects imperfect information about the economic 
status of others, as Posel suggests. 
 
There is another potential explanation for why South Africans tend to underestimate their 
relative economic position. Posel (2012: 8) found that black Africans were more likely to 
underestimate their relative economic position than white individuals. She hypothesizes that 
this may be the case because “one of the legacies of apartheid may be that even relatively rich 
Africans still perceive their economic status as being inferior, particularly to Whites” (Ibid.: 
9). The individuals in all three migration categories viewed themselves as part of an 
“inferior” economic group, though they differed over which group this was: while migrants 
emphasized the racial elements of inequality, returnees and those who had never migrated 
emphasized inequality’s geographical elements. 
 
These findings suggest that black Africans continue to view society through a lens of poverty. 
Viewing society through a particular economic lens is not unique to black South Africans. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Because Statistics South Africa does not release local quintile data, national income quintiles were used in this 
analysis. Individuals in rural areas like Alfred Nzo are, however, poorer on average than individuals in urban 
ones like Cape Town. The interviewees who live in Alfred Nzo are thus most likely underestimating their local 
economic positions by a greater amount than the national data suggest, while those living in Cape Town may in 
fact have a more accurate understanding of their local economic positions. 
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Surveys from both the Pew Research Center and Gallup—both polling organizations that 
track social, demographic, economic, and political trends—for example, have consistently 
found that approximately half of Americans identify themselves as “middle class,” though the 
Pew Research Center observed a marked decline of those who consider themselves “middle 
class” during the Great Recession (Pew Social & Demographic Trends, 2012: 3-4; Dugan, 
2012). This middle-class ethos has been synonymous with American society since at least 
1835-1840 when Alexis de Tocqueville published his two-volume tome Democracy in 
America (de Tocqueville, 2000). Similarly, Cruces et al. (2013) found that most Argentines 
consider themselves middle class as well. It is possible that after centuries during which 
blackness was inextricably linked to poverty in South Africa, black Africans continue to 
conceptualize their economic system through this lens. 
 
The fact that the majority of black Africans view themselves as poor may have profound 
political and economic repercussions for South Africa. Many have argued that the middle-
class ethos in America influences its tax and welfare policies (see, e.g., Rampell, 2011). And 
Cruces et al. (2013: 106-110) found that once respondents were informed of their objective 
place in the income distribution, they altered their views on certain redistributive policies. 
The findings in South Africa suggest that black Africans still feel alienated from the rewards 
of the South African economic system. This isolation may thus imply that there is more 
widespread support for expansive redistributive policies than the purely objective economic 





Though South Africa still has among the highest rates of economic inequality in the world—
potentially undermining its nascent democracy and social cohesion—the nature of this 
inequality has changed dramatically since South Africa’s transition to democracy two 
decades ago. Not only has there been a significant integration of the upper deciles of the 
income distribution, but social spending and taxation have also become dramatically more 
pro-poor, reducing overall inequality by over one-quarter. Whether and how South Africans 
conceptualize the changing nature of inequality thus has profound repercussions for South 
African society. 
 
Migration background does not seem to affect how individuals perceived the distribution of 
income in South Africa. However, migration background does shape whom the interviewees 
believe are located in different parts of the income distribution and what they view as the 
primary economic division in society. While those who had never permanently left their rural 
areas and those who had returned to their rural area after migrating to Cape Town saw the top 
and middle of the income distribution as primarily comprised of those from the public sector, 
migrants to Cape Town argued that private sector individuals made up a substantially larger 
share of the middle and upper classes. The non-migrant and returnee focus on the public 
sector indicates that a potentially troubling dynamic may be developing in South Africa: if 
the majority of South Africans believe that government jobs are among the best opportunities 
available to them, then they may apply increasing pressure on the South African government 
to increase the public sector employment rolls, a trend that is already underway. 7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The proportion of formal sector employees working for the government has increased from 18.6 percent in 
2005 to nearly 23 percent in 2012 (UASA, 2012; Bosch, 2006: 17). And these figures are likely to 
underestimate the South African government’s impact on formal sector employment; they exclude employment 
created indirectly through government expenditure. 
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Additionally, migrants were much more likely to highlight the racialized nature of class 
divisions in South Africa, while non-migrants and returnees more often pointed to the 
geographic character of economic divisions between rural and urban areas. How the 
interviewees conceptualized the distribution of income in South Africa provides further 
evidence for the hypothesis advanced in Telzak (2014) that local economic conditions may be 
more important than national trends in shaping perceptions of inequality. 
 
Finally, this chapter examined where interviewees placed themselves within the income 
distribution in South Africa. The vast majority of the interviewees substantially 
underestimated their economic position in society, arguing that they were at or near the 
bottom of the income distribution, when in fact many were in the upper-end. These findings 
suggest that South Africans may continue to view their economic position through a lens of 
poverty, which has potentially profound repercussions for South African policymaking. 
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Chapter 3: Migrating to Mobility: Perceptions of Social Mobility 
 
Analyses of inequality and, by extension perceptions of inequality, though important, are 
ultimately limited. As Louw et al. (2007: 549) emphasize, “Analyzing the income 
distribution at any given moment using cross-sectional data generates a static picture only.” 
That is, although these studies offer insights into what is changing in South African society, 
they offer less insight into who is benefiting from these changes and why these changes are 
occurring (Woolard and Klasen, 2005: 866). And the study of these trends—the study of 
social mobility—may ultimately provide greater understanding of the evolution of post-
apartheid South Africa than studying inequality alone. As Birdsall and Graham (2000: 5) 
note, “Mobility provides a better measure of changing opportunities than do the traditional 
measures of inequality, and [] understanding mobility is critical to the discussion of 
inequality and of what to do about it.” 
 
Unfortunately, the study of social mobility in South Africa is very “limited and generally 
more ad hoc” (Woolard and Klasen, 2005: 896; see also Louw et al., 2007: 549). Although 
social mobility—or the changes in economic status of an individual either within his or her 
lifetime (known as “intra-generational mobility”) or across generations (known as “inter-
generational mobility”)—is among the most studied topics internationally for precisely these 
reasons, little work has been done on social mobility in South Africa, in no small part 
because of a lack of available data (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 264).1 
 
What studies do exist suggest that there has been a considerable degree of upward absolute 
mobility—or the overall socioeconomic gains that an entire society makes over time—among 
some black individuals since the end of apartheid, as the dramatic de-racialization of the top 
of the income distribution in South Africa suggests (see Section 2.1). However, what upward 
relative mobility—or the extent to which particular individuals in a given society gain 
relative to others—exists appears largely to be captured by a small group of black South 
Africans. Schneier (1983), who studied mobility in Soweto and three townships outside of 
Cape Town, and Crankshaw (1997), using data from manpower surveys since 1965, found 
that black Africans began to experience significant upward absolute mobility (primarily to 
formerly white occupations) near the end of apartheid. However, Schneier, who unlike 
Crankshaw collected retrospective data for his study, discovered that the degree of relative 
mobility within the black population was largely uneven. He concluded that black Africans 
from relatively privileged backgrounds monopolized most of these new opportunities. 
 
These trends appear to have persisted into post-apartheid South Africa. Agüero et al. (2007), 
for example, in their analysis of the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) and its follow up study, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics 
Survey (KIDS), found some intergenerational mobility among those living in KwaZulu-
Natal, but concluded that there was little intergenerational mobility among poorer 
households. Similarly, though Finn and Leibbrandt (2013) uncovered both absolute and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The National Income Dynamics Survey—a nationally representative survey of individuals that seeks to follow 
income dynamics in South Africa—promises to do much to close this gap in the existing data on intra-
generational mobility. However, only now, with the completion of the third wave of NIDS and its available 
retrospective data, can scholars begin to examine intra-generational mobility trends and do more than identify 
short-term income volatility patterns (as Woolard and Leibbrandt [2006: 12] highlight in their prospectus for 
NIDS, “You generally need 3 waves of a panel to [even] start to … tease out mobility pathways”). To analyze 
inter-generational mobility fully—that is, to go beyond a dependence on retrospective data—you need panel 
data that spans generations and covers at least a three-decade period. 
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relative intra-generational mobility among black South Africans generally between the first 
and third wave of NIDS—which were completed in 2008 and 2012, respectively—they found 
relatively little mobility (over this short period of time) among those at the top of the income 
distribution, suggesting that individuals from advantaged backgrounds continue to 
monopolize the most lucrative economic opportunities in South Africa (see also Finn et al., 
2012). This pattern of social mobility reflects that observed in many post-industrial, 
developed economies (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe et al., 1980). 
 
The literature that does exist is almost exclusively focused on objective mobility trends and 
has largely neglected the study of perceptions of social mobility, a common trend globally 
(Strauss, 2006: 4). Nor is this lacuna innocuous; the available literature indicates that 
perceptions of social mobility appear particularly dissociated from reality (Graham, 2000: 
227; Heath at al., 2010: 30) and that this dissociation may have a profound impact on society 
(Lipset and Bendix, 1991: xxii). Perceptions of social mobility not only influence an 
individual’s views of the economic system in which he or she operates, but these also shape 
voting behavior (Birdsall and Graham, 2000: 5). Furthermore, as Graham (2000: 228) argues, 
subjective mobility trends “can [also] have long-term effects on incentives and allocation 
structures,” the foundations of any capitalist economic system. Additionally, Jin and Tam 
(2012) found that perceived mobility affected mental health outcomes of individuals in 
China. And, for post-apartheid South Africa, examining perceptions of social mobility 
appears particularly important because perceptions of economic mobility have profound 
repercussions for social and political cohesion (Behrman, 2000: 77; Burns, 2009: 7). Thus, it 
is impossible to fully comprehend the intricacies of any economic and social system without 
also investigating subjective perceptions of social mobility.  
 
Perceptions of social mobility, which often differ greatly from objective trends, may 
ultimately be self-fulfilling. Piketty (1995: 556-7), for example, in his model of the impact of 
mobility experience on redistributive policies, found that individuals who have experienced 
negative economic shocks “may get (rationally) discouraged and supply less effort; whereas 
more successful agents supply more effort.”  As he concludes, “Eventually a lot of persistent 
inequality has been created simply because of endogenous beliefs dynamics.”  Piketty’s 
model indicates that perceptions of the degree of mobility held by different groups in society, 
which are shaped by past experience, may influence which cohorts are ultimately 
economically mobile. Although Piketty makes the simplifying and most likely incorrect 
assumption that individuals only examine their own experiences of mobility and not those of 
their peers (Ibid.: 562), his analysis suggests that studying perceptions of social mobility may 
ultimately provide important insights into why some groups are economically mobile while 
others are not, and can serve as a leading indicator of the degree of social mobility in a given 
society. The study of subjective mobility is thus a vital, if often neglected, component of the 
larger discipline of social mobility scholarship. 
 
There has been some work done on perceptions of social mobility internationally (see, e.g., 
Graham, 2000, on Latin America, especially Peru; Materju, 2000, on Eastern Europe; Webb, 
2000, on Peru; Heath et al., 2010, on Britain). However, this work suffers from a common 
trend: most of it is based on responses to survey questionnaires that tend to highlight the 
dissociation between objective and subjective mobility and fail to uncover why this 
dissonance exists and the potential repercussions of this dissonance for society. The few 




The authors who have indirectly waded into the difficult task of cataloging perceptions of 
social mobility in South Africa have discovered that, as predicted, perceptions do in fact 
differ greatly from reality. Bray et al. (2010: 217-9) examined “expectations” of educational 
attainment among Cape Town youth and their parents and found that young people were 
particularly poor at predicting their future educational attainment (and thus their future 
economic mobility), often greatly overestimating their educational potential. This raised the 
possibility that reported “expectations” were, perhaps, aspirations. Burns (2009: 7-12) found 
that this dissociation between perceptions and objective trends also exists in expectations of 
future economic mobility in South Africa. In an attempt to uncover perceptions of social 
cohesion in South Africa using data from the first wave of NIDS in 2008, Burns concluded 
that there was “an expectation of significant upward economic mobility” among South 
Africans in all locations of the income distribution: only 18 percent of those in the lowest 
quintile, for example, expected to remain there over the subsequent two years, with over two-
thirds of these individuals predicting that their income would gain at least 17 percent 
compared to the average South African. These expectations, however, appear largely 
unfounded in the existing literature, indicating that individuals are poor at predicting their 
future mobility. As Bray et al. (2010) suggested, these “expectations” might be better 
understood as “aspirations,” given how far removed from reality they are. 
 
Posel (2012: 5-11), in her exploration of subjective well-being in South Africa using data 
from the first two waves of NIDS, also found that individuals were overly optimistic about 
their future mobility and overly pessimistic about their current location within the income 
distribution: Not only did most NIDS respondents underestimate their comparative wealth, 
but in 2008, nearly three-quarters of these individuals expected to experience upward relative 
mobility within two years. The number expecting to experience upward mobility, however, 
fell to 50 percent by 2010, perhaps reflecting the impact of the global economic downturn on 
the economy of South Africa. 
 
Wale (2013) has engaged in perhaps the most concerted effort to uncover perceptions of 
social mobility in South Africa. In “Perceptions of Class Mobility,” Wale drew on 72 
qualitative interviews—a non-random subset of 2,550 respondents to a 2006 survey run by 
the University of Johannesburg, designed in part to uncover perceptions of class mobility in 
Soweto (the set of townships outside Johannesburg). Wale demonstrates that class-
consciousness is deeply rooted in concepts of “affordability” and, thus, that individuals assess 
their mobility through the lens of material acquisitions (Ibid.: 167-172). She ultimately 
argues that respondents presented both “individualistic explanations”—highlighting the 
importance of hard work and determination—and “structural explanations”—emphasizing 
the high barriers of unemployment and access to capital—of social mobility (Ibid.: 172-181). 
 
In my earlier work (Telzak, 2012, 2014) I examined whether previous mobility experiences, 
and not just current class position, influence perceptions of mobility. Based on both economic 
background and outcome, I interviewed four categories of individuals according to their 
mobility experiences: those who were poor and had experienced little mobility, those who 
were poor and had experienced some mobility, those who were born into advantaged families 
and remained advantaged, and those who were born into advantaged backgrounds and have 
had relatively unsuccessful outcomes. Because there are few individuals in South Africa who 
have experienced downward mobility, I focused primarily on the first three categories. I 
showed that previous mobility experience did influence perceptions of social mobility among 
black Africans in Cape Town. Though the interviewees had a largely racialized view of the 
distribution of income in South African society, all of the interviewees saw a number of 
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different pathways to economic success—including education, hard work, social capital, and 
government patronage—open to all South Africans. However, the interviewees largely 
disagreed on the accessibility of these pathways. Those who were born into relatively 
advantaged families or who had experienced some degree of upward mobility were optimistic 
about their children’s and their chances for further mobility. In contrast, those from poor 
backgrounds who had experienced little upward mobility were pessimistic about their 
children’s and their opportunities for economic success. I ultimately hypothesized that an 
intergenerational “mobility trap” may have developed in South Africa: because of this 
pessimism, South Africans may not invest in their children’s future regardless of their ability 
to do so; their perceptions may thus become reality, pulling whole families into a cycle of 
immobility. 
 
Because Cape Town is demographically and economically dissimilar to the rest of South 
Africa, I then reproduced this methodology in two other areas of the country: the rural areas 
around Mount Frere, Eastern Cape and the town of Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal. Interviewees 
in Mount Frere and Newcastle, like those in Cape Town, stressed the importance of education 
for social mobility, but, unlike those in Cape Town, they emphasized the necessity of 
political connections for getting ahead and the danger of drug and alcohol abuse to an 
individual’s mobility potential. The interviews in Mount Frere and Newcastle confirm the 
finding from Cape Town that there may be a “mobility trap” developing in South Africa 
(Telzak, 2014). These results, however, were very preliminary. The sampling methodology—
which used purposive sampling to identify interviewees—was not nearly as rigorous as the 
methodology used in Cape Town and relied disproportionately on a single contact: Thobani 
Ncapai, the fieldworker who provided knowledge of the local areas and translation services. 
 
In this chapter, I test my previous findings on perceptions of mobility in rural and urban 
settings, examine whether and how migration itself shapes economic perceptions, and 
consider the perceived role of migration in an individual’s mobility prospects. I do this in 
three parts. First, I argue that the perceived pathways and impediments to social mobility 
highlighted by the interviewees can be grouped into two categories—an individualistic one 
and a structural one—the relative importance of which can vary based on an individual’s 
location. I then examine these individualistic and structural groupings in more depth, 
exploring whether and how migration experience shapes how the interviewees’ perceive 
these mobility pathways and how these pathways differ in rural and urban settings. Finally, I 
conclude by arguing that the interviewees conceptualize migration as an opportunity to 
overcome the structural impediments of rural areas. 
 
 
3.2 A Framework for Perceived Social Mobility 
 
Individuals can exploit any number of pathways to achieve economic success. How socially 
mobile an individual is, is thus a function of that individual’s ability to exploit one or more of 
these mobility pathways. Similarly, individuals can perceive any number of mobility 
pathways, which may or may not reflect the economic realities of society. The aggregation of 
an individual’s ability to exploit these perceived mobility pathways is thus an individual’s 
expected mobility potential—that is, not his actual mobility, but the degree of mobility one 
would be expected to achieve if these perceived mobility pathways and their presumed 
outcomes directly mirrored reality. Expected mobility is a particularly meaningful concept 
because individuals make economic and social decisions based on their perceived outcomes, 
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which may or may not be accurate; that is, they choose which perceived mobility pathways to 
pursue based on their expected, and not necessarily their actual, payoffs (see Section 1.1). 
 
Social mobility theorists and egalitarian philosophers, however, are not merely concerned 
with measuring the degree of social mobility in society, but are also interested in 
investigating to what degree the mobility that does exist reflects individual merit (i.e., to what 
degree there is equality of opportunity, if not necessarily equality of outcome, in a given 
society) (see, e.g., Roemer and Trannoy, 2013; Roemer, 2012; Sen, 1980; Rawls, 1971 and 
1958). Just as equality of opportunity is a salient consideration when studying objective 
social mobility trends, it should also be considered during the study of perceived mobility. 
 
In this chapter, I thus divide perceived mobility pathways into two categories: the first, which 
(borrowing from Wale’s distinction) I call  “individualistic” pathways, are those which are 
perceived to have entirely meritocratic outcomes and which individuals believe they can 
directly exploit, for example education and hard work. The second, which I call “structural” 
pathways, are broader societal trends, which individuals believe they have a limited ability to 
influence, for example nepotism and racism.2 Although these structural “pathways” can 
facilitate economic mobility, they were more often perceived as impediments to this mobility 
by the interviewees. For clarity, I thus refer to them as “Structural Pathways and 
Impediments” throughout this chapter. In reality, no perceived mobility pathway fits neatly 
into either category; no pathway is either completely structural or completely meritocratic. 
However, dividing perceived mobility pathways into these two categories has considerable 
practical, in addition to philosophical, significance: whether or not an individual believes that 
the outcome of a particular mobility pathway is meritocratic will help determine the degree of 
effort he will dedicate to that pathway. 
 
In societies with perfect equality of opportunity, only meritocratic pathways exist. Individual 
effort still matters, and thus outcomes will vary, but each individual is given equal access to 
the available mobility pathways. In contrast, in societies with perfect inequality of 
opportunity, an individual’s degree of mobility is dictated entirely by structural factors, and 
his or her economic outcome is predetermined. In reality, in all societies, both individual 
effort and structural factors matter and an individual’s mobility is a function of pathways and 
impediments both within and outside of that individual’s control. However, the relative 
importance of individualistic and structural factors need not be constant within a single 
country; in fact, in this chapter I argue that the importance of individualistic and structural 
factors are perceived to vary considerably between urban and rural areas in South Africa, thus 
inducing individuals to migrate. 
 
 
3.3 Individualistic Aspirations in a Structural Reality: Perceived Social Mobility 
Pathways and Impediments 
 
During the interviews, I asked my interviewees whether it was possible for an individual to 
move from the bottom of the income distribution to the top and, if so, how (Appendix A, 
Question 1c). We can thus examine the pathways and impediments that the interviewees 
believe lead to or inhibit their economic success. My interviewees identified two pathways 
that were primarily individualistic, which they believed they could directly exploit: education 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 These names loosely follow from Wale (2013)’s discussion of the kinds of explanations given by individuals 
in SOWETO for social mobility. 
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and hard work. In contrast, they identified three structural pathways/impediments that they 
believed they had little, if any, direct control over: corruption and nepotism, access to 
information, and the availability of jobs. Throughout this section, I highlight differences in 
the conceptualization of these pathways among the three migration groups, though there is a 




3.3.1 Individualistic Pathways 
 
In this section, I examine the two individualistic pathways stressed by the interviewees: 
education and hard work. The interviewees believed education to be among the most 
important pathways to economic success available to South Africans. The interviewees also 
argued that hard work was a necessary, but insufficient, pathway to mobility.  
 
 
3.3.1.1 Individualistic Pathway 1: Education 
 
All the interviewees in this study highlighted the importance of education for mobility (as did 
interviewees in my previous studies). NM-8, the administrator for government projects, for 
example, described how “it’s easier [to be mobile] if you are educated, but very difficult 
without an education.” Similarly, R-4, the unemployed 27 year-old who spent 11 years in 
Cape Town before returning, argued that what “differentiates” those at the top from those at 
the bottom is “education.” M-8, the hotel cleaner, similarly argued that “one has to be 
educated to get” to the top. “Those who are not on top are the people who didn’t get an 
education.” And M-4, the street cleaner, observed the changing requirements for reaching the 
top of the income distribution in South Africa: “It used to be your role in the struggle for 
South African liberation” that allowed you to reach the top, “but now it’s an education.” 
 
In fact, many perceived education as the most important pathway to mobility. Both NM-2, 
the unemployed woman who lives outside of Qumbu, and R-6, the municipal council 
employee, asserted that “education is the key” to success. “Just allow me to say that 
[successful people] study,” R-6 continued. “If you’re educated, you can go all these steps. 
But it is mostly impossible for someone who is not educated.” “Without an education, you 
cannot be on top,” R-9, the clothing-store employee, argued. M-1, the police officer, used 
similar logic: “Through education, it is possible that from the bottom you can see yourself on 
top. … There is nothing else [other] than education.” M-8, the hotel cleaner, was even more 
emphatic: “Everyone who is educated gets to the top,” she flatly asserted. 
 
These views echo those reported in previous studies (Telzak, 2012: 26-29, 2014: 17-19) and 
largely reflect the empirically established relationship between education and economic 
outcomes in South Africa (Louw et al., 2007: 549; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 265). 
Educational attainment not only affects an individual’s employment prospects (Bhorat, 2004: 
951), but also affects his income level (Statistics South Africa, 2010b: x). Returns to 
education in South Africa, however, are not linear: there appear to be very few, if any, returns 
for lower educational qualifications. Keswell and Poswell (2004: 835 and 844), for example, 
found that returns to fewer than ten years of education are negligible. In contrast, returns to 
tertiary education in South Africa are large and increasing. Additionally, Branson and 
Leibbrandt (2013: 16 and 18) found that, although there may be some wage advantages to 
secondary schooling and matriculation degrees, only those with tertiary qualifications 
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received an employment premium (i.e., there was a higher likelihood that they would be 
employed compared to those with only primary levels of education). 
 
Many of my interviewees seemed to recognize the particular importance of tertiary 
qualifications. NM-6, the spaza shop owner, for example, described how “we’re making 
efforts to send our kids to higher learning institutions” because through those institutions, 
they will “access opportunities that offer better outcomes.” Similarly, M-6, the collections 
department manager, argued that “you will need to study … and make sure that you at least 
do your honors” to get to the top. At the extreme, R-2, the taxi owner, asserted that even to 
get to the “middle” you must “have tertiary education. The people in the middle have 
tertiary” degrees. 
 
Interviewees from all migration backgrounds saw educational attainment, especially at the 
lower levels, as primarily an individualistic pathway to mobility. NM-3, the unemployed 21-
year-old from outside of Mount Frere, for example, attributed the difference between those 
who pursue education and those who do not to “how serious [the] person is. … Some are 
willing, some aren’t. Some don’t care.” People who don’t get educated are those who “don’t 
take education seriously,” NM-4, the security officer, agreed. Returnees and migrants were 
more pointed in their critiques of those who do not complete their educations. Those who 
don’t make it to grade 12 “are [too] lazy to study,” R-9, the clothing store worker, asserted. “I 
think it’s laziness,” M-2, the Transnet employee, concurred. “It’s being lazy to just drop off 
at secondary education. And then if you’re lazy, you can’t make it.” Ultimately, most were in 
agreement that educational opportunities, at least through high school, were largely open to 
those who chose to pursue them.  
 
However, the interviewees recognized that there are very real structural barriers to education, 
particularly at the tertiary level. In addition to “laziness,” the interviewees often attributed a 
lack of educational achievement to poverty. Although some—including NM-7, the credit 
collector in the furniture store, argued that there are “pupils [who] give up because they don’t 
have school uniforms. They get ridiculed by other pupils and are starving and not getting 
enough support even from the schools”—believed that poverty inhibited educational 
attainment at lower levels, the vast majority of my interviewees believed that monetary 
concerns only became relevant after high school. NM-6, the spaza shop owner, described 
how “some of our children don’t continue studying after matric” because of a “lack of money 
and bursaries.” Similarly, R-6, the municipal council employee, argued that most people “are 
trying to be educated. … But when they [get] their matric [degrees], they don’t have more 
money to go up and continue with their studies.” “With us [black people],” M-2, the Transnet 
employee, described, “It's a problem because sometimes you finish high school and there's no 
money for you to study further. You finish your matric and then you [have to] start looking 
for a job. [As a result,] you don't go further and go to a tertiary [institution] so that you can 
study for something that [will help] you live the life that you want to live.” 
 
These views reflect the realities of South African society. The South African constitution 
guarantees all South Africans a right to basic education. South African primary and 
secondary schools are funded by a combination of government allocations and school fees. In 
practice, however, the cost of education for the majority of South African students is at or 
near zero. In 2007, South Africa extended the number of no-fee institutions—or those schools 
who are prohibited from charging fees in exchange for supplementary governmental 
funding—from 40 percent to 60 percent of all schools. Additionally, parents are exempt from 
paying school fees if the fees represent 10 percent or more of a household’s income, and they 
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receive a partial exemption if the fees are between 2.5 percent and 10 percent of their total 
income (Department of Basic Education; www.etu.org.za). 
 
This generous support, however, does not extend fully to tertiary education, which is often 
prohibitively expensive. Although South Africa provides funding for tertiary education 
through the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), the majority of this funding 
must be paid back upon graduation (up to 40 percent of the loans will be forgiven, depending 
on academic performance). Additionally, NSFAS loans do not cover living expenses, which 
are a necessary, and often insurmountable, financial burden for many South Africans 
(www.nsfas.org.za; van der Bank and Nkadimeng, 2014; Mdepa and Tshiwula, 2012: 24). As 
the Department of Higher Education concluded in 2012, “There are inadequate financial 
resources [in South Africa] to allow most school leavers … to successfully enter post-
[secondary] provisions” (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2012: 9). Thus, the 
interviewees, who recognized the structural barriers to tertiary education but believed 
primary and secondary schooling was accessible to most, had a relatively accurate 
understanding of the educational opportunities and barriers in South Africa.  
 
 
3.3.1.2 Individualistic Pathway 2: Hard Work 
 
In addition to education, interviewees from all three migration categories suggested a second 
individualistic pathway to economic success: hard work. As NM-6, the spaza shop owner, 
described, “One has to be extremely hard [working] to get from the bottom to the top.” 
Similarly, R-6, the municipal council employee, argued that “it is possible” to move up 
economically, but “you need to work very, very, very hard—very, very, very hard.” As, M-6, 
the manager in the collections department, concluded, there are “only [two] things that can 
take you clean” to the top: first, “to make sure that … you study” and second, to “work very 
hard. … Those [are] the only options that can take you there.” 
 
Thus, many of the interviewees concluded, those who are not socially mobile are not 
successful at least in part because they do not work hard enough. NM-5, the administrative 
intern, described how “some of us are lazy. … We don’t want to stand up on our own and 
some of us want to be unemployed.” Similarly, NM-7, the credit collector, argued that some 
of those who fail to advance economically are “lazy. … They are not serious. They don’t 
want to get out of their comfort zone. They are only expecting things from other people … 
[and not] aiming for anything better than where they are.” R-1, the police office from 
Matatiele, believed that those who don’t have jobs “are those who are … not getting things. 
They are not motivated. That is why you’ll find a lot of matriculants out there in rural areas 
… just sitting.” These people, M-3, the Labour Department auditor, argued, “want someone 
to work for them. They just want something on the plate [and someone] to say, ‘Take it.’ 
They don’t want to work for themselves.” 
 
The views expressed by these interviewees are what Wale (2013: 172-173), in her 
examination of perceptions of class mobility in Soweto, called “individualistic” explanations 
for social mobility. “The assumptions underpinning” these views, Wale describes, “Is that the 
opportunities of a better life are there for the taking. Responsibility is [thus] placed on the 
individual to’ take advantage of these opportunities (Ibid.: 173-174). In fact, like in Telzak 
(2012: 30-33), previous mobility experience appears to be the link among those who 
emphasized the importance of hard work for economic success: the vast majority of those 
who believed hard work was a key pathway to mobility had achieved some degree of 
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economic success themselves, though this “success” reflects an extremely broad range of 
economic outcomes.3 In contrast, those who were unsuccessful tended not to highlight the 
role of “hard work” in social mobility; only one of the six unemployed interviewees (i.e., R-
3) considered “hard work” an important mobility pathway, though none of the other 
interviewees rejected the role of hard work outright. 
 
In fact, there was awareness among those who emphasized the importance of hard work that 
hard work was necessary but not sufficient for economic success. R-7, the police officer from 
Tsolo, argued that “maybe some [who do not succeed] are lazy, but others are trying” and 
they still don’t succeed. Many of the interviewees also felt similarly about education. There 
were a number of interviewees who echoed R-2’s contention that education could only take 
an individual so far: “We have graduates here with master's, honours,” R-2 described, “They 
never got a job, even now.” As the interviewees argued, there are other, structural pathways 
and impediments—including corruption and nepotism, a lack of available jobs, and access to 
information—that hamper the potential economic gains from both hard work and education. 
 
 
3.3.2 Structural Pathways and Impediments 
 
Though my interviewees emphasized the importance of two individualistic pathways to 
mobility—education and hard work—they believed that there was tension between these 
pathways and a number of structural impediments that were completely outside of their 
control, including corruption and nepotism, access to information, and the availability of 
jobs. In this next section, I examine these three structural pathways/impediments in more 
depth and argue that my interviewees believe the structural barriers to mobility are much 
higher in rural than in urban areas. 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Structural Pathway/Impediment I: Corruption and Nepotism 
 
Corruption in South Africa is endemic. Nearly a quarter of South Africa’s procurement 
budget (or approximately US$3.8 billion) gets lost to corruption every year, according to 
South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit (The Economist, 2011).4 Newspapers are full of 
stories of corruption at every level of the South African government, including (it is alleged) 
at the presidency itself. More immediately, according to the 2011 Afrobarometer survey, on 
average 40 percent of South African respondents believed that “all” or “most” government 
officials across seven different categories (“President and his Office,” “MPs,” “Government 
Officials,” “Local Government Councillors,” “Police,” “SARS,” and “Judges and 
Magistrates”) were corrupt, up from fewer than 25 percent in 2002. Additionally, 35 percent 
of respondents admitted to have personally paid a bride to a government official in their 
lifetimes (Wielders, 2013: 3-5). 
 
It is thus no surprise that many of the interviewees saw corruption as a prominent pathway to 
economic success. NM-1, the information-technology specialist, argued that Members of 
Parliament are on top because “they have forgotten where they came from [and] are selfishly 
keeping the gains [for] themselves.” Parliamentarians and other government officials are on 
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3 R-9, for example, works part time in a clothing store, and NM-4 is an administrative intern. In contrast, R-1, 
R-7, and M-1 are police officers and M-6 is a manager in a collections department and owns a number of rental 
properties. 
4 For a more thorough examination of corruption in post-apartheid South Africa, see Hyslop (2005). 
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top “because of the corruption that is taking place here,” NM-4, the security officer, agreed. 
Similarly, R-7, the police officer from Tsolo, described how “you’ll find those corrupt people 
[in] the middle and also on the top. … There are [a lot of these] people who are getting 
money that they weren’t supposed to get.” R-2, the taxi owner, was even more emphatic: 
“Most people are on top because of” “corruption and fraud.” 
 
The intense corruption found in most of South Africa, according to many interviewees, is not 
only an opportunity for some to profit, but also inhibits the abilities of others to succeed. 
NM-1, who asserted that parliamentarians reach the top by “fork[ing] money for themselves,” 
described how doing so “keeps them on top and everybody below.” NM-9, the unemployed 
Matatiele resident, argued that “I think government allocates money for services”—which 
many interviewees believed was one of the key reasons why rural areas remained poorer than 
urban ones (see Section 2.3.2)—“but it gets lost due to corruption” and thus presumably 
inhibits the development of rural areas. R-2 was again more direct: corruption “and fraud,” he 
argued, are “killing this province, not to mention the country.” 
 
Those in the Migrant category, however, were much less focused on corruption. Only one—
M-2, the Transnet employee—made a vague and passing remark about it: “There’s a lot of 
corruption,” she argued, “In the government and stuff.” The differing emphasis on corruption 
between those in Cape Town and those in the Eastern Cape reflects the large differences in 
the degree of corruption in both areas. Though corruption is endemic in South Africa, the 
Western Cape is by far the least corrupt province in the country, while the Eastern Cape is 
arguably the most corrupt. And the City of Cape Town was one of only 22 municipalities—
and the only metropolitan area—to receive a clean audit report from the South African 
Auditor General (Auditor-General South Africa, 2014). It is thus unsurprising that those in 
the Migrant category, all of whom had been living in Cape Town for over a decade, would 
not consider corruption as significant to economic success as those who live in the Eastern 
Cape. Migrants, however, wholeheartedly agreed with those who live in rural areas on the 
profound impact of another, related mobility pathway: nepotism and connections. 
 
Those from all three migration categories believed that nepotism and connections were 
important, if not essential, to social mobility. NM-9, the unemployed Matatiele resident, 
described how “people hire their friends and families and that’s the problem we face in our 
communities. … If you know someone inside that company, by the time the job is advertised 
you already know the details. When other people apply, the job is already yours.” “People 
that are in jobs first consider their relatives if there’s a vacancy where they are working,” 
NM-7, the credit collector, agreed. Similarly, R-9, the clothing store employee, argued that 
“if you don’t know anyone it’s difficult to get the jobs.” This happens even when individuals 
are unqualified to fill the vacancy: “If someone has got a relative who is in the position to 
give him or her a job, they get it even if there is someone who [actually] qualifies for that 
job,” R-7, the police officer from Tsolo, bemoaned. As M-4, the street cleaner, stated flatly, 
“These days, you find a job through another person.” 
 
The importance of connections—what is often called “social capital”—for securing 
employment in South Africa is well documented (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 280-7). 
As early as 1984, McCartan (1984), through a series of interviews with 43 employers in the 
Eastern Cape, observed that informal networks played a large role in the hiring processes of 
both skilled and semi-skilled workers. Similarly, Standing et al. (1996: 338), in their analysis 
of survey responses of 500 manufacturers in Cape Town, Durban, Gauteng, and Port 
Elizabeth, found that 41 percent of manufactures utilized family and friend networks to fill 
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their vacancies, while only 7 percent considered applicants with no prior relation to the firm. 
And it appears that those looking for work have adjusted their approach accordingly: 
Erasmus (1999: 60), in his survey of 2,000 unemployed individuals, ultimately concluded 
that most black South Africans “relied [mainly] on family and friends” to seek and secure 
employment.  
 
And unlike corruption, the role of informal networks in securing employment also appears 
very important in Cape Town. Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 284-6; see also Schöer and 
Leibbrandt, 2006), for example, in their analysis of Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain Survey 
responses, found that nearly two-thirds of respondents reported that their first job came 
through help from either friends or family and nearly 60 percent of respondents reported that 
they got their “previous” job through these social networks. Perhaps more interestingly, 91 
percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Employers 
employ the friends and relatives of their existing workforce rather than other people.”  
Furthermore, Magruder (2007: 18-21, 28-9), in his analysis of familial network effects among 
respondents of the Cape Area Panel Study, found that father’s employment status had a 
“substantial” impact on son’s employment status, perhaps reflecting the importance of 
familial connections in securing work. In my own unpublished research, I found that of the 
53 percent of CAPS respondents who had searched for work in the months directly preceding 
Wave 5, over 93 percent had sought help from either friends or family members in the job 
search (Telzak, 2013). 
 
The interviewees not only believed that corruption and nepotism were important mobility 
pathways for certain individual; they also argued that their widespread use impeded the 
realization of the full economic potential of other, more meritocratic pathways, particularly 
education. “In South Africa, we have this thing called nepotism,” M-1, the police officer, 
explained. “That is the other effect that may cause those educated people to not get to the top 
because they are not known by well-known-people.” You “need to go and study” to be 
successful, M-5, the government-office cleaner, argued, “But these days people are 
promoting others with no qualifications. … [It is impossible to reach the top] if you don’t 
know anyone.” NM-8 the government project administrator, agreed: “Some are not reaching 
the top due to high levels of corruption. [] You can be educated only to struggle to get a job 
because jobs are only gotten by those who have connections.” In fact, the importance of 
corruption and nepotism to mobility, some of my interviewees argued, discouraged 
individuals from pursuing an education to begin with: NM-7, the credit collector, described 
how nepotism “is a problem which discourages other people from studying because they feel 
like education doesn’t help if jobs go to [those with] connections.” 
 
Many of my interviewees, especially those who lived in rural areas, believed that there was 
disproportionately more corruption and nepotism in rural areas than in urban ones. As NM-2, 
the unemployed woman from Qumbu, argued, “To put it in perspective, here in rural areas, 
you have to know the top officials to get the top positions within power. … Even if there are 
positions that have been advertised, nepotism is the way they determine who gets such 
positions.” Officials engage in this gross nepotism, she continued, because “they assume 
people in rural areas know nothing and will be grateful for what they get.” R-1, the police 
officer from Matatiele, confirmed NM-2’s suspicions: “There’s a lot of stealing” in rural 
areas, unlike in urban areas, because people “don’t have the knowledge to follow up that 
maybe there was 100 rand that was sent to the community” but it got lost.5 Similarly, R-2, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Here, I interpreted R-1’s references to “Limpopo” and “Gauteng” as synonyms for “rural” and “urban.” 
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taxi owner, argued that in rural areas, in contrast to urban ones, “There is a lot of 
unemployment. You will see that most people are not working. [So] if you don’t have any 
connections, you don’t get a job.” 
 
The prevalence of corruption and nepotism in rural areas does in fact appear higher than in 
urban ones. As du Toit et al. (2007: 526) describes during his discussion of economic 
opportunities in Mount Frere, which is a major town in the area where this study was 
conducted, “What stable and secure livelihoods there are in the area are those linked to the 
state and local government. In turn, access to these is governed by a local elite that is both 
traditional and political and which [abuses] its economic clout and connections with state 
power.” R-8, the unemployed 25-year-old woman from Mount Frere who had moved to Cape 
Town for health reasons, observed this process firsthand in her community: “There are no 
other jobs” except for those given out “by the local municipality … [and] through the 
councilors” who distribute the jobs through “nepotism.” “You find out that there’s a position 
in a municipality”, she continued, and “when someone [] applies for it, they won’t get a job, 
but if an applicant is related to a councilor, he or she will get the job.” 
 
Notably, few of the interviewees highlighted racial discrimination as a continued hurdle to 
mobility during the interviews, though some did recognize the historical legacy of apartheid 
in shaping the distribution of income in South Africa (see Section 2.3.1). In the survey 
portion of the interview, individuals were asked “Which of these things”—“a wealthy 
family,” “working hard,” “a good education,” “knowing the right people,” “your race,” 
“your gender (i.e. whether you are a man or a woman),” “luck,” or I “don’t know”—“is the 
most important in terms of whether you do or do not get ahead in life? Which of these things 
is second most important?” (Appendix B, Question D.8). None of the interviewees believed 
that “your race” was either the first or second most important factors determining an 
individual’s mobility. In contrast, nearly 20 percent (n=5) believed “knowing the right 
people” was significant in an individual’s economic outcome. Much as intra-racial income 
disparities have become a more important driver of inequality in South Africa since the end 
of apartheid than inter-racial income disparities (see Section 2.1), these interviews raise the 
possibility that intra-racial discrimination in the form of nepotism and corruption has come 
to replace inter-racial discrimination as a more important constraint to (or opportunity for) 
mobility in the minds of South Africans. 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Structural Pathway/Impediment 2: Access to Information 
 
A prerequisite for social mobility is knowledge of the available economic opportunities and 
how to exploit them. Interviewees from all three mobility backgrounds recognized the 
importance of this information. R-9, the clothing store worker, for example, argued that some 
of “those who are not working hard [are] people who don’t know where to start from to get 
on top.” NM-3, the unemployed young man from outside of Mount Frere, offered a 
suggestion for how to access this information: for “a person [to] get” to the top, he argued, he 
must “asking [] another” at the top “how they got there.” NM-7, the credit collector, 
explained why these people are potentially helpful: “They know what it takes to be on top. 
They have been through stages of success that led them there. [You] cannot just move there 
without their help.” Thus, to reach the top, “you need advice from those who are already on 
top. You shouldn’t be lazy. You must be someone who is curious for information.” M-2, the 
Transnet employee, elucidated this process with an example: Let’s say “maybe you’re here at 
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the bottom and you want to make a business, you go out and find out from the people who 
already have businesses and ask for help from them.” 
 
Although the interviewees felt like they had some control over accessing this information, it 
is telling that the only suggestion they offered for doing so was relatively vague and of 
nebulous efficacy: seeking advice from successful individuals. Notably, only one of the 
interviewees—R-6, the municipal council employee—claimed to have gained helpful 
information by talking to others, and even he acknowledged that his ability to do so 
ultimately “depend[ed] on luck” and was largely outside of his control. In fact, most of the 
interviewees felt that access to information in South Africa is almost entirely dependent on 
where one lives: information about the available economic opportunities and how to pursue 
them, the interviewees argued, is much more accessible in urban areas than in rural areas.  
 
Interviewees from all three mobility backgrounds believed that rural areas in South Africa 
were, in effect, informational deserts, where few details about economic opportunities and 
how to access them penetrate. NM-2, the unemployed woman from Qumbu, argued that 
“Grade 12 is a great achievement. There’s a lot you can do, but our problem in rural areas is 
[a] lack of advice on what you can do … after passing matric.” R-1, the police officer from 
Matatiele, described this phenomenon: “A lot of matriculants out there in rural areas, [] 
they’re just sitting. They’re thinking maybe, ‘If we don’t have someone who is up there, who 
will always support you with the newspapers, with the information [it doesn’t make sense to 
look for work].’ In contrast, people in urban areas know “how to access things … so [there is 
a difference between] those who are in rural areas and those who passed matrics in the 
cities.” Blacks are on the bottom of the income distribution in South Africa, NM-5, the 
administrative intern, argued, “Just because they don’t know most of the things as [they] are 
living in rural areas.” “If you are in urban areas,” however, “you can’t miss anything.” 
 
Some of those in the Migrant category—those who live in urban areas—expressed nearly 
identical sentiments. M-2, the Transnet employee, concluded that the lack of information in 
rural areas contributed directly to the poverty of these areas: People in rural areas “are on the 
bottom,” she explained, because of a “lack of knowledge. … Some of the people, they don’t 
know where they can go and get help. The information is not so clear.” M-3, the Department 
of Labour auditor, proposed a straightforward solution that she believed would help solve this 
problem. “I don’t think they have [information] in rural areas. There are rural areas that have 
that [information], but [] most of the rural areas” don’t, she argued. “The government [should 
thus] have a community hall [] for placing jobs. You use the notice boards to [advertise the 
jobs], then people can go there” and learn about them. 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Structural Pathway/Impediment 3: Availability of Jobs 
 
Perhaps more important in determining an individual’s mobility prospects than knowledge of 
how to exploit the economic opportunities that do exist is the number and kinds of 
opportunities—that is the number and kinds of jobs—that are available to begin with. All of 
the interviewees believed that there were far too few economic opportunities available in 
South Africa and that this dearth of opportunities greatly hindered their mobility. NM-1, the 
information-technology specialist, for example, argued that “everybody is trying to be in the 
middle [everybody wants to be mobile], but there are [just] not enough [job] opportunities.” 
In South Africa, R-9, the clothing store employee, agreed, “There are people at the bottom 
just because there are no jobs. … There [is a large] population in South Africa and the jobs 
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are very few.” M-2, the Transnet employee, was even more emphatic: “I would say [a lack 
of] jobs,” she concluded, is “the most important thing that makes people still stay at the 
bottom” (emphasis added). In fact, M-3, the Department of Labour auditor, implicitly argued 
that the dearth of jobs in South Africa was as important for an individual’s potential lack of 
mobility as education was for augmenting their expected chances of mobility (see Section 
3.3.1.1): the two reasons why “most South Africans are poor” are that “they don’t have skills 
[i.e., education] and there’s a scarcity of jobs.” 
 
The scarcity of jobs in South Africa, the interviewees argued, does not just affect low-skilled 
individuals. According to the interviewees, there is also a dearth of high-quality jobs. R-9, the 
clothing store employee, argued that there are “those who cannot get to the top [even though] 
they are educated [] because [there is a] lack of jobs. You will find out that people get 
educated then stay with their qualifications without getting a job.” R-7 agreed: “Some of the 
people, they have grade 12 and they have diplomas, and they are not working. They have 
been applying for work, but they haven’t been finding jobs … [because of] job scarcity.” In 
fact, NM-5, the administrative intern, who has a diploma from a university, believed she had 
not found a job because “there are a lot of people who are looking for a job and these years [a 
lot of people have] an education.” 
 
The extremely high rate of unemployment in South Africa—which reached 28.5 percent for 
black Africans in 2014 (Statistics South Africa, 2014b: 4), and which, according to some 
commentators, including Johnson (2009), grossly underestimates the actual number of 
unemployed individuals by counting many individuals as underemployed though they are, for 
all intents and purposes, not working—appears to confirm these views. The official 
unemployment rate only includes those who have searched for a job in the previous month. 
The act of looking for work reveals an individual’s preference for employment; that is, it 
suggests the individual would prefer to be employed but is unable to find a (suitable) job. It is 
thus, as the interviewees suggested, a scarcity of jobs, and not an unwillingness to work, that 
appears to be hindering the mobility prospects of many South Africans. 
 
The lack of job opportunities, according to the interviewees, also interacts with other mobility 
pathways in negative ways. NM-4, the school security guard, argued that rampant nepotism 
in South Africa existed in part because “there are not a lot of job opportunities,” a not 
unreasonable conclusion. Similarly, NM-9, the credit collector, attributed her decision not to 
pursue tertiary education to the shortage of jobs in South Africa: “I have grade 12 but I did 
not continue [with my studies] because … we don’t have [that many] job opportunities” here. 
And the scarcity of jobs in South Africa, according to some, is demotivating and stops some 
individuals from working hard. R-4, the unemployed 27 year old from Mount Frere, 
described how “laziness [does] come from the person, but also the scarcity of jobs makes 
people lazy.” “It’s not easy to [motivate yourself to] work,” NM-5, the administrative intern, 
continued, when “the jobs are very scarce [for] the qualifications they have.” 
 
Although the interviewees believed that South Africa as a whole suffered from a dearth of job 
opportunities, they argued that the issue was significantly more acute in rural areas than in 
urban ones. The interviewees repeatedly argued that in rural areas “there are no jobs.” At 
various times nearly every interviewee emphasized the particularly severe scarcity of jobs in 
rural areas, especially when compared with urban ones (see also Section 2.3.2). M-3, the 
Department of Labour auditor, captured this sentiment best when she argued that the rural 
areas are “the worst place for jobs,” but “here [in urban areas] there are jobs. There are jobs 
for people in the urban areas.” That is not to say that the interviewees believed urban areas 
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did not also suffer from employment shortages. As NM-8, the government projects 
administrator, observed, “Even in urban areas there are lots of people who are struggling to 
get jobs.” However, the vast majority of the interviewees argued that the scarcity of jobs in 
urban areas was less intense than in rural ones. These views reflect the economic realities of 
South Africa: while the broad unemployment rate (which includes those who have given up 
looking for work but would still like to work) in rural areas was over 50 percent in 2005, the 
broad unemployment rate in urban areas was only about two-thirds as large (Ardington et al., 
2009: 3).6 
 
Klasen and Woolard (2009: 30 and 41) offer two primary explanations for why rural 
unemployment is so much higher than urban unemployment. On the one hand, they argue, 
because black Africans were herded into rural homelands during apartheid, those who are 
unable to find work will necessarily gravitate towards their private safety nets (i.e., their rural 
homes). On the other hand, this concentration of the unemployed in rural areas has been 
reinforced by the post-apartheid public safety net, particularly the extremely generous Old 
Age Pension, which in 2009 reached more than 940 Rand per month, more than double the 
median per capita income of black Africans (Ardington et al., 2009: 23). Because black 
Africans traditionally return to their rural homes upon retirement,7 the private safety nets of 
the unemployed are further concentrated in rural areas. Additionally, as Anderson (2006: 
111-113; see also Neves, 2008: 4), observes, despite improvements, rural infrastructure 
continues to pale in comparison to urban infrastructure in South Africa. Because of the close 
relationship between infrastructure and economic growth (see, e.g., World Bank, 1994; 
Aschauer, 1989), it is unsurprising that there are fewer jobs, and thus higher levels of 
unemployment, in rural areas. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion: Migrating to Overcome Structural Constraints  
 
My interviewees identified a number of pathways to social mobility in South Africa. Though 
none of these pathways fit perfectly into the individualistic-structural binary presented in 
Section 3.2, the interviewees argued that two of these pathways—education and hard work—
were primarily individualistic in nature and were largely shaped by an individual’s own 
efforts. In contrast, there were three pathways that my interviewees believed mostly impeded 
their mobility and were primarily structural in nature: corruption and nepotism, access to 
information, and the supply of jobs. Though the interviewees believed that all five pathways 
affected mobility in South Africa, they argued that the relative importance of the 
individualistic and structural pathways varied considerably between rural and urban areas. 
Specifically, the interviewees suggested that rural areas were substantially less meritocratic 
than urban ones. In this context, the interviewees viewed migration as an opportunity to 
overcome the intense structural barriers of rural areas and to better exploit the individualistic 
pathways available to them. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Although dated, these are the most recent, comprehensive unemployment figures available for urban and rural 
areas in South Africa, in part because Statistics South Africa (the statistical arm of the South African 
government) does not release unemployment by geotype (see, e.g., Statistics South Africa, 2014b) and does not 
cross reference their Quarterly Labour Force Surveys with census data, which contain location information 
(Berkowitz, 2013). There is some indication, however, that rural unemployment rates have remained mostly 
constant over the last decade (see, e.g., Davies, 2012). 
7 This is another legacy of apartheid when elderly black Africans were forced to return to their homelands 
(Klasen and Woolard, 2009: 30). 
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The vast majority of individuals, the interviewees believed, migrated from rural to urban 
areas because there are simply too few opportunities—too few jobs—available locally. NM-
2, the unemployed 25-year-old woman from Qumbu, described how “people decide to leave 
because they see themselves getting old photocopying CVs without getting employed. They 
decide to go to urban areas in hope that things will be better there.” NM-5, the administrative 
intern, believed opportunities are better elsewhere: “There are no jobs, and it’s very scarce in 
rural areas,” she asserted, “So we are looking for better jobs in other” areas. In fact, R-2, the 
taxi owner, argued that he never would have left his area if he had found a job there: “If in 
my location, on my homestead there, if there was a big firm there, I don’t think I would have 
left my home place to go and look for a job [in Durban and Cape Town] because everything 
would be here close to me. But because there are no industries, nothing, we have to leave 
there and go to [urban areas] and look for a job.” M-6, the collection department manager, 
believed that R-2’s feelings held for others as well: “If the government did everything in the 
stage that they want it to be [in the rural areas], then everyone would stay in the Eastern Cape 
because the jobs will be able to be created there and people wouldn’t have to move to other 
areas to look for a job.” 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees argued that what economic opportunities do exist in rural areas 
are captured almost entirely by corrupt government officials and those with connections. 
Individuals, my interviewees argued, thus move to cities in part to escape this nepotism. NM-
2, the unemployed Qumbu resident, described how “even if there are positions that have been 
advertised [in rural areas], nepotism is the way such positions are determined on who gets 
what. It’s because of such issues that most people in rural areas leave for cities like Cape 
Town. We realize that if you don’t have a relative there, you’ll only apply for posts in places 
like the municipal council, but you’ll never get employed.” Similarly, R-2, the taxi driver, 
argued, “There’s a lot of unemployment. You will see that most people are not working. If 
you don’t have any connections, you don’t get a job. As a result, most of us, we leave our 
homes.” Interestingly, there is some indication that this nepotism also shapes migratory flows 
back to rural areas, by encouraging those who are able to exploit them to return. M-6, the 
collections department manager, for example, has a degree in sport’s management from a 
technikon in Cape Town. However, because he wishes to return to the rural Eastern Cape, he 
is pursuing a degree in education so that his brother, who is a principal in a school in the 
Eastern Cape, can “help us [his wife, who is also a teacher, and presumably himself] look for 
a teaching job.” As he described, “Once I [am able to] get [into] the government, then I will 
go back to the Eastern Cape. … I need something that is going to sustain me” before I am 
able to return. 
 
Though my interviewees believed that connections were also important in urban areas, they 
argued that, free from the insurmountable nepotism of rural areas, individuals are better able 
to exploit the individualistic pathways to mobility available to them, namely education and 
hard work. NM-2, who argued that most of the opportunities were captured by those with 
connections, thus contended that because of the “lack of opportunities[,] it’s better to move 
elsewhere after obtaining qualifications [i.e., education]. … I think it’s better in [the] cities.” 
Similarly, NM-3, the unemployed 21-year-old male individual from Mount Frere, believed 
individuals migrate so that they can be judged on their own merits, not constricted by the 
structural barriers of rural areas: “If a person feels like they are not well treated—they cannot 
get a job or do something—in the rural areas, then they will go to the city where they can be 
easily identified as what type of person they are.” 
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The findings in this chapter also offer some evidence for the “exaggerated expectations” 
thesis presented in Bray et al. (2010). Bray et al. argued that the educational “expectations” 
of their sample of Cape Town youth could better be understood as “aspirations” because of 
how far removed they were from reality. This logic, I posited, could be extended to the 
exaggerated expectations of upward mobility among NIDS respondents (Posel, 2012; Burns, 
2009). These interviews reveal that my interviewees appear to have a relatively accurate 
conception of the workings of the South African economy. They were able to identify the 
major pathways and impediments to mobility and understood how these pathways and 
impediments differ in rural and urban settings. Thus, if the wider black South African 
population also has a relatively accurate conception of the South African economy, it is likely 
that the NIDS respondents did not truly “expect” to be as mobile as they claimed in the 
survey—a level of mobility that is largely divorced from any objective reality—but rather 
aspired to be that highly mobile. 
 
Additionally, this chapter adds some nuance to Wale’s (2013) conclusion that individuals in 
Soweto hold either “individualistic” understandings—highlighting the importance of hard 
work and determination—or “structural” understandings—emphasizing the high barriers of 
unemployment and access to capital—of social mobility in South Africa. Though individuals 
may have a primarily individualistic or structural view of the South African economy, none 
of the interviewees in this chapter viewed social mobility as entirely individualist or 
structural, as Wale suggests; all of my interviewees identified both individualistic and 




Chapter 4: Oscillating between Opportunity and Stagnation: Perceptions 
of Migration 
 
The economic and social history of South Africa is a history of migration. Beginning in the 
19th century, young men left their rural homes to work for British and “Afrikaner” colonists 
in order to pay lobola, appease chiefs seeking a source of hard currency, buy guns and other 
goods, and cover the hut, poll, and labor taxes designed specifically to compel these men to 
migrate (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006: 83; Feinstein, 2005: 55). With the expansion of British 
military and legal control over South Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
black Africans systematically lost their rights to own land and farm for themselves and were 
cultivated for labor on white-owned farms. Beginning with the Natives’ Land Act of 1913—
which abolished sharecropping and banned the sale of land to black individuals—black 
Africans were eventually herded into reserves, where traditional and communal farming was 
all but impossible. As Feinstein (2005: 47-48) argues, “The final outcome of [this] whole 
process was that, for the African people of South Africa, land was no longer abundant; in 
areas they could still own, land was scarce and it was labour that was plentiful.” Less and less 
able to earn a living from farming their own land, black men had little choice but to seek 
employment elsewhere to support themselves and their families (Nattrass and Seekings, 
2012: 535; Kok et al., 2006: 15; Feinstein, 2005: 47-48). 
 
Initially, these men sought employment primarily on white-owned farms and in white-owned 
mines (Nattrass and Seekings, 2012: 535). The system of labor that developed in the mines—
and to a lesser extent in agriculture—set the tenor for all future labor policy in apartheid 
South Africa. Mining companies employed migrant laborers for relatively short periods of 
time—on average twelve-to-eighteen months. These men migrated without their families and 
lived in company-owned dormitories with other miners; until 1969, mining companies were 
prohibited from providing housing for the families of more than three-percent of their work 
forces, and in practice a much lower proportion of black men were able to live with their 
families. At the conclusion of their contracts, miners were forced to return home, entrenching 
a system of “oscillating” migration in South Africa, which allowed these companies, free 
from the constraints of supporting entire families, to pay below-market wages. Migration in 
South Africa was thus largely gendered: though some women were required for domestic 
services in the mines and in cities, the vast majority of migrants were men (Feinstein, 2005: 
49 and 64-66; Wilson, 1972: 7-9). 
 
However, the low-wage, oscillating black African labor of the mining sector undermined 
South Africa’s growing manufacturing industries. In contrast to the needs of a mining-
dominated economy, a flourishing, industrialized South Africa required a stable and educated 
work force, concentrated in urban centers, and with plenty of disposable income. 
Manufacturing was thus where the economic needs of a modernizing economy abutted the 
racist ideology of the Union and National Party governments. As Wilson (1972: 156-157) 
presciently observed in the early 1970s, “And herein lies South Africa’s dilemma. For the 
country is simultaneously pursuing two goals [—the first, economic growth and the other 
separation of the races—] whose consequences move people in different directions.” To 
reconcile the demands for an urban labor force with the desire to achieve as pure a 
segregation of white South Africans from their black counterparts as possible, the Union and 
then apartheid governments enacted a system of ever constricting residency, labor, and 
migratory laws that were largely fashioned on the system of oscillating labor developed for 
the mining sector (Feinstein, 2005: 128-130, 151; Wilson, 1972: 156-158). 
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The roots of the National Party’s attempts after 1948 to completely control the movements of 
South Africa’s black population can be found in the framework instituted by previous 
governments. Beginning with the Urban Areas Act of 1923 and continuing with a series of 
laws passed in 1937 and 1945, South Africa laid the foundations for an oppressive system of 
influx control that made it increasingly difficult for migrant black laborers to seek 
employment in urban areas and all but impossible to do so with their families. By the time the 
National Party won control of South Africa in 1948 and began to institute its own system of 
“apartheid,” the mobility of the black population was already severally constricted: only 
those with special passes could reside in specifically demarcated locations near major urban 
centers, and these individuals had a limited amount of time to find employment before risking 
“rustica[tion]” (Kok et al., 2006: 15; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006: 84; Feinstein, 2005: 152). 
 
The apartheid government, beginning with the Group Areas Act and continuing with the 
Native Laws Amendment of 1952 and Separate Development, developed a system of 
centralized control and complete domination of black movement in South Africa. Not only 
did the National Party attempt to direct which individuals could migrate and where they 
could go, but it also actively removed millions of individuals from urban areas. When it 
became clear that these policies alone would not fully stanch the rapid increase of the black 
African population in urban areas, the apartheid government instituted its policy of Separate 
Development, which sought to economically and socially develop black African homelands 
in order to present an attractive alternative to working in urban areas (Wentzel and Tlabela, 
2006: 86-88; Feinstein, 2005: 153-155). The entirety of apartheid labor policy was well 
summarized by the Minister of Bantu Affairs, who in 1955, soon after the National Party 
began instituting its own vision for the labor policy of South Africa, proclaimed, “I see the 
future economic pattern of South Africa being that there will [continue to] be thousands of 
Bantu on the white farms, in the mines, in industry and also as servants in the white homes. 
The difference, however, will be that the natives will be there, not as a right but at the bidding 
and by the grace of the whites. At best they will be visitors in the white areas” (as quoted in 
Wilson, 1972: 163-164). 
 
The ultimate effectiveness of this elaborate system of population control is questionable. By 
1970, the census indicated that one-third of Africans—or over 5 million individuals—were 
living in urban areas (Feinstein, 2005: 156). Though net rural-urban migration fell 
dramatically between 1970 and 1990 with the National Party’s increasingly stringent 
migratory policies, the number of black Africans in urban areas continued to rise (Anderson, 
2006: 110). Still, as Anderson (2006: 110), argues, “Migration in South Africa [during 
apartheid] was far below what it would have been in the absence of policies that severely 
limited such movement.” The long-term impact of over 100 years of direct legal intervention 
in population movement was to entrench a unique system of temporary, oscillating migration 
in South Africa that differed from patterns observed across much of the rest of the world (see 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 125-127; see also Portes [1985] on Latin America; Adepoju 
[2006] on the similarities between international migration in Africa with internal migration in 
South Africa; International Organization for Migration [2005] on Asia, especially pages 25-
32, which show that rates of temporary migrants, though growing in number, represent a 
much smaller proportion of total migrants in Asia than in South Africa). 
 
With the erosion and then repeal of apartheid South Africa’s repressive migration policies in 
the mid-1980s and early 1990s, South Africa did not experience a sudden massive influx of 
permanent migrants to urban areas, contrary to expectations (Collinson, 2010: 5081; Casale 
and Posel, 2006: 15; Mabin, 1989, 1990). In fact, overall migration flows remained 
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surprisingly constant. Kok and Collinson (2006: 7-9), using census data, concluded that the 
migration rate was around 12 percent of the population at all points between 1975 and 2001. 
Similarly, Posel and Casale (2003: 462-463), analyzing data from the 1993 Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development and the 1995, 1997, and 1999 October 
Household Surveys, found little change in the number of migrant workers among black 
Africans, which averaged around 10-11 percent. 
 
The relative consistency in gross migratory flows in South Africa, however, obscures 
changes in the nature of this migration. Posel and Casale (2003: 462-463) found a modest 
increase (of around one-percentage point) in the number of rural African labor migrants. 
Anderson (2006: 108-110), using an expanded definition of “urban” areas that includes many 
rural towns and analyzing United Nations data, found that the rate of net rural-to-urban 
migration increased dramatically at the end of apartheid and the beginning of democracy 
from around two individuals per thousand between 1980 and 1984 to over 15 individuals per 
thousand between 1995 and 1999. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Migration 
Study also found a large increase in movement from rural areas after the end of influx control 
(Cross, 2006: 208-209). Additionally, what was once primarily a male activity has become 
increasingly female (see, generally, Hunter, 2010: 47 and 94-95). Posel and Casale (2003: 
462-3), for example, found that the proportion of female migrants increased by four 
percentage points (from 30 percent to 34 percent) between 1993 and 1999, and Posel (2009: 
8), using data from the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), concluded 
that the proportion of female migrants continued to increase at least through 2008 to 39 
percent. Collinson et al. (2003: 9) uncovered a similar trend in the Agincourt sub-district of 
Mpumalanga after 1997. 
 
During the period immediately following South Africa’s transition to democracy, despite 
changes in the geographical origins and gender composition of migrants, migration remained 
largely circular (see, generally, Todes et al., 2010: 340-341; see also Kok and Collinson, 
2006: 25; Posel, 2003). There is some evidence, however, that the circularity of migration in 
South Africa is ebbing. In her analysis of the first wave of NIDS, Posel (2009: 3-4 and 7) 
found a marked decrease in the number of African households reporting members absent for 
employment reasons, from around 24 percent in 1993 to 13 percent in 2008. She 
hypothesized and presented some evidence (i.e., the dramatic increase in households 
reporting members “living elsewhere”) that many of these individuals may be settling 
permanently at their places of work and not following the traditional circular routes. 
 
Migration in the Eastern Cape typifies many of these changing migration dynamics (see, 
generally, Bank and Kamman, 2010: 6-16). Cross et al. (1999) found a pattern of “rural 
densification,” or movement to informal settlements outside of rural towns, in the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal as restrictions on movement to these towns were repealed at the 
end of apartheid. They argued that these rural-to-“rural” moves were becoming more 
dominant than the more traditional rural-to-“urban” (which are perhaps better characterized 
as rural-to-“metro”) ones (see also Cross et al., 1998, specifically on KwaZulu-Natal). Bank 
(1997), summarizing much of his research in townships in the Eastern Cape during the 1990s, 
found similar patterns in specific towns. In Butterworth, for example, a town in the former 
Transkei, Bank found that the number of “shacks” increased from 700 in 1989 to over 5,000 
in 1995 (Ibid.: 21). He also concluded that rural-to-urban streams generally fell into two 
categories: long-distance routes to major metropolitan centers including Cape Town and 
Johannesburg, which were generally dominated by men, and routes to local urban centers 
including East London, which tended to attract mostly women. However, an increasing 
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proportion of migrants, Bank established, began to avoid these regional urban centers 
altogether and migrate directly to larger metropolitan areas, where there was greater 
economic opportunity (Ibid.: 21-22). 
 
Bank and Kamman (2010; Bank et al., 2006), in their analysis of a comprehensive socio-
economic survey of over 12,200 households in the Eastern Cape, confirmed many of Bank’s 
(1997) earlier findings. The majority of migrants in the Eastern Cape (approximately 80 
percent) originated in rural areas, and 55 percent of these went to either Cape Town or 
Johannesburg. Women migrants, however, who were in the minority, tended to stay closer to 
home than men, but overall many fewer migrants (approximately 6 percent) moved to rural 
areas than in the 1990s (Cross et al., 1999; Bank, 1997). Finally, Bank et al. (2006: 30) found 
that a lower proportion of black African households reported having an active migrant 
member, perhaps reflecting decreased circularity among migrants who move further from 
their homes. Posel’s (2009) findings (see above) and research on circular migration 
specifically between the Eastern Cape and Cape Town (van der Berg et al., 2002: 5; Bekker, 
2001-2002) appear to confirm this conclusion. 
 
The historical and contemporary importance of migration in South Africa has led to a number 
of sociological and anthropological studies of how migration has shaped rural and urban 
identity. James (2001; see also James, 2000), for example, argues that the process of 
migration has intimately connected rural areas with urban ones, refashioning representations 
of both and rural identity itself. Although other authors, including Bank and Minkley (2005: 
23), have since argued that the connections between rural and urban are less robust than they 
once were, James (2001: 105-107), drawing on anthropologic interviews from the Northern 
Province and Mpumalanga, concludes that migration has “turned rural areas into places of 
retirement and refuge for labour migrants” from places for agricultural production. In turn, 
she argues, land reform and poverty alleviation programs that hope to rely on farming to 
develop rural areas face high barriers. 
 
Migration has also re-formed identify in urban areas. Reexamining the Xhosa in Town 
trilogy, a series of anthropological studies of the townships of East London, a medium-sized 
city in the Eastern Cape, Bank (2011) traces how urban identity in one such township, 
Duncan Village, was shaped by the rural identity of migrants from the surrounding Ciskei 
and Transkei homelands and contestation among successive generations of these migrants. 
And Hunter (2010: e.g., 41-44, 180-182) observes how labor migration has altered 
conceptualizations of marriage and love in South Africa and how the recent rise in female 
labor migration has altered gender roles in South Africa. 
 
Much less attention, however, has been paid in sociological and anthropological circles to the 
actual migration process. With the exception of Schapera (1947), who in the 1940s examined 
migration from present day Botswana (which was, for a time, a de facto province of South 
Africa) to South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council’s 2001-2002 Migration 
Survey,1 little work has been done to systematically uncover individual motivations for 
migrating and perceptions of each step of the migration process. Furthermore, no one has yet 
examined how migration experience itself influences these perceptions. And examining 
perceptions of the migration decision and process has important practical, in addition to 
academic, ramifications: as a number of authors have suggested, it is necessary to investigate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Though the HSRC Migration Survey has been criticized for methodological flaws, particularly in the 
administration of the survey (van Zyl, 2006: 147), it is cited throughout this chapter because it is among the only 
other sources of data available for comparison. 
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these perceptions in order to better understand the causes, impacts, and ultimately aggregate 
trends of internal migration in South Africa (see de Jong and Steinmetz, 2006: 249; Kok and 
Collinson, 2006: 9). This chapter, through interviews with 26 individuals from diverse 
migration backgrounds, begins to fill this gap in the existing literature. 
 
In this chapter, I attempt to do so in two parts. First, I explore why my interviewees believe 
individuals migrate from rural to urban areas, and investigate whether a household or 
individual understanding of migration decisions—whether the “new” or “old” economics of 
migration—is a more appropriate lens through which to view migration in South Africa. I 
then explore how the interviewees perceive each step of the migration process: what 
categories of people are believed to migrate to urban areas, which individuals succeed while 
there, and finally which individuals return to their rural homes. Throughout this chapter, I 
compare these perceptions to the available data and examine some of the possible 
repercussions of the views held by the interviewees for both internal migration in South 
Africa and the South African economy more generally. This study marks the first attempt to 
examine perceptions of migration in contemporary South Africa; as a result, many of the 
conclusions presented here are preliminary and primarily suggest areas where further 
investigation is merited. 
 
 
4.2 The Migration Decision 
 
Over the past half-century, two opposing theoretical schools have emerged in an effort to 
explain global migratory patterns.2 The first school, which gained prominence in the mid-
1960s, considers migration to be an economically equilibrating movement of autonomous 
individual or household actors. In contrast, the second school, which emerged in the mid-
1970s as a response to the limitations of this economic paradigm, emphasizes the larger 
structural and historical context in which migration occurs. This section argues that, though 
both “individual-equilibrium” and “historical-structural” approaches may have some 
theoretical import in South Africa, economic migration theories may be more practically 
significant. My interviewees mostly conceptualized rural-to-urban migration through an 
economic lens. 
 
Early migration theorization examined the motivations and outcomes of migration through 
the lens of neoclassical economics (see Massey et al., 1993 and Paton, 1995 for detailed 
explorations of the economic migration literature). Though economic theorization about 
migration was far from monolithic, these theories, as Paton (1995: 3) argues, shared a 
fundamental theoretical framework, which placed “an emphasis on the individual decision 
maker as the determinant and greater economic equilibrium as the result. Th[ese theories 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Most migration theoreticians focus on international migration—or movements of individuals across national 
borders—as opposed to internal migration—or movements of individuals within a single country (Kok and 
Collinson, 2006: 4). Though international migration differs in many important respects from internal migration, 
international migration theory can inform the internal migration patterns observed in South Africa. Firstly, the 
context in which internal migration in South Africa developed closely resembles an international migratory 
system. Anderson (2006: 107), for example, merely states the obvious when he recounts how “the creation of 
homelands and the laws regarding residence in the rest of the country effectively treated Africans in South 
Africa as foreign residents.” Secondly, though cross-border migration often adds considerable legal and 
economic obstacles to movement usually absent in internal migration (Zolberg, 1981: 4), borders themselves do 
not fundamentally alter why individuals choose to migrate or the historical and structural relationship between 
sending and receiving areas. Thus, in the South African case at least, international migration theories can be 
applied to internal migration with relatively minor adjustments. 
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presented] a positive vision of migration as a voluntary movement towards greater 
socioeconomic equality.” 
 
The neoclassical, microeconomic approach—the dominant economic approach to 
migration—focuses on the individual decision maker (Todaro, 1969; see also Gelderblom, 
2006: 271-272; Paton, 1995: 4-5 and Massey et al., 1993: 434-436). An individual decides 
whether to migrate weighing the short-term costs of moving to a new location and searching 
for a job against the expected long-term income benefits of migrating, given the demand for 
the individual’s skills in the receiving economy. If the expected income gains outweigh the 
costs of migration then the individual will move; if not, the individual will remain. Spengler 
and Myers (1977: 14) captured this neoclassical, microeconomic framework well, when they 
argued, “Migration on the part of an individual … reflect[s] an expectation that the individual 
will be better off at the point of destination than at the point of provenance.” Over time, the 
market wage and opportunities available in the sending and receiving areas, are equilibrated. 
 
This general microeconomic framework has served as the starting point for a number of other 
migration theories, perhaps the most important of which is the push-pull model. The push-
pull model argues that an individual bases his decision to migrate by balancing the “pulls”— 
“those things in either the destination or the origin area that are attractive to the potential 
migrant”—and  “pushes”—“things in either area that tend to drive the migrant away.” This 
model expands the traditional economic analysis of migration beyond a simple income 
calculation to include infrastructural, educational, and social considerations in both the 
sending and receiving areas. Ultimately, in the push-pull framework, the potential migrant 
will choose to live in the more appealing location (Gelderblom, 2006: 270; Adepoju, 2006: 
36; Cross et al., 1998: 639; Alonso, 1977: 85-86). 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, an opposing theoretical school that focused on the historical and 
structural contexts of migration began to take shape. This school, which is deeply rooted in 
the Marxist theories of dependency and center-peripheral development, removes individual 
decision-making from the migration equation, and instead focuses on how global economic 
forces create conditions in both sending and receiving areas that inevitably lead to the 
observed migratory patterns (Gelderblom, 2006: 272; Brettell, 2000: 103; Paton, 1995: 3 and 
7-8; Massey et al., 1993: 444-448). Brettell (2000: 103-104) nicely describes the fundamental 
differences between historical-structural approaches and microeconomic migration analyses: 
“The unit of analysis in this body of theory is not the individual migrant, but rather the global 
market and the way that national and international economic and political policies, and 
particularly capitalist development, have disrupted, displaced, or even attracted local 
populations, thereby generating particular migration streams.” 
 
During the interviews, my interviewees viewed migration in primarily economic terms. Most 
of the interviewees saw migration as an opportunity for economic mobility: the push of 
poverty in rural areas and pull of jobs in urban ones encouraged individuals to migrate. 
“They’re tired of poverty,” R-7, the clothing store employee, said of those who leave rural 
areas. Similarly, NM-6, the spaza shop owner, described how people leave “because [they’re] 
suffering” and “expect[] something better in urban areas.” “It’s [because of] hunger” that 
people leave, NM-2, the unemployed 25-year-old woman from Qumbu, concurred. “They 
decide to go to urban areas in hope that things will be better there,” she continued. M-5, the 
government office cleaner, agreed: “Most of them are forced by circumstances. They see 
poverty getting very critical and decide to move to urban areas.” R-6, the municipal council 
employee, believed that the individuals had very little autonomy over the decision: “They 
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have to leave because there’s nothing here. There is no improvement. There is poverty. … 
They have to leave due to the situation that they are living under.” As M-8, the hotel cleaner, 
described, people “are forced by circumstances. … They are starving and going to bed on an 
empty stomach. They don’t have money and so they decide to go elsewhere … [thinking] it 
will change their situation.” 
 
The pull of jobs and the subsequent ability to overcome this poverty attracts these individuals 
to urban areas, the interviewees argued. As NM-5, the administrative intern, related, “We all 
believe that at least if you stay in Johannesburg [and other cities] it’s easy to get a job. … 
There are so many factories there. It’s not that difficult to find a job.” “Most [people] are 
leaving to find jobs [in urban areas] and make means to support their families,” R-5, the 
government project employee, argued. M-4, the street cleaner, agreed with R-5’s assessment: 
“Most people leave to get jobs in urban areas [because] they need money.” M-1, the police 
officer, was even more emphatic: “To look for jobs [in urban areas] … that’s the main, main, 
main reason. … I cannot think of another reason why people leave their areas.” 
 
These pure economic considerations were far and away the most common explanation 
offered for why individuals left rural areas. However, a number of the interviewees 
emphasized an additional push from rural areas and pull to urban ones: infrastructure and 
services.3 NM-9, the 32-year-old unemployed woman from Matatiele, for example, argued 
that some individuals migrate because they “can’t take the things of non-service delivery. 
They leave to areas where there is service delivery.” Similarly, the R-7, the police officer 
from Tsolo, described how many “want a better life. In the rural areas sometimes there is no 
electricity, no water, no toilets. So they move to the urban areas.” 
 
The majority of those who viewed infrastructural disparities as a motivating force for 
migration, however, had never permanently left Alfred Nzo; only a fraction of returnees and 
migrants believed that infrastructure and services were important considerations in an 
individual's decisions to leave rural areas. The non-migrant emphasis on infrastructure is not 
particularly surprising. As Section 2.3.2 argued, non-migrants view infrastructure as 
primarily a quality-of-life concern. However, migrants and to a lesser degree returnees 
emphasized the developmental impact of infrastructure and the close relationship between 
service delivery and job creation. If individuals understand infrastructure mainly in relation to 
economic outcomes, as those in the Migrant category and many in the Returnee category do, 
then emphasizing jobs as the motivating force for migration would implicitly account for the 
infrastructural disparities between rural and urban areas. However, if individuals understand 
infrastructural development as a concern largely unrelated to economic outcomes and one 
that is desirable in itself, as the non-migrants do, then infrastructural disparities could provide 
a second, unrelated motivation for migrating. 
 
Ultimately, the views expressed by the interviewees—that individuals migrate to town 
primarily for economic reasons—reflect the findings of large-n, South African surveys that, 
at least in part, focus on migration. Collinson, in his study of the Agincourt sub-district of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A handful of individuals also argued that “education” was an important motivating force. However, most of 
those who argued that education was an important factor in migration were from the Migrant category. Due to 
the design of this study (i.e., using CAPS—a longitudinal study of young adults begun over a decade ago—to 
find interviewees for the Migrant category), many of the migrants came to Cape Town while they were still in 
school and a large proportion came specifically for educational reasons. Thus, the migrants may have been 
projecting their own experiences onto others and their views may not fully represent broader opinions about 
migration.  
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Mpumalanga—a rural sub-district in the Northeast of South Africa—argued that “a limited 
labour market is a function of underdevelopment and a major determinant of migration” 
(Collinson, 2010: 5081; see also Kok and Collinson, 2006: 10). Similarly, the 2001-2002 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Migration Survey, which interviewed a group of 
2,142 internal migrants, concluded that economic justifications—particularly employment 
opportunities—were the primary reason given by individuals who left rural areas (Casale and 
Posel, 2006: 13; Cross, 2006: 215-217).4 And Posel (2009: 3-5), in her analysis of the first 
wave of National Income Dynamics Study data, found that the majority (59 percent) of 
absent household members were working or looking for work elsewhere, though that number 
had fallen substantially (around 18 percentage points) since 1993 when the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PLSD) was conducted. The economic 
imperative to migrate appears particularly strong in the Eastern Cape: in their analysis of a 
comprehensive survey of Eastern Cape residents, Bank and Kamman (2010: 23) found that 
three-quarters of black Africans who were no longer living in their primary household were 
absent because of employment-related activity. There is thus strong evidence that the 
economic lens through which most of the interviewees viewed migration both reflects the 
views held by the majority of South Africans on migration and the reasons that most South 
Africans choose to leave their rural homes. 
 
These primarily economic justifications for migration suggest that any examination of 
internal migration in South Africa must consider the economic rational behind migratory 
decision-making. Though researchers would be remiss to ignore the historical and structural 
context in which this migration takes place—especially because of the profound impact that 
apartheid has had on contemporary migration dynamics—viewing migration through a purely 
historical-structural lens would undoubtedly lead researchers astray. As these interviews and 
data from large-n studies in South Africa reveal, migration in South Africa has primarily 
economic roots. Thus, if the goal is to understand why individuals in South Africa migrate 
(and ultimately to understand larger migration trends), economic theory and analysis must 
play a fundamental role in research on migration. 
 
 
4.2.1 A “New” or “Old” Economics? 
 
Though the previous section examined why individuals migrate, it is equally important to 
explore how these economic decisions are made. Early migration theorists argued that 
individuals moved to the location where their income potential was greatest. However, 
recognition of the integral role that households play in developing countries forced migration 
theorists to reexamine the individual focus of their work. Not only do groups of individuals in 
developing countries often have to pool resources for survival, but individual choices are 
made in the context of these familial structures (Gelderblom, 2006: 274). Households, like 
individual actors, do not focus solely on income maximization; rather, households seek to 
maximize total wellbeing by striving to diversify risk and overcome credit constraints 
through the household members. In what became known as the New Economics of 
Migration, these theorists posited that migration was one tool of many available to 




4 In contrast, services and infrastructure were much larger concerns for migrants originating in urban areas 
(Cross, 2006: 215-217). 
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During the interviews, I asked my interviewees whether “individuals decide for themselves [] 
to leave or [whether] others decide for them” (Appendix A, Question 3a) in an attempt to 
probe the relationship between individuals and their households in the migration decision. It 
is thus possible to explore whether migration decisions are made at the individual or 
household level. Although most of the interviewees argued that the ultimate decision to 
migrate was made by the individual, there was general consensus that migration decisions 
were almost always made in consultation with other household members. 
 
Most of the interviewees believed that individuals ultimately decided for themselves whether 
to move. “I decided for myself and most people decide for themselves. Very few of those are 
told to leave and [to] go look for a job,” R-2, the taxi owner, described. Most of the other 
interviewees echoed this sentiment, arguing as R-5, the builder on government projects, did 
that “it’s their choice. … It’s [] their decision [whether] to go.” As NM-5, the administrative 
intern, stated bluntly: “Adults make their own choices. Only kids are told by [their] families 
what to do.” 
 
There are situations where household members do force an individual to migrate. “A few 
[people] are forced to go by families. … Maybe the family has lost a breadwinner and 
someone in the family has to find a job to keep the bread on the table,” M-5, the cleaner in 
government offices, explained. But, ultimately, as M-5 concluded, “Most people decide for 
themselves.” R-8, the unemployed 25-year-old woman who had moved to Cape Town for 
health reasons, agreed: “Maybe [there are situations where] people don’t choose to leave by 
themselves. … [But] most of the times it’s their choice.” These views appear consistent with 
those expressed by respondents in the HSRC Migration Survey: 47 percent of internal 
migrants indicated that the decision to migrate rested solely with themselves, while only 21 
percent responded that their families had made the decision (Wentzel et al., 2006: 190). 
 
Though most of the interviewees believed that the decision to migrate more often than not 
rested with the individual, these decisions, the interviewees argued, were frequently made in 
consultation with other members of the household. People “decide for themselves. … [But 
families] support that person and give advice,” R-9, the clothing store employee, described. 
Similarly, R-4, the unemployed 27-year-old woman from outside of Mount Frere, believed 
that “you decide for yourself but you consult your parents” before you go. Both NM-4, the 
security officer, and M-8, the hotel cleaner, agreed that families play some role in the 
migration decision. “Most of the times, families advise people [who] go,” NM-4 reiterated. 
M-8 even argued that this consultation process extended to family members “who [are] in the 
city [who do] call and advise someone to come.” 
 
How instrumental this “advice” is to a given individual’s migration decision, however, was 
unclear from the interviews. Certain individuals used “advice” as a euphemism for “force.” 
NM-7, the credit collector, for example, who described how “families [often] advise” those 
who migrate, later argued that these individuals are in fact “forced by parents [to migrate] 
most of the time.” In contrast, for others, this “advice” was entirely incidental to the decision 
to migrate. As R-4 argued, individuals “consult [their] parents” before they migrate just “to 
tell them in case something happens.” Although more detailed questioning may have clarified 
the roles of the individual and household in the migration decision, it appears that neither the 
“new” nor the “old” economic theorization on migration adequately illustrates the migration 
dynamics of South Africa: both individuals and households appear to serve important 
functions in the decision to migrate, though understanding the nuances of this relationship 




4.3 The Migration Process 
 
In the following section, I examine how the interviewees perceive each step of the migration 
process in three parts. First, I investigate what kinds of people are believed to migrate from 
rural areas to urban ones. I then explore the perceived attributes of the migrants who 
“succeed” and those who do not. Finally, I examine how the interviewees conceptualize 
return migration—that is, what kinds of people are believed to return to rural areas and why. 
 
 
4.3.1 Who Migrates? 
 
Using census data and data from other household surveys, scholars have developed a 
relatively detailed profile of the typical South African migrant. This individual is most likely 
an African male (though African women appear to comprise an increasing proportion of 
migrants) (Posel, 2009: 7-8; Posel and Casale, 2003: 465), younger than 44-years-old and 
probably in his mid-to-late twenties (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006: 92), and on average better 
educated than the local population (Ibid.), though van der Berg et al. (2002: 1, 7, and 10) 
found the most educated individuals (i.e., those with tertiary educations) have a propensity to 
remain closer to home. Yet despite these clear trends, my interviewees had difficulty 
pinpointing who migrates from rural areas. Though there was some recognition that migrants 
were on average younger and more likely to be male than the general population, my 
interviewees tended to focus on the characteristics of those who did not migrate rather than 
on the characteristics of those who did. 
 
My interviewees may have had difficulty pinpointing the characteristics of those who 
migrate, because, according to the interviewees, nearly everyone migrates from rural areas at 
some point in their lives. As R-6, the ward council employee, described, migration is “not for 
everyone. But … you can see here, there are no people who are my age. [Those] people [] are 
not here. … You can see now the village is empty because” they have all migrated. M-1, the 
police officer, agreed: though “old people” remained, all of the “youth leave.” Because so 
many people migrate, it is not surprising that the characteristics of those who do not leave 
would be much more salient to the interviewees than the characteristics of those who do. 
 
My interviewees identified two primary characteristics of those who never migrate: a general 
lack of ambition and a lack of access to social networks in urban areas. NM-2, the 
unemployed 25-year-old woman from outside of Qumbu, for example, described how 
migration was dependent on an “individual’s thinking. Some people are less ambitious. They 
don’t really think of changing.” NM-7, the credit collector, compared these people to those 
“who migrate to urban areas … who feel like they need something different in life.” Those 
who had migrated to Cape Town, however, tended to be more critical of this lack of 
ambition. R-2, the taxi owner, for example, tried to be diplomatic in his description of those 
who stay: “Those who stay,” he described, “Some of them are lazy. I’ll put it like that.” 
Similarly, M-4, the street cleaner, was also critical of those who did not migrate: “Others just 
say, ‘The government is giving me grant money. What am I [going to] do[] in the big 
cities?’” If migration is viewed by the interviewees as among the only opportunities available 
for rural residents to access economic opportunities (see Section 3.4), it is unsurprising that 
the interviewees believe many of those who do not migrate lack ambition. 
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However, according to my interviewees, a lack of ambition was not the only reason why 
individuals did not migrate; more importantly, many lacked access to social networks in 
urban areas, a prerequisite, the interviewees argued, to migrating. “Those who don’t leave,” 
NM-8, the administrator of government projects, argued, “Are often those who don’t have 
relatives in urban areas.” “It’s because they don’t have families” elsewhere that people do not 
leave, R-4, the unemployed 27-year-old woman from outside of Mount Frere, agreed. Those 
in the Migrant category were even more emphatic in their belief that a lack of access to social 
networks inhibited migration. M-4, the street cleaner, for example, argued that the key 
difference between those who migrate and those who do not is access to these social 
networks: “Those people who don’t have families or friends in urban area are unlikely to 
move because they don’t have a support or shelter in [these] areas. Those who have relatives 
or friends are more likely to leave,” she described. M-7, the electrical appliance saleswoman, 
also thought that for most individuals a lack of ambition was not the major hurdle to 
migration: “Most [of those who stay] want [to leave] but a lack of opportunities”—like, for 
example, “not having relatives in urban areas”—“prevents them” from doing so. 
 
The importance of social networks to migration is well established in the migration literature 
(Brettell, 2000: 106-108). Social networks facilitate migration by decreasing both the costs 
and risks of movement. By providing assistance, local knowledge, and job market access to 
migrants, these networks increase the chances of successful outcomes and create “a self-
sustaining diffusion process,” where “each act of migration itself creates the social structures 
needed to sustain it,” thus further increasing migratory flows (Massey et al., 1993: 448-450). 
The vast majority of the interviewees recognized the importance of the assistance and 
information that these networks provided. “Relative[s]” in destination cities “help you until 
you are able to stand on your own,” NM-2, the unemployed 25-year-old from outside of 
Qumbu, described. They “help with accommodation and even money to go look for a job,” 
NM-8, the government project administrator, elaborated. Without family in urban areas, “you 
have to struggle for a place to stay because you are not working. At least if you move where 
you have family, it’s easier. It’s easy to move if you have someone there,” M-3, the Labour 
Department employee, agreed. Similarly, R-3, the unemployed 22-year-old man from Mount 
Frere, emphasized the importance of the information that these networks provide: “It is very 
important to know someone so that they can inform you on what is going on in that area,” he 
argued. Without that knowledge, he continued, it is difficult to succeed. 
 
There was more debate, however, on the role of these networks in securing employment for 
migrants. Some, particularly those who had never left Alfred Nzo (and thus had limited, if 
any, firsthand experience with migration), thought that these networks were integral to the 
success, or lack thereof, of a migrant’s job search. These networks “play a very important 
role” in helping people find jobs, NM-7, the credit collector, argued.  NM-2, the 25-year-old 
woman, described this process: “Someone who is working may attempt to get you a job 
where the person is working. … A relative may take you where he’s working and introduce 
you. If they have a vacancy, then you’ll be in.” NM-9, the administrative intern, agreed: “Yes 
they [help you find a job]. They ask around [and] are also providing shelters so you can come 
and live in the city.” 
 
The rest of the interviewees—primarily those who had spent at least some time in Cape 
Town—recognized the direct role that these networks do sometimes play in securing 
employment but argued that the indirect support they provide is more fundamental to a 
migrant’s success. R-9, the clothing store employee, for example, argued that “it’s important 
to have family [in urban areas] because they support you while you are still looking for a 
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job.” Almost as an afterthought she added, “It is [also] important [to have these networks] 
because some of the jobs you will find through connections.” M-2, the Transnet employee, 
described the support that these networks can provide: “Yes, [these networks] … can support 
you. Support in such things as motivation: they motivate you, they support you with money 
for transport when you go up and down looking for a job, they support you to get food, to get 
something to wear to go up and down.” Though many of those in the Migrant and Returnee 
categories agreed with the non-migrants that members of these urban networks, as M-4, the 
street cleaner, put it, “even speak with friends [to tell them they] have someone who is 
looking for a job” and help secure the migrant a job, most saw this as of secondary 
importance to the “accommodation, a place to stay, money for transport,” et cetera that these 
networks provide. 
 
Though the interviewees appeared to confirm the role of social networks in facilitating 
migration, there is some indication from the interviews that, in South Africa at least, much of 
the existing literature may actually understate the importance of these networks to migration. 
The vast majority of my interviewees argued that it was close to impossible to move without 
knowing individuals in receiving areas. NM-6, the spaza shop owner, argued that “it rarely 
happens that someone moves to a city without relatives or someone they know.” NM-1, the 
information-technology specialist, quantified NM-6’s statement: “Maybe three percent of 
people go where they don’t know anyone.” R-4, the unemployed 27-year-old woman from 
outside of Mount Frere, was even more emphatic: “You choose the area to go because you 
have a family member in that city,” she described. “You cannot” go if you don’t know 
anyone (emphasis added). M-7, the electrical appliance saleswoman, agreed with R-4: 
Ultimately, she argued, “You need to know someone in that area. You can’t just go to [a 
place] if you don’t know anybody there.” In fact, four of the nine non-migrants claimed that 
they could not move in part because they did not know individuals in urban areas with whom 
they could stay, and 15 of the 17 of those in the Migrant and Returnee categories lived with 
relatives when they first moved to Cape Town. 
 
There was a seemingly prohibitive barrier to migration that all but three of the interviewees 
failed to mention: the financial costs—which include transportation costs and relocation fees, 
among others—of moving to a new location. In other studies of migration in South Africa, 
these costs have been found to be prohibitive. Collinson (2010: 5087), in his examination of 
the Agincourt sub-district of Mpumalanga, discovered that wealthier households were more 
likely to send migrants to other areas than poorer households. Similarly, Kok et al. (2003: 59; 
see also Kok and Collinson, 2006: 2), in their examination of 1996 census data, concluded 
that districts in South Africa with higher unemployment rates had lower rates of out-
migration. And Bank and Kamman (2010) found that households with migrants in the 
Eastern Cape were “poor, but not the poorest of the poor.” Both Ardington et al. (2007) and 
Posel et al. (2006) found that the probability a household will have a labor-market migrant 
increases considerably if at least one household member is eligible for South Africa’s 
generous Old Age Pension. These findings all suggest that there are financial costs to 
migration, which are insurmountable for some. 
 
There is, however, a compelling explanation for why more interviewees did not see the 
financial barriers to migration as a significant hurdle: these costs may not actually be 
prohibitive. As both Collinson (2010) and Kok and Collinson (2006) acknowledge, poorer 
households not only have less capital but also tend to have less access to migrant networks 
(see also Gelderblom, 2007; Seekings and Nattrass, 2006). Access to Old Age Pensions may 
allow individuals to compensate for a lack of access to these networks, by, for example, 
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covering living expenses—which these networks often subsidize—while they look for a job 
in the destination location. Thus, the salient factor limiting the migration of poorer 
households may not be the financials costs of moving to a new location, but their exclusion 
from migratory networks. 
 
Ultimately, the views held by the interviewees on the importance of migrant networks in 
South Africa appear to largely reflect reality. A analysis of migration intentions measured 
during the 2001-2002 HSRC Migration Survey found that “the presence of a migrant network 
in the possible destination is by far the most important predictor of” intentions to move 
(Wentzel et al., 2006: 195-196). As Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 284) conclude after 
reviewing the available literature on social networks and migration, “The unemployed people 
who remain in rural areas ... where there are few job opportunities [i.e., those who do not 
migrate] are probably those who lack the social capital to escape the constraints of local 
conditions” (see also Klasen and Woolard, 2009; Nattrass, 2000; Murray, 1995; Sharp and 
Spiegel, 1985). 
 
The importance of social networks to migration in South Africa thus suggests that this 
understudied aspect of the migratory process should be explored in much greater depth. 
Researchers should map these migration networks, exploring the relationships between 
migrants and receiving individuals, the motivations for accepting migrants, the degree of 
autonomy migrants retain over their decisions to migrate, expectations of these migrants upon 
arrival, and the impact of various characteristics of receiving networks on the short-, 
medium-, and long-term outcomes of migrants. It is likely impossible to understand the 




4.3.2 Who “Succeeds”? 
 
My interviewees judged a migrant’s “success” primarily through the lens of material 
acquisition. They believed that the success of a migrant was ultimately inseparable from both 
his own material comfort and the material comfort of those in his rural household. Ironically, 
however, the interviewees simultaneously argued that budgeting and saving—and not 
spending money frivolously—were fundamental to a migrant’s long-term prospects. These 
long-term prospects were further undermined by what the interviewees believed was a major 
pitfall awaiting those who migrate from rural areas: the lure of urban vices. 
 
The interviewees believed that the acquisition of material goods reflected the success of a 
migrant. “It’s when someone accumulates his own possessions” that his migration becomes 
successful, NM-7, the credit collector, argued. R-1, the police officer from Matatiele, 
elucidated what “possessions” NM-7 may have been referring to: “You will see [he is 
successful in] the way [he] dress[es]. Maybe he’s coming with updated fashion or is driving a 
nice vehicle or now he managed to build his [own] home.” R-8, the unemployed 25-year-old 
who had moved to Cape Town for health reasons, similarly considers an individual’s 
migration successful once he has “money, a good house, material possessions like a car and 
so on.” M-7, the electrical appliance saleswoman, agreed: A successful migrant, she argued, 
“Is someone who manages to buy his own cars and a house in the city. … Everything goes 
well for him.”  
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The interviewees looked in particular to improvements in the standard of living of the 
migrant’s rural household when determining the degree of success a migrant has achieved. In 
order for a migrant to be successful, NM-2, the unemployed 25-year-old woman from outside 
of Qumbu, argued, “There must be something that is showing at home. I must build houses 
and also help other people that are in need.” Similarly, NM-9, the unemployed 32-year-old 
woman from Matatiele, described how, “You see the difference [when a migrant is 
successful]. Like if someone is from a poor family, which depended on the mercy of the 
neighbors, [they] begin to manage without their help. If houses were in bad condition you’ll 
see them rebuilding.” R-2, the taxi owner, agreed that investment in rural houses was a key 
indicator of success: “This [migrant is] able to build his home. You see most of us we are 
coming from two rondavels or three rondavels homes. But now [with this person] you see no 
more rondavels. You see tiled houses with face bricks. You see houses with garages. And 
you say, ‘This person, he has made it in the city!’”  
 
Improvements in the quality of life of the migrant’s rural household did not just signal 
success for those who live in rural areas (i.e., the non-migrants and returnees); Those in the 
Migrant category, who still live in Cape Town, also believed that migrants were only 
successful once they were able to support their rural family. M-4, for example, described how 
when a migrant becomes successful, “you start seeing a change in his [rural] home. He starts 
renovating houses. If his family is dependent on neighbors for something to eat you start 
seeing them buying their own groceries.” M-8, the hotel cleaner, agreed that a migrant is 
successful when he “is earning [enough] … to support his rural family.” 
 
The views of success expressed by the interviewees add an important piece of evidence to the 
assertion made in Section 4.2.1 that neither the “new” nor the “old” economic theories of 
migration are adequate to describe the migratory process in South Africa. Not only do both 
individuals and households play an important role in the migration decision, but also a 
“successful” migrant, according to the interviewees, must support both himself and his 
household, which are not ultimately synonymous. This provides further impetus to 
investigate the seemingly intricate relationship between individuals and households in the 
migration process. 
 
This emphasis on material acquisition could have potentially deleterious consequences for the 
South African economy. The desire of migrants to appear successful to others could be one of 
the factors fueling South Africa’s extremely high household-debt and unsecured-credit 
burdens. Household debt in South Africa has largely stabilized at 76 percent of disposable 
income (South African Reserve Bank, 2013: 10). However, unsecured credit—or credit that 
is either secured by placing a lien on an individual’s salary or is not secured at all—increased 
by 400 percent between 2007 and 2012 and accounted for 40 percent of credit issued in 2012 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013: 6 and 26; South African Reserve Bank, 2013: 44; World 
Bank, 2013a: 21). Notably, unsecured credit is among the only avenues available to lower 
income households (or those making fewer than R10,000 per month) to borrow money 
(National Credit Regulator, 2013: 28-29). There is growing evidence that the increased 
unsecured credit burden threatens South Africa’s macroeconomic stability by undermining its 
banking system (International Monetary Fund, 2013: 11) and contributing to the wave of 
labor unrest crippling South Africa’s mining and manufacturing industries (see, e.g., Rhode, 
2013). If a large proportion of the population, like my interviewees, also measures a 
migrant’s success by his or her ability to acquire material goods, then these views could help 
explain South Africans’ insatiable appetite for credit. 
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My interviewees’ emphasis on material acquisition, however, was in direct opposition with 
what many of them thought was fundamental to the success of any migration: financial 
prudence. To succeed, NM-3, the unemployed 21-year-old male from Mount Frere, argued, 
“You must also bank [i.e., save] some of your money.” NM-7, the credit collector, agreed 
that a migrant’s success was due to “how [he] managed money.” And NM-9, the 32-year-old 
woman from Matatiele, posited that those who do not succeed “spend recklessly, while” 
those who do “have a budget plan.” 
 
Saving, according to the interviewees, serves two purposes. First, it helps migrants reach their 
long-term goals and thus achieve success. As R-8, the unemployed 25-year-old who had 
moved to Cape Town for health reasons, described, “People succeed because they have 
planned and committed to their plans. Those who fail, it’s because they don’t have a plan. … 
The plan is the set goal of what you want to achieve and how you want to achieve it. You put 
money aside so you can be able to see your plan through.” NM-3, who earlier had 
emphasized the importance of saving, viewed the benefits of putting aside money similarly: 
“If you were not going to school you can go to the city and actually further your studies if 
you can save up the money that you get from work. And then once you are educated, you can 
become successful.” Secondly, frugalness provides insulation from negative economic 
shocks. R-1, the police officer from Matatiele, for example, argued, “You see, some of them, 
they’ve got jobs but still you don’t see anything coming from them. … They enjoy their 
money while they are still young and … [t]hey don’t secure whatever they’ve got. So one 
day, when they lose their jobs, they can’t point to something out of it.” Thus, a desire on 
behalf of a migrant to appear successful may not only undermine South Africa’s economic 
outlook, but it may actually directly undermine the migrant’s probability of achieving this 
success. 
 
Many interviewees—primarily those who had returned from Cape Town—identified a 
second pitfall awaiting those who migrate from rural to urban areas: the lure of urban vices. 
“Some will go there [and just] have fun,” NM-3, the unemployed 21-year-old man, said of 
certain migrants. The people who just go to have fun “lose track of [their goals]. When they 
get to the city, they forget that they left hungry parents, they left hungry children at home. 
They start enjoying the city life [instead],” R-2, the taxi owner, elaborated. You can even 
“earn a lot of money but fail,” R-5, the builder on government projects, described, if you 
“have no ambitions except drinking too much alcohol and are addicted to women. Alcohol 
and women are a big downfall of many.” In contrast, he continued you can “succeed even if 
[you] earn so little” if you avoid these vices and “have a goal.” As R-6, the municipal council 
employee, concluded, “If you drink too much, move at night going out to those parties … you 
won’t succeed.” Like financial imprudence, engaging these urban vices, the interviewees 
believed, lowered the probability that a migrant would ultimately be successful and thus be 







5 The views of those in the Migrant category are not part of the discussion of how financial prudence and the 
lure of urban vices affect a migrant’s potential for success, because I neglected to ask half of those in the 
Migrant category the question from which this discussion was drawn (“Why do you think some migrants 
succeed while others fail?” [Appendix A, Question 3f]). Additionally, the answers provided by three-quarters of 
those who were asked this question were perfunctory and not particularly insightful. 
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4.3.3 Who Returns? 
 
Because of the distinctly circular nature of migration in South Africa (see Section 4.1; see 
also, Posel, 2009: 3; Adepoju, 2006: 28; Kok and Collinson, 2006: 25; Posel and Casale, 
2003: 460; c.f. Posel, 2009, for evidence that return migration may be decreasing in post-
apartheid South Africa), it is not only important to investigate who migrates and who 
succeeds, but it is also necessary to explore who returns to rural areas and why. Expectedly, 
by far the most common reason given by the interviewees for why people return home was 
failure to achieve economic security in urban areas. The interviewees also suggested a 
number of additional reasons why individuals return to rural areas, including sickness (which 
has been found to be a particularly strong pull for those returning to the rural areas around 
Mount Frere [Neves, 2008]), urban crime, and because they are forced to do so by their urban 
hosts. Though there was some indication from those in the Migrant category and those who 
had never permanently left Alfred Nzo that individuals who return are better positioned to 
exploit the economic opportunities available in rural areas, the only interviewees to have 
actually experienced return migration—the returnees—strongly disagreed that there were 
benefits from migration upon return. 
 
My interviewees argued that the primary reason why individuals return to rural areas was 
because of economic failure in urban ones. NM-2, the unemployed 25-year-old woman from 
outside of Qumbu, for example, described how “some people [go] back because they don’t 
find work and are struggling. They just say, ‘It’s better to suffer at home in rural areas than in 
the city.’” Similarly, NM-9, the unemployed 32-year-old woman from Matatiele, argued that 
individuals “return to rural areas because they’re not working and don’t feel like being in the 
city makes any difference.” R-7, the police officer from Tsolo, agreed: Those who return 
“realize [] that this [migration] was nothing”—“They have no money, they have no job, they 
have nothing. They were just staying in those shacks, depending on grants or depending on 
boyfriends’ salaries. They have nothing of their own”—“So they’ll have to go back and 
plough mielies in rural areas.” As M-1, the police officer, argued, using language resonant of 
NM-2’s descriptions, “Some people, they go back home because they say, ‘Okay, I’m not 
going to die here without anything. Let me rather be at home and starve at home because this 
is where I was born, this is where I live.’” 
 
Though interviewees from all three-migration backgrounds believed that migrants returned to 
rural areas primarily for economic reasons, those in the Migrant category tended to be more 
critical of these individuals. The vast majority of non-migrants and returnees used neutral 
language when describing this phenomenon, but it was impossible to miss the more 
judgmental tone that a number of the migrants adopted for these individuals, often faulting 
them for “giving up.” M-2, the Transnet employee, for example, described how “some they 
give up. They lose hope” and then return. M-7, the electrical appliance saleswomen, agreed 
that those who return for economic reasons have “give[n] up looking for jobs.” M-6, the 
credit department manager, was perhaps most forceful in his critique: “There are those people 
who just go back there, who already [have] give[n] up on life and say, ‘Okay, I’m going back 
home. I’m just going to go there and then I will look after the cattles or [plough] mielie.’ … 
Most of the people who go [back] to the Eastern Cape, most of them, they [have] given up.” 
The judgment evident in a number of the migrants’ descriptions of these individuals could 
perhaps reflect the economic position of these individuals. Because all of those in the Migrant 
category were employed, they could believe that securing employment in urban areas may 
simply be a function of not “giving up” and returning home. As M-1 argued, those who do 
not succeed in urban areas, “don’t persevere. They are losing their hope very quickly.” 
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Although the interviewees believed that economic failure was the primary reason why 
individuals return to rural areas, they identified three other drivers of return migration: 
sickness, urban crime, and disagreements with their hosts. Sickness was the second most 
common reason mentioned by the interviewees for why individuals return to rural areas. 
“Some return,” NM-9, the unemployed 32-year-old woman from Matatiele, argued, “Because 
they are sick and have no one to look after them. They go back to rural areas [] because 
someone can look after them there.” R-7, the police officer from Tsolo, also believed that 
sickness was an important factor in return migration: “HIV, tuberculosis, stroke because of 
drugs. Maybe others were stabbed so they became disabled” drive individuals who “don’t 
have someone to look after them in urban areas, … back so they can get support.” Even those 
who do have support in urban areas, NM-4, the security guard, argued “come back before 
they die, [so as to] avoid[] being a burden.” Neves (2008) and Clark et al. (2007) found that 
illness was a significant factor in return migration to both the former Transkei in the Eastern 
Cape and to the Agincourt sub-district in Mpumalanga, respectively. This trend, however, as 
both papers argue, is not innocuous: the return of sick and dying migrants places an 
extremely heavy burden on both rural households and infrastructure, which are already in 
precarious positions. 
 
Some of those who do not return home because of economic failure or illness, according to 
the interviewees, are driven away from urban areas because of crime. NM-7, the credit 
collector, described how people return because “it’s [] not safe, especially in the informal 
settlements.” “Certain people come back because they do not like what is going on in the city 
[and] because of crime,” R-3, the unemployed 22-year-old man from Mount Frere, agreed. 
“They’re [more] used to the rural livelihood.” M-1, a police officer, confirmed these views: 
“You get those people who didn’t feel comfortable anymore living here [because] crime [] is 
very high in the cities. So you get those people who are very scared to be victims of crime. 
Then some of them rather prefer to go back home because they say the crime rate is less than 
in big cities.” 
 
Crime in South Africa is in fact rampant. South Africa has among the highest murder rates 
(World Bank, 2013a; see also, UNODC 2013) and the highest rate of rape (Heiskanen, 2010: 
39) in the world. Though there is some indication that crime rates in urban and rural areas are 
largely comparable, the absolute number of criminal events in urban areas most likely dwarfs 
those in rural areas, perhaps driving the perception of urban areas as a place of vice (Pelser et 
al., 2000). Thus, because of its perceived impact on migration, crime, in addition to its 
psychological and physical toll, may also have adverse economic consequences: if 
individuals leave urban areas because of crime (and presumably the threat of crime keeps 
others from migrating to urban areas to begin with), then the economic benefits of migration, 
both to the individuals and households and to the broader South African economy, may be 
diluted. 
 
Even if an individual wishes to remain in the city, however, he is still ultimately at the mercy 
of his urban hosts. Those in the Returnee and Migrant categories, though not those who had 
never permanently left Alfred Nzo, believed that many individuals return home not because 
they want to but because they are no longer welcome by their hosts. Returnees and migrants 
highlighted two specific situations where individuals are spurned by their urban support 
systems. In the first, the migrant gets involved in unsavory activities. R-6, the municipal 
council employee, for example, described how “if [someone] is misbehaving, his relative 
there decides to take him home because they see he is stoned, he is not doing things, he 
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almost dies. Then they tell him[:] ‘No man, the thing that you were here to do, you failed to 
do. Just go home.’” “It could be that some people have not adapted or they become 
troublemakers in the city that makes those housing them worry” and forces these individuals 
to return, R-8, the unemployed 25-year-old who had moved to Cape Town for health reasons, 
argued. In the second situation mentioned by the interviewees, the hosts grow frustrated at 
the migrant’s economic stagnation and force the migrant to return home. As M-2, the 
Transnet employee, related, “For a person who came here … and then someone else took him 
or her in, then it becomes three months or six months or one year, the person doesn’t get a 
job. … At some point the other person is getting fed up knowing that there is someone in the 
house who is not working, who’s not contributing anything.” Notably, none of those who had 
never permanently left Alfred Nzo considered this a serious concern for migrants, perhaps 
because none of them had any direct experience contending with the vagaries of these 
migration networks. However, the emphasis that returnees and migrants placed on the role of 
urban networks in return migration questions the degree of autonomy that migrants have in 
the migration process and provides additional motivation to explore how migrant networks in 
South Africa shape this process (see Section 4.3.2). 
 
There was some indication, however, that, regardless of the reason, those who return home 
are better positioned to take advantage of the economic opportunities in rural areas. Some 
non-migrants and migrants believed that the skills and experiences a migrant gained while in 
urban areas ultimately benefit him in the rural labor market. NM-5, the administrative intern, 
for example, argued, “It is easier than before [to get a job] … because you learn a lot of 
things while you are in urban areas. … Some come back with experience of the jobs that they 
were doing there and others tried to get those tenders.” M-6, the credit department manager, 
agreed: “If you come to Cape Town, you will get a better education6 obviously. And then 
when you go back [home], then there is a post there or a job there, you are privileged [i.e., in 
a better position] to get [it]. … [In urban areas,] you learn different cultures, different ways of 
living, … [and you get] exposure [to certain things like] how to open your own business.” As 
M-7, the electrical appliance saleswoman, concluded, “No, it’s not easy [to find a job] but 
someone who has been in the city is more likely to find [one] because of the experience [he] 
acquired while in the city.” 
 
Yet those who had returned from Cape Town—the only individuals in the sample who had 
first-hand experience with return migration—adamantly disagreed that there were benefits 
from migration upon return. R-4, the unemployed 27-year-old woman from outside of Mount 
Frere, for example, argued that after a migrant returns, his job prospects are “one and the 
same like before.” R-1, the police officer from Matatiele, explained why this was the case: 
“No, [migrating] doesn’t help them, because those things they do [in the city], they are not 
here. For instance, there are factories there and we don’t have factories here. … You’ll find 
[some of them were] working on the factory, or where they make tires, or where they do 
metal work, [but] we don’t have those things here.” However, the differing views held by 
non-migrants and migrants on the one hand and returnees on the other suggest the importance 






6 Here, M-6 appears to be using “education” informally. He seems to be referring to all the knowledge that an 




Despite the profound impact that migration has had on South Africa, few anthropologic or 
sociological studies have examined individual motivations for migrating and perceptions of 
each step of the migration process. This chapter strove to begin to fill this gap in the existing 
literature and to suggest potentially fruitful paths for further research. 
 
The interviewees in this study viewed migration primarily through an economic lens. Though 
some who had never left Alfred Nzo argued that infrastructural disparities facilitated 
migration, the vast majority of my interviewees ultimately believed that the push of poverty 
in rural areas and the pull of economic opportunity in urban ones encourage individuals to 
migrate. This finding suggests that comprehensive examinations of migration must include 
economic analysis and not rely solely on historical-structural approaches. The decision to 
migrate, however, could not be fully explained by either the “new” or “old” economic 
theorization on migration: both individuals and households, my interviewees indicated, are 
instrumental in the decision-making process, suggesting that a more nuanced theoretical 
understanding of migration may be warranted. 
 
I then examined how my interviewees conceptualize the migration process. The interviewees 
had difficulty pinpointing the characteristics of those who migrate; instead, they tended to 
highlight the characteristics of those who remain in rural areas. Though the interviewees 
believed that some of those who remain in rural areas are unambitious, they suggested that 
most lack access to migrant networks, a prerequisite, the interviewees argued, for moving to 
a new location. The interviewees judged the “success” of those who did migrate through the 
material progress of both the migrant and the migrant’s rural household, which was in 
conflict with what the interviewees believed was a primary attribute of successful migrants, 
financial prudence. Those who did not succeed, however, were likely to return to rural areas, 
if illness, the threat of crime, or the migrants’ urban hosts did not force them to return home 
beforehand. 
 
This chapter suggests two important directions for future research. First, researchers should 
further examine the relationship between the individual and the household in migration 
decisions in South African. This relationship appears to deviate from the individual-
household binary presented in the theoretical literature: not only do both individuals and 
households play an important role in the migration decision, but the success of migrants is 
also judged on the material progress of both the migrant and her household. Second, 
researchers should explore the intricacies of migratory networks in South Africa. The views 
expressed by the interviewees indicate that these networks may play a much more 
fundamental role both before and during the migration process than the literature suggests. 
Understanding the nuances of migration in South Africa thus ultimately requires 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to the nascent literature on the changing 
relationship between rural and urban areas in South Africa by examining perceptions of 
economic opportunity and of migration in the “Alfred Nzo” District Municipality in the rural 
Eastern Cape, and in Cape Town. Though much work has been done on the changing 
economic realities in rural and urban areas, few scholars have investigated economic 
perceptions, which ultimately shape South Africa’s economic and political systems. This 
thesis differs from the few existing studies of economic perceptions in South Africa by 
examining how migration—which has framed how generations of black South Africans have 
experienced their economic system, either directly, as migrants themselves, or indirectly, as 
beneficiaries of remittances—shapes these perceptions. In particular, I interviewed 
individuals from three distinct migratory backgrounds: “migrants” (M), or those who had 
migrated to Cape Town from in and around the Alfred Nzo District Municipality and have 
remained there; “returnees” (R), or those who had moved to Cape Town but have since 
returned home; and “non-migrants” (NM), or those who have never left the Alfred Nzo 
District Municipality with the intention of permanently resettling elsewhere. Through in-
depth interviews of individuals with diverse migration experiences, I sought to offer initial 
insights into how migration shapes perceptions of economic inequality, social mobility, and 
migration itself in rural and urban areas in South Africa. 
 
The findings in this study add additional support to the hypothesis advanced in my previous 
work (Telzak, 2012, 2014) that local economic conditions and personal economic 
experiences—including an individual’s experience with migration—have a profound impact 
on economic perceptions. Although migration experience does not appear to shape how my 
interviewees perceived the distribution of income in South Africa, as Chapter 2 argues, it 
does affect how my interviewees conceptualize the makeup of this distribution. Those in the 
Non-Migrant and Returnee categories—who live in a rural area of South Africa where most 
of the employment opportunities are in the public-sector and where there is little racial 
diversity—tended to argue that the top and the middle of the income distribution consisted 
primarily of public sector employees and to emphasize the geographic character of the 
economic divide between rural and urban areas in South Africa. In contrast, migrants—who 
live in Cape Town, where there is a more robust private sector and intense racial disparities 
persist—argued that private sector individuals made up a substantially larger share of the 
middle and upper classes and that race was a much more salient economic division in South 
Africa than was geography. In contrast, regardless of migration experience, the vast majority 
of my interviewees greatly underestimated their relative economic position. However, there is 
some evidence that the lens of poverty through which most of my interviewees conceptualize 
their economic positions reflects their individual expectations and aspirations more than their 
perceived economic position relative to others. 
 
Personal economic experiences and local economic conditions also appear to shape 
perceptions of social mobility, although not as profoundly as perceptions of inequality. 
Interviewees from all three migration categories highlighted two individualistic pathways—
or pathways over which the interviewees believed they could exercise direct control—
including education and hard work, and three structural pathways and impediments—or those 
which the interviewees believed were entirely outside of their control—including corruption 
and nepotism, access to information, and the availability of jobs. However, my interviewees 
did not concur on the relative importance of each pathway/impediment to social mobility: 
those who live in rural areas (i.e., never-migrants and returnees) placed more emphasis on the 
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roles of corruption and a lack of information in impeding mobility than those in urban areas. 
Ultimately, many of my interviewees believed that structural barriers to social mobility were 
substantially higher in rural than in urban areas, and they viewed migration as an opportunity 
to overcome these structural barriers and to better exploit the individualistic pathways 
available to them. 
 
The findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 appear to support previous assumptions about 
economic perceptions. Piketty (1995), for example, in his theoretical model of how mobility 
experience affects redistributive policies, assumes that individuals only look towards their 
own mobility when formulating political views. Though, as I hypothesized in Chapter 3, 
Piketty is probably overstating the importance of personal economic experiences in economic 
and political decision-making, this thesis lends some support to his assumption. When 
formulating their economic views, national and international trends were of secondary 
importance to my interviewees; they more often looked to their personal experiences and 
local economic conditions. This conclusion has particularly important ramifications for South 
Africa. South Africa has made significant macroeconomic strides since the end of apartheid. 
However, most of these economic gains, as Chapters 2 and 3 argue, have been captured by 
the most advantaged elements of society. These findings indicate that many South Africans 
do not recognize these gains when formulating their economic perceptions. South Africa may 
thus be at greater risk for many of the negative repercussions—including decreased economic 
output, social and political alienation, and negative mental health outcomes—associated with 
pessimistic perceptions of economic inequality and social mobility. 
 
Because my interviewees identified migration as among the only tools that many rural 
residents have for accessing economic opportunities in South Africa, in Chapter 4 I examined 
how these individuals conceptualize migration itself. My interviewees understood migration 
through a primarily individualistic, economic—as opposed to structural—lens. This 
economic lens shaped how my interviewees perceived each step of the migration process. 
The interviewees had difficulty pinpointing the characteristics of those who migrate—in part 
because, they believed, most people migrate for work at some point in their life—but argued 
that those who remained in rural areas lacked access to social networks in urban ones that 
could provide financial support during and after the move. The success of a migration was 
thus unsurprisingly judged entirely on the economic gains, measured by material acquisition, 
of both the migrant and his family. Migrants who did not achieve this material success, my 
interviewees believed, were likely to return to their rural homes, if illness, the threat of crime, 
or the migrants’ urban hosts did not force them to return beforehand. 
 
The findings in this thesis have important implications for development policy in South 
Africa and may help to explain the persistent underdevelopment of rural areas. Bank and 
Minkley (2005: 20) describe how simply “expanding rural services, restoring rights to land 
and pursuing more market-friendly economic polices”—oft advocated developmental 
interventions—have largely failed to foster “competitive farmers and rural entrepreneurs” in 
South Africa. This thesis offers some evidence about why this may be the case. James (2001: 
105-107), in her study of land reform in the Northern Province and Mpumalanga, argues that 
migration has “turned rural areas into places of retirement and refuge for labour migrants” 
from places of agricultural (and presumably other forms of) production and has turned urban 
areas into the “site of wage labor.” Although Bank and Minkley (2005: 23) are correct that 
the interdependency between rural and urban areas has “become increasingly disentangled by 
post-apartheid developments,” this thesis suggests that the psychological relationship 
between rural and urban areas that James describes may still permeate the perceptions of 
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South Africans. My interviewees still viewed urban areas as the centers of economic 
opportunity in South Africa and migration as the means to access this opportunity; few 
believed that there were meaningful opportunities in rural areas, despite the infrastructural 
development that these areas have experienced since the end of apartheid. Rural South 
Africans may thus avoid investing resources and their own human capital near their homes, 
contributing to the underdevelopment of these areas. Economic development of rural areas in 
South Africa may thus depend as much on changing preconceived notions of the economic 
roles of rural and urban locations as on pro-development policies and interventions. 
 
A crucial part of changing these preconceived notions may involve changing the existing 
power structures in rural areas. The interviewees believed that a nepotistic and corrupt elite 
captured the vast majority of economic opportunities available in rural areas. Migration was 
thus seen as a way to escape this intense nepotism and corruption and access South Africa’s 
economic opportunities. Although rural areas have changed dramatically since the end of 
apartheid, my interviewees may continue to view these areas primarily as “places of 
retirement and refuge” and not economic centers because the opportunities that do exist are 
largely inaccessible. This thesis thus adds further support to du Toit and Neves’ (2007: 171, 
175) argument that “rather than aim at ‘eliminating’ the second [rural] economy or hoping 
that it can somehow be transfigured into the first, policymakers would do better to look 
carefully at measures that can ameliorate existing power imbalances and reduce inequality.” 
Though infrastructural development and some degree of integration into the South African 
economic system are likely prerequisites to the economic development of rural areas, 
reducing these power imbalances could go a long way in changing the conceptualization of 
rural areas and in keeping individuals who could contribute substantially to the development 
of these areas from migrating to urban centers in search of work. 
 
This study began to explore how migration experience shaped perceptions of economic 
inequality, social mobility and migration itself in South Africa. However, this thesis suffers 
from a number of limitations. The findings in this thesis were drawn from interviews with a 
relatively small sample of 26 individuals, which lacks statistical significance. Additionally, 
my interviewees are not representative of the broader South African population. This study 
focused on a specific cohort of individuals—relatively young black South Africans originally 
from the area in and around the Alfred Nzo District Municipality of the rural Eastern Cape—
which is unlikely to reflect the tremendous diversity of both the South African population 
generally and the black South African population specifically. As previous studies have 
found (Brey et al., 2010: 217-219 on South Africa; Graham, 2000: 243-244 on Latin 
America) younger cohorts of individuals have systematically different (and generally more 
optimistic) economic expectations than older cohorts. Furthermore, although understanding 
migration between the Eastern Cape and Cape Town is important for understanding broader 
economic and social trends in South Africa, the distinctive racial and economic makeup of 
Cape Town may limit the generalizability of the economic perceptions articulated by my 
interviewees. And these interviews with black African interviewees reveal nothing about 
perceptions of social mobility among coloured or white individuals, who comprise significant 
minorities of South Africa’s population. Because the small sample size of this study fails to 
capture the full demographic, ethnic, and economic diversity of this enormously 
heterogeneous country, it is possible that the views expressed by my interviewees are not 
commonly held among black South Africans and instead represent outlying opinions. 
 
There is also a risk that social desirability bias—or the tendency for interviewees to orient 
their answers during surveys and interviews in a way that portrays their lives as positively as 
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possible—influenced the opinions expressed by my interviewees. Although I strove to 
uncover this bias by asking questions multiple times at various points during the interviews, 
there is a chance that the opinions expressed by my interviewees were ultimately formulated 
to appeal to the interviewer—a white, American student—and my translator—a Xhosa-
speaking, black African from Alfred Nzo but currently living in Cape Town—and thus may 
not have been entirely reflective of their views. 
 
These shortcomings ultimately suggest a number of potentially fruitful paths for researchers 
interested in economic perceptions to pursue. To better understand economic perceptions in 
South Africa, research must investigate how these perceptions differ among various age 
cohorts; how different locations in South Africa affect conceptualizations of inequality, social 
mobility, and migration; and whether different racial and economic subgroups of South 
African society have similar aspirations and expectations about their futures. Additionally, 
future research should employ more statistically robust methods, including survey 
instruments, to supplement in-depth, open-ended interviews. In the end, a more detailed 
analysis of how South Africans conceptualize their economic environment would require a 
larger sample of individuals that captures more of the geographical, economic, racial, and 
cultural diversity of South Africa as a whole. 
 
Additionally, researchers must do more to understand the intricacies of the migration process 
in South Africa. Any comprehensive attempt to understand this important economic and 
social force must further investigate the role of individuals, households, and migrant 
networks in this process. This study suggests that there is a nuanced relationship between 
individual and household actors in the migration decision—and thus neither the “new” nor 
the “old” economics of migration is an appropriate lens through which to view migration in 
South Africa. However, there were insufficient data to develop a comprehensive theoretical 
alternative. Moreover, this thesis indicates that migrant networks play a much more 
fundamental role both before and during the migration process than the available literature 
suggests. Understanding the nuances of migration in South Africa thus necessitates 
understanding the intricacies of the role that individuals, households, and migrant networks 
play in this process. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis sought to highlight the importance of studying economic and migratory 
perceptions in South Africa and to present findings on how individuals from one migration 
pathway conceive of their economic opportunities. As South Africa enters its third decade of 
democracy with an increasingly tenuous economic and political outlook, it will become even 
more crucial to study and understand the nuances of economic and migratory perceptions 
among South Africans. The results of this study, thus, indicate a number of meaningful and 




Appendix A: Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Economic Perceptions Questions: 
 
1. These four pictures show different types of society. The first picture represents a 
society with a small elite of rich people at the top, a few people in the middle, and a 
large number of poor people at the bottom. The second picture represents a society 
that is like a pyramid, with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and a 
lot of poor people at the bottom. The third picture shows a society in which most 
people are in the middle. The fourth picture shows a society with lots of people at the 
top, some in the middle, and very few at the bottom.  
a. Which of these pictures, in your view, describes South Africa today? Why? 
b. What kinds of people are at the top? What kinds of people are at the bottom? 
(Probe with specific examples [e.g., teachers, policemen, taxi drivers, etc.] if 
not forthcoming.) 
c. Is it possible for someone to move from the bottom to the top? How do people 
get to the top? Why do some people get to the top and not others? 
d. Where would you place yourself in that picture? What are the chances that 
you’ll reach the top? What about your children? What are the chances you’ll 
be in the bottom? What about the middle? 
e. In your understanding of how society looks, where would you place most of 
the white people? Where would you place most of the black people? Where 
would you place most of the people living in rural areas? What about the 
people living in urban areas? The people in townships? 
 
2. Government intervention 
a. Are people in urban areas better off than people in rural areas? 
b. Do you think that the government is doing too much, enough, or too little for 
people living in rural areas in South Africa? 
c. Do you think the government is doing too much, enough, or too little for 
people living in urban areas in South Africa?  
d. What do you think the government should do differently for people in rural 
areas? 
e. What do you think the government should do differently for people in urban 
areas? 





3. Migration decisions and outcomes 
a. Why do people leave their home villages and move elsewhere? Do you think 
people want to leave their homes or do they feel like they have to? Do 
individuals decide for themselves whether to leave or do others decide for 
them? Do individuals migrate to make money for themselves or for their 
families? 
b. Some people migrate while other people don’t. What kinds of people migrate 
and what kinds of people remain in their home village? 
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c. How do people choose an area in South Africa to move to? Why do people 
choose certain areas over others? (If they respond that “knowing people” is 
important, ask: Are these individuals important for helping migrants find 
jobs?) 
d. To where do most people move? Do more people migrate to urban or rural 
areas? Do more people move to big cities or small towns? Do you consider 
places like Mount Frere and Matatiele urban areas? 
e. Why do some people go back home? Do you think those who return are more 
likely to find jobs than before they left? 
f. What do you think counts as a successful migration? Why do you think some 
migrants succeed while others fail? 
 
For “Never Migrants”: 
 
4. Your lack of migration experience 
a. Why have you never left your home village? 
b. Do you, or have you ever, wanted to move elsewhere? If so, why have you not 
moved elsewhere? 
c. Are there any individuals in your household who have migrated? If so, why 
did they migrate and why didn’t you migrate? 
d. Do you want to move elsewhere? To where would you move? 
 
For “Failed Migrants”: 
 
5. Your Past migration experience 
a. To where did you move from the Eastern Cape? Why did you move to that 
area instead of another one? Why did you leave your home in the Eastern 
Cape? 
b. Why did you move back to the Eastern Cape? 
c. If you had a chance to do it over again, would you still move?  
d. Do you intend to migrate again? Why or why not? What would have to change 
for you to move back to the area you originally migrated to? 
 
For “Successful Migrants”: 
 
6. Your migration experience 
a. Why did you move from the Eastern Cape? Why did you move to Cape Town 
as opposed to another location? Why did you leave your home in the Eastern 
Cape? 
b. As you know, not everyone who migrates to a different part of South Africa 
stays in that area permanently. Why have you remained in Cape Town? 
c. When you first moved to Cape Town, what were your goals? Have you 
accomplished these goals? 
d. Would you consider your migration to Cape Town “successful”? Why or why 
not? Why did you succeed, while others failed? OR Why did you fail, while 
others succeeded? 
e. If migrant has a job: why were you able to find a job while others were not? 
 
7. Home and remittances 
a. Where do you consider “home”? When you draw your Old Age Pension, 
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where do you want to live? 
b. How often do you visit your home in the Eastern Cape? Do you send money 
back to the Eastern Cape? Do you like to send money home or do you feel 
obligated to do so? When your children have jobs would you like them to send 
money to your family in the Eastern Cape? 
c. Have you ever had someone from the Eastern Cape live with you? Why did 
you decide to let this person live with you? How did you choose which of your 
relatives/friends to bring over? How was the experience? How did you help 




8. Migration intentions 
a. Do you plan to move away from this area to settle permanently in another area 
in the next 12 months? 
b. If yes, why do you intend to move? To where do you intend to move? Why do 
you want to move to this area instead of other areas? 
c. If no, why don’t you intend to migrate? What would it take for you to want to 
move? (e.g., If you had a job waiting for you in another part of the country 
would you move? What kind of job would it take for you to move?) 
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A.1.1 Personal ID  A.1.2 Interview number  
A.2: Record of attempted contacts 
Day and date 




code detail (as necessary) 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Codes for A.2:     C completed                2 number not working                           3 person not available (record time for call-back) 
4 person who answered provided another number (record new number) 
5 person who answered has never heard of respondent                            6 respondent refuses 
 
A.3: If interview completed 
A.3.1 Interviewer name  A.3.2 Interviewer code  
A.3.3 Backcheck date  A.3.4 Backcheck time  
A.3.5 Backchecker code  A.3.6 Backchecker signature  
A.3.7 Data capturer code   
 
A.4 Interviewer: record time at the start of the interview Use 24 hour clock h h m m 
 
Interviewer: Ask whether the contact details for the young adult below are currently correct. If correct, tick 
the middle box. If incorrect now, please record the correct details in the right-hand column. 
A.5.1 Full name    
A.5.2 Current address    
A.5.3 Suburb / neighbourhood    
A.5.4 Postal code    
A.5.5 Telephone (work)    
A.5.6 Telephone (home)    
A.5.7 Mobile phone    
Interviewer: confirm that this is the mobile phone number to which we should send airtime as a token of our gratitude. 
A.5.8 Email    
 
Contacts: Last time you gave us these names and phone numbers to help us contact you in future. Are they still correct? 
A.6.1 #1 name and telephone      
A.6.2 #2 name and telephone      
A.6.3 #3 name and telephone      
!
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First, I have some questions about where you live 
B.1 What kind of a house do you live in? House or brick structure on a separate stand or yard 1 
Go to 
B.3 Flat in a block of flats 2 
Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, duplex or triplex) 3 





Informal dwelling/shack, in backyard 5 
Informal dwelling/shack, NOT in backyard, e.g. in an 
informal/squatter settlement 
6 
Room/flatlet not in backyard but on a shared property 7 





If not in formal housing: 
Do you have electricity inside the 
shack? If so, do you have your own 
meter or electricity box? 
Yes, and we have our own meter 1 
Yes, but we do not have our own meter 2 
No, we do not have electricity 3 
B.2.2 
If not in formal housing: 
Do you have you own tap inside or 
outside the shack, or do you share a 
tap with other households? 
Yes, we have a tap inside the shack 1 
Yes, we have our own tap in our yard 2 
No, we share a tap with other households 3 
B.3 
 
Who owns this residence? 
 
The respondent 1 
Another member of the household 2 
A family member not living in the household 3 
Someone else 4 
Don’t know 9 
 
We would now like to ask you some questions about the things household members own.  Does 
anyone in this household own the following items in good working order …? Yes No Refuse 
Don’t 
know 
B.4.1 Radio, stereo or cassette recorder 1 2 8 9 
B.4.2! Television 1 2 8 9 
B.4.3! Video, VCR, DVD 1 2 8 9 
B.4.4! Telephone (not cellular) 1 2 8 9 
B.4.5! Cellular telephone 1 2 8 9 
B.4.6! Refrigerator/freezer 1 2 8 9 
B.4.7! Gas/electric stove 1 2 8 9 
B.4.8! Microwave 1 2 8 9 

































Now let’s think about who lives in this household. 
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B.5.1 How many children (under age 18) live with you in this household?  Don’t know 9 
B.5.2 How many of these children are you biological children?  Don’t know 9 
B.6 Excluding yourself, how many other adults (aged 18 or more) live with you in this household?  Don’t know 9 
B.7 Are you the head of the household? Yes 1 No 2 
B.8 Are you married? Yes 1 No 2 
B.9 If married, does your husband/wife live in this household? Yes 1 No 2 
B.10 If not married, do you cohabit with a boy/girlfriend in this household? Yes 1 No 2 
 
Your biological children living elsewhere 
B.11 Do you have any biological children who are not living here with you? Yes 1 Go to B.12 
No 2 Go to B.13 
B.12 How many children do you have living elsewhere?  Don’t know 9 
 
Your household’s financial situation 
B.13 About how much money in total do all of the members of this 
household receive in a typical month (including all earnings, 
pensions, grants and so on, received by all household members)? 
Interviewer:  Probe respondent for best guess. 
Rand per month  Go to B.15 
Refused 8 Go to 
B.14 Don’t know 9 
B.14 Would you say that the total received by all of the household 
members is less than R1,000 per month, or more than R1,000 per 
month, or more than R3,000 per month, or more than R5,000 per 
month, or more than R10,000 per month? 
Less than R 1,000 per month 1 
R 1,000 – R 3,000 2 
R 3,000 – R 5,000 3 
R 5,000 – R 10,000 4 
More than R 10,000 5 
Refused 8 
Don’t know 9 
B.15 Did anyone in this household receive income from employment or 
self-employment last month? 
Yes 1 Go to 
B.16 




Don’t Know 8 
Refused 9 
B.16 About how much money did this household receive from 
employment or self-employment last month? Rand per month  
B.17 Did anyone in this household receive income from government 
grants last month? 





Don’t Know 8 
Refused 9 
B.18 Which government grants did this household receive (mark all that 
apply)? 
 Old Age Pension 1 
Child Support Grant 2 
Disability Grant 3 
Care Dependency Grant 4 
Other (Please specify)  





Don’t Know 8 
Refused 9 
B.20 How much remittance income did this household receive last 
month? Rand per month 
 
B.21 How would this household classify its overall financial situation now? 
Would you say it is very comfortable, comfortable, just getting by, 
Very comfortable 1 
Comfortable 2 
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poor, or very poor? Just getting by 3 
Poor 4 
Very poor 5 
Refused 8 
Don’t know 9 
B.22 How does this household’s financial situation now compare to the 
situation of other households in this same neighbourhood? Would 
you say that the situation of this household is much better, slightly 
better, the same, slightly worse, or much worse than other 
households in the neighbourhood? 
Much better than neighbours 1 
Slightly better than neighbours 2 
The same 3 
Slightly worse than neighbours 4 
Much worse than neighbours 5 
Refused 8 Don’t know 9 
B.23 Is does this household’s current financial situation compare with the 
situation four years ago, in 2009? Is your situation better now, the 
same now as then, or worse now? 
It is now better than then 1 
It is the same as then 2 
It is now worse than then 3 
Refused 8 Don’t know 9 
B.24 Do you expect that this household’s financial situation will be better 
in four years’ time, in 2017, than it is now, or will it be the same, or 
will it be worse in four years’ time than it is now? 
Better in 2017 than now 1 
The same as now 2 
Worse in 2017 than now 3 






I now have some questions about your education. 
C.1 What is the highest grade in school that you have 
successfully completed? (Do not count the final year you 
were in school if you did not successfully complete the 
year.) 
Grade 1/Sub A 1 
Grade 2/Sub B 2 
Grade 3/Standard 1 3 
Grade 4/Standard 2 4 
Grade 5/Standard 3 5 
Grade 6/Standard 4 6 
Grade 7/Standard 5 7 
Grade 8/Standard 6 8 
Grade 9/Standard 7 9 
Grade 10/Standard 8 10 
Grade 11/Standard 9 11 






No Schooling/Grade 0/Little Sub A 95 
Don’t know 99 
C.2 Have you successfully completed any diplomas, 
certificates, and degrees outside of school? (Don’t 
include any courses that you did not successfully 
complete.) 
Undergraduate Diploma/Certificate from a 
Technikon with Grade 12/Std 10 
20 
Undergraduate Diploma/Certificate from a 
University with Grade 12/Std 10 
21 
Undergraduate degree from a Technikon 22 
Undergraduate degree from a University 23 
Postgraduate degree or diploma  24 
Diploma/Cert that requires matric, not from a 
University or Technikon 
26 
Diploma/Cert that does not require matric, not 








Don’t know 99 












Are you currently working?  By “work”, we mean anything that you are doing for 
money or for payment in kind (such as food) or if you are helping unpaid in a 
household business of any kind.  Please tell us even if the work was not a proper 
job.  Work also includes self-employment or working in your own business, casual 
or part-time work, and even occasional work you might do. 
Yes 1 Go to C.6 
No 2 Go to C.5 
C.5 
 
Have you done any work since 2009? 
Yes 1 
Go to C.6 and tell us 
about your most 
recent work 
No 2 Go to C.11 
C.6 
 
What kind of work did/do you do? 
Interviewer: Probe most recent job if not currently working and please 
record the person’s occupation or job title (e.g. supermarket cashier) using 















What was/is the main business of your place of work?   
What does it produce, sell or do? 





How much money did/do you earn from this work in a typical month?  Please tell 
us your take-home pay after tax and other deductions. 
If your work involves making or selling goods, how much money do you take 
away and spend or save after paying expenses? 
Rand per month  Go to C.11 
Unpaid 5 
Refused 8 Go to C.10 




Interviewer: If the respondent refused to answer or said don’t know to 
previous question, ask: 
Is your income in a typical month less than R1000, or between R1000 and 
R3000, or between R3000 and R5000, or between R3000 and R5000, or 
between R5000 and R10000, or more than R10000? 
 
Less than R1000 per month 1 
R1000 – R3000 per month 2 
R3000-R50000 per month 3 
R5000 – R10000 per month 4 
More than R10,000 per month 5 
Refused 8 
Don’t know 9 
C.11 Have you looked for work in the last month? 
 
Yes 1 Go to C.13 
No 2 Go to C.12 
C.12 Interviewer: If not looked for work in last month and not working currently: 
Do you want work, even if you are not looking for it? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 9 
C.13 Would you accept a job that pays less than R4000 per month? Yes 1 
No 2 
It depends 3 
Don’t know 9 
I am going to read a list of jobs.  For each job, would you accept this job if it was offered to you 
now? 
Yes No Don’t 
know 
C.14.1 A domestic worker or gardener with a monthly wage of R1300? 1 2 9 
C.14.2 A security guard with a monthly wage of R2000? 1 2 9 
C.14.3 A general worker with a monthly wage of R2400? 1 2 9 
C.14.4 A machine operator with a monthly wage of R2700? 1 2 9 






How often did you have a drink containing 
alcohol in the past 12 months? 
 
Interviewer: Read options. 
I have never had a drink containing alcohol 1 Go to 
F.12 Not in the past 12 months 2 





2-4 times a month
 
4 
2-3 times a week
 
5 









How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when 
you are drinking? 
 
Interviewer: Read options. 
 
Interviewer: one tot of spirits, or one can of ordinary beer, or one 





















What you think 
I now have some questions about what you think about some things. 
Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following 














D.1 If you work hard you can get rich in South Africa today. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.2 The value of old age pensions should be increased even if it means that people like you have to pay higher taxes. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.3 
The value of the Child Support Grant should be increased 
even if it means that people like you have to pay higher 
taxes. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.4 You are nobody if you do not have a job. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.5 Antiretroviral (ARV) medicines to treat AIDS harm you more than help you. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.6 Some young women have children so that they can get the Child Support Grant. 1 2 3 4 5 9 
Whether you get ahead in life depends a lot on whether …       
D.7.1 … you come from a wealthy family 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.2 … you work hard 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.3 … you have a good education 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.4 … you know the right people 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.5 … your race 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.6 … your gender (i.e. whether you are a man or a woman) 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.7.7 … you are lucky 1 2 3 4 5 9 
D.8 Which of these things is the most 
important in terms of whether you do 
or do not get ahead in life? 
Which of these things is second 
most important?  







a wealthy family 1 1 
working hard 2 2 
a good education 3 3 
knowing the right people 4 4 
your race 5 5 
your gender (i.e. whether you are a man or a woman) 6 6 
Luck 7 7 
Don’t know 9 9 
D.9 Overall, do you think that South Africa is going in the right 
direction or the wrong direction? 
Going in the right direction 1 
Going in the wrong direction 2 
Don’t know 9 
!
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Interviewer: What is the respondent’s year of birth? Check that there is a zero in E.1 in this year. 
Migration 




When you had 
your birthday 
in this year, 
how old were 
you? 
E.3 
Where did you live during the year? Name of suburb 
(if in Cape Town) or nearest town (elsewhere), 
District, and Province 
Only include places where you lived for at least 
three months during the year. 
E.4 
What was your main 
reason for moving? 
E.5 
Who decided that you 
should move? 







1979        
1980        
1981        
1982        
1983        
1984        
1985        
1986        
1987        
1988        
1989        
1990        
1991        
1992        
1993        
1994        
1995        
1996        
1997        
1998        
1999        
2001        
2002        
2003        
2004        
2005        
2006        
2007        
2008        
2009        
2010        
2011        
2012        
2013        
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Codes for E.4: 
01 To find employment 
02 Because I had a job offer/contract 
03 For education and/or training 
04 Because I have family or friends there 
05 Marriage or divorce 
06 Because I got sick 
07 Because I couldn’t find a job 
08 Because I wasn’t allowed to stay in the house 
09 I moved with a family member, specify reason 
family member moved 
10 Other, please specify  
 Codes for E.5: 
01 I did 
02 I did in consultation with individuals in my 
household, please specify 
03 Another household member, please 
specify 
04 Another family member or friend not part of 
my household, please specify 








Finally, I have a few questions about your health 
F.1 
 
In general, how is your health? Would you say it is 





Very good 4 
Excellent 5 
Refused 8 
Don’t know 9 
Do you have any of the following health problems or disabilities? Yes No Don’t know Refused 
F.2.1 Tuberculosis 1 2 8 9 
F.2.2 Other respiratory problems (asthma, bronchitis, pneumonia) 1 2 8 9 
F.2.3 Physically handicap 1 2 8 9 
F.2.4 Problems with sight, hearing or speech 1 2 8 9 
F.2.5 Mental problem 1 2 8 9 
F.2.6 HIV/AIDS 1 2 8 9 
F.2.7 Other sexually transmitted disease 1 2 8 9 
F.2.8 Diabetes 1 2 8 9 
F.2.9 Heart disease 1 2 8 9 
F.2.10 Cancer 1 2 8 9 
F.2.11 Epilepsy or fits 1 2 8 9 
F.2.12 Headaches or migraines 1 2 8 9 
F.2.13 Blood pressure problems 1 2 8 9 




1 2 8 9 
F.3 Do you receive a disability grant? 1 2 8 9 
F.4 Over the past month, have you consumed any alcohol? 1 2 8 9 
Interviewer: Ask WOMEN RESPONDENTS only  
F.3 Do you currently receive a child support grant? 1 2 8 9 
F.4 Are you currently pregnant? 1 2 8 9 
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